Amarji - A Heretic's Blog

On Assad's Visit to Spain: Peeing in the Wind - عن زيارة الأسد إلى إسبانيا: التبول في وجه الريح

2010-07-05T23:12:00.007-04:00

Global media fail to accurately report on Bashar al-Assad's anti-peace statements that he made in Madrid, where he said:

1) "ٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍٍSigning peace agreement does not mean actual peace, but more like a permanent ceasefire."

2) “Should there be peace with Israel, an Israeli Embassy will open in Damascus, but it will be besieged and no one will dare enter.”

3) “Should there be peace with Israel, no tourists will come nor businessmen.”

4) "There will be no popular sympathy for any peace achieved with Israel."

Reading through Assad's statements we can only conclude that a peace deal with Israel will not alter the status quo, so why should Israel return the Golan Heights?

Conclusion: BasharAl-Assad of Syria is either the most stupid peace negotiator in history, or aman who is not interested in peace in any way, or both.

So, Mr. Obama, Mrs. Clinton, are you happy with the fruits of your engagement?

"استبعد الرئيس السوري إمكانية التوصل إلى سلام مع إسرائيل قريبا وأكد أن السلام يعني علاقات طبيعية بين الطرفين وأن توقيع اتفاقية السلام لا يعني تحقيقه، وإنما هو أشبه بوقف إطلاق نار دائم. ونقلت وسائل الإعلام الرسمية وشبه الرسمية عن الرئيس السوري خلال اليوم الأخير في ختام جولته اللاتينية التي شملت زيارة فنزويلا وكوبا والبرازيل والأرجنتين قوله: إن التعاطف الشعبي سيكون معدوما (إذا ما تحقق السلام مع إسرائيل) وسيكون هناك سفارة (إسرائيلية في دمشق) مطوقة لا أحد يجرؤ على دخولها ولا سياح سيأتون ولا تجار."

النتيجة إذاً أن التوصل إلى اتفاقية سلام مع إسرائيل لن يؤدي إلى أي تغيير في الوضع الحالي من وجهة نظرها، إذاً، لماذا ستعيد إسرائيل الجولان؟ خوفاً من الجيش السوري؟ إكراماً لخاطرالأسد؟

الخلاصة: إما أن بشار الأسد هو أغبى مفاوض في التاريخ، أو أنه لايريد السلام، أو الإثنان معاً – وهو المرجح. فهنيئاً لأمة أنجبت بشار الأسد، ورأسته عليها ورقصت فرحة به! وهنيئاً لأوباما وكلينتون على النتائج الإيجابية لانفتاحهما على وحوارهما مع الأسد...

Announcement!

2007-03-18T04:10:00.000-04:00

Well, it finally had to happen, I guess. I have just moved my blog to the Tharwa Community. It can be accessed using the following link:

http://www.tharwacommunity.org/amarji/

I think the move makes some sense in light of the fact that Tharwa is indeed my own project, which I have been slaving over for a few years now. The new site uses Typepad which is a far more developed blogging tool than Blogger. The migration of the content from Blogger to Typepad was somewhat smooth, but there a few glitches that I need to work on iun due course of time. But, anybody with an email can still comment on the blog, so the move will not affect the ease with which we interact.

See you on the new site.

The Dying of Old Damascus!

2007-03-06T19:33:00.000-05:00

Despite ample protests by civil society advocates, current residents and international NGOs, the Syrian authorities are said to move forward with plans to destroy the last pieces of Old Damascus that remain just outside the Old City Walls, especially the area known as Souq al-Manakhliyyah. Should this indeed take place, thousands of Damascene families will be thrown out of their dwellings with little or no compensation, and a piece of history will perish forever. Unless we can bring prompt international attention to this matter, soon there will be nothing to protest, as we will all be faced with a fait accomplit.

This is not the first time that such a measure has been adopted by the Syrian authorities. Indeed, in the early 90s, the Syrian authorities destroyed much of the old dwellings encroaching upon the old dwellings encroaching on the walls of the Umayyad mosque, including the cloister of the famous medieval philosopher Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. Protests came too late at that time as well.

If this trend should continue, soon there won’t be anything truly Damascene about Damascus. The old forest al-Ghouta has been all but completely wiped off, the River Barada, has all but completely dried up, Qasayoun, the simple of its resisting spirit, has long been tamed by squatter settlements, unruly development, and, of course, palaces. And death haunts the Old City itself. Old Damascus, it seems, is following, or, to be more exact, is made to follow, in the footsteps of Old Hama, albeit armed with nothing but whimpers.

It may not be too late, however, to prevent the crowning of this macabre achievement, if we made our protests loud enough and avoided, for the sake of Damascus at least, the overpoliticization of the issue - a pretty strange demand, I admit, coming from me.

This report is based on contact with an old friend who is in a position to know.

Towards a democratic Syria!

2007-02-24T18:52:00.000-05:00

In 1998, only 219 Syrians voted against Hafez Assad's government. One of them was Ammar Abdulhamid. Now exiled and awaiting political asylum in US, Syrian opposition leader talks to Ynet in exclusive interview.

Yitzhak Benhorin

WASHINGTON – In a national referendum held by late Syrian President Hafez Assad in 1998, only 219 people voted against the government. One of them was Ammar Abdulhamid, 40, a Syrian opposition activist, exiled from Damascus in 2005 and currently awaiting political asylum in the United States.

"The security agents give you a paper with a circle saying 'yes' and a circle saying 'no.' I voted 'no', and the person in front of me was shocked. He said, 'Look, you made a mistake. You said 'no' to the president.' He thought I had made a mistake. We expected for some time that somebody would come and say, 'Come with me', but it didn't happen. For 219 people, they didn't give a damn."

In his first interview with an Israeli news agency, Abdulhamid tells Ynet how he frequently took risks, wrote articles against the president and generally pissed off the Syrian administration, until they got tired of him and showed him the door.

In Washington he serves as representative of the National Salvation Front (NSF), a Syrian reform group operating abroad against President Bashar Assad’s regime.

So why didn’t they show him to a prison cell instead of deporting him? Abdulhamid believes it is because his mother was superstar actress Muna Wassef, one of Syrian’s most famous TV celebrities.

“It wasn’t easy to arrest the son of such a famous and popular actress,” he says.

Enemy of the regime

With long brown hair tied back in a ponytail and an easygoing demeanor, Abdulhamid isn’t exactly how one might imagine a Syrian reformist. His English is refined and he demonstrates impressive knowledge. He declares that he doesn’t believe in God and he has no qualms about talking with Israelis.

The first time he left Syria’s borders was in 1986, when he came to the United States to study at the University of Wisconsin. He returned to Damascus in 1994, but after a decade relocated to the US again, this time on a research fellowship at the Brookings Institute in Washington, DC. At the end of the fellowship, he returned to Syria – a rather surprising move considering the vehemently anti-Syrian articles he published while in Washington.

How did you become an enemy of the Syrian regime?

"They told me to leave, over a variety of issues. Apparently the project I was doing was a main issue. It was on majority-minority relations. So I am basically trying to create grassroots dialogue between different sects. I started in 2001, but officially in 2003."

So what did you do that was so wrong that they told you to leave?

"We were accused of fomenting the very thing we were trying to combat, which is sensitivities between the majority and minority. But I think what they are afraid of is these issues being raised at the popular level and being resolved at the popular level because our regime survives by exploiting the fears between the sects."

In 2004 he left for Washington, where he wrote for the English-language Lebanese newspaper the Daily Star. He wrote a joint article with Israeli professor Moshe Maoz on the need to renew the Israeli-Syrian peace process. It was the first time a Syrian and an Israel had written something together which appeared publicly.

Hariri murder was last straw

Despite his severely critical writings, Abdulhamid returned to Syria. He said he didn’t want to make trouble, and even made a commitment to hold his pen and stop writing against the regime. The quiet lasted until the regime arrested a group of Syrian intellectuals, followed shortly thereafter by the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and Abdulhamid could no longer keep quiet.

“I was a loud-mouth, I couldn't control my tongue. When Hariri was assassinated a lot of people started pouring into Syria and asking questions, 'Who did it?' and whatever, I was very clear that I thought the the president was behind it. And I was very clear in calling him a moron in a number of interviews, and I think that was always not a good move. I was in Damascus calling the president of my country, which is a dictatorship basically, a moron.

Why didn't they arrest you?

“Arresting me would have really been problematic, I think. The person who made the decision not to arrest me was Assef Shawkat, head of the Syrian intelligence. You have two problems. One, you are arresting the son of a very famous actress who is very respected in Syria, and who said very clearly at one point, 'I may not necessarily agree politically with what he's saying the whole time, but if anything happens to him, you know, he's my son.'”

After that meeting, Abdulhamid was invited to meet Shawkat, Assad’s brother-in-law, who is suspected to have been thickly involved in Hariri’s murder.

“I had a meeting with Shawkat - my wife insisted on coming with me, so instead of having an interrogation you have a social event, and he tries to sort of contain the situation. I was under a travel ban at the time, so they lifted the travel ban and I promised to stop writing and simply to work quietly.”

But Abdulhamid didn’t keep his mouth shut for long, and the regime started getting tired of him. Soon he found himself on a plane from Damascus with a one-way ticket.

That was probably Syria’s biggest mistake: Back in the US, Abdulhamid became the opposition’s intermediary between the Syrian opposition and the American administration.

“There are about a 100 active dissidents in Syria. The ones who are well known are 15-20 maybe. And I was never one of them… My strategy was, 'Look, I can get you the funding and support your activity so you wouldn't have to deal with the Americans directly or the Europeans or whoever.'”

Together with his colleagues from the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdulhamid founded the National Salvation Front, an umbrella organization of opposition groups working for the democratization of Syria. Former Syrian vice president Abd Al-Halim Khaddam is apparently closely associated with the Front.

What relation do you have with Khaddam, who was part of the corrupt dictatorship?

"He knows a lot of secrets and they are afraid of him. He meets with King Abdullah, he has access to people in the region. He has contacts with people inside the regime as well. Khaddam’s joining is also meant to signal to the regime that we aren’t here for revenge. We aren’t involved in vengeance or in the past. We want to operate like (Nelson) Mandela: We’ll forgive, but we won’t forget. Our faces are to the future.”

What is your stance on Israel?

"The Muslim Brotherhood, by the way, said they prefer a negotiated settlement with Israel. They are not calling for Jihad to return the Golan (Heights). They went public on it, and I was very surprised nobody in the media picked up on it. And the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sadr Al-Din al-Banouni, said it very clearly in an interview on al-Jazeera. This is exactly why we decided we can talk to the Muslim Brotherhood.

"We simply cannot ignore the Islamists. We are talking about change, about democracy, about elections at one point in time. So it's really good to sit down to realize with whom we can talk and how much they can moderate their language, and what sort of deals we can arrive at. Because either we do this or we have two other options: Either we talk to the Islamists and find moderates and work together for change at the risk of being betrayed. The other options are to stick to the status quo but then the status quo cannot hold a lot with the Assads.

"The final analysis is that they are a minority regime, they are dictators, and they are not addressing any of the country's problems … and had they been good, slightly enlightened, I would never be in the opposition. It is much better to work with a slightly enlightened regime than to risk the chaos that comes with change. So we either continue to cooperate with a regime that will continue to abuse the system or we resort to violence ... All we want is support were do not want someone to do the work for us … As long as we are building networks, and we know we are creating realities on the ground, I don't care if it takes ten years.

Why did you agree to do an interview for the Israeli media?

"Many Israelis are wondering whether they should talk to Assad or not. I said at one point they cannot deliver what he wants because sooner or later this regime is going to fall. Because it represents a very small group of people, because it is corrupt, because the economy in Syria is imploding, poverty is rising, the Kurdish-Arab divide is widening, the Sunni-Alawit divide is widening. So sooner or later it is going to pass either peacefully or violently.

"I hope for peace and if it is going to be violent I don't want to have anything to do with it. I really want Bashar to become a genius overnight, I really do. Even if he killed Hariri, I believe that, I am willing to forgive so many things, just to save us a violent solution for the country and to have some sense of reform. We do need to begin tackling the Sunni-Alawit divide because the more they postpone it the more it is going to get violent."

Rosy Scenarios & Regional Realities!

2007-02-20T01:26:00.000-05:00

The Saudis, led by prince Bandar, seems to be doing a really great job trying to break up the HISH Alliance. They are doing this by engaging both the weakest and strongest links in the Alliance. Indeed, and rather than trying to wean the proven hopeless Assads off of their dependence on Iran and Hezbollah, as the pro-engagement crowd in the US was want to do, the Saudis went straight to the source, to the puppet-masters themselves, and showed them the wisdom of divesting themselves from the pesky and troublemaking Assads. In the meantime, they managed to sponsor an important summit in Mecca in which they sponsored a deal between the warring factions in Gaza, and reestablished their patronage over the weakest link in the Alliance – Hamas. Net results, the Assads are once again isolated, and the region might have taken the first real steps towards a compromise that can help most parties involved avert a disastrous and unnecessary showdown.

This is at least the scenario that seems to be unfolding these days, according to the reading of some observers.

In truth, however, it is indeed still too early in the day to celebrate and uncork those champagne bottles. This is not a done deal by far, and there are still plenty of opportunities to sabotage the whole thing. Moreover, the scenario itself does seem to call for some kind of a showdown with the Assads, who seem to be the ultimate losers here. Such a showdown, even if limited, is not going to be a rosy affair.

Let’s briefly explore some of the potential problems that might still lie ahead.

First, just like Ali Khamenei said in his recent meeting with Bashar, the alliance between Syria and Iran is well-nigh three decades old and will prove enduring. As such, the two sides might be staling for time while quietly writing an alternate scenario more suitable to their needs, interests and desires. So, we should just wait and see how things might progress over the next few weeks.

Even should Hezbollah and the March 14 Movement come to an understanding that ends up increasing Shia representation in the government and approving the establishment of the Hariri Tribunal, the adventurous Assads might still have enough wiggling room here to survive. For instance, considering the possibility that the Tribunal might fail to name people like Assef and Maher, the Assads might have the option to stage a failed coup against their villainous selves in which all the chief suspects, other than themselves, end up getting killed (seeing that having these people commit suicide would prove quite the hard sell at this stage).

The Assads will find themselves in a bit of a pickle, however, should the Tribunal end up casting any doubts or aspersions on any one of them. Rather than risking this, the Assads might be willing to risk it all in Lebanon before the Tribunal is approved by continuing to try to inflame the situation, the will and wishes of the Iranians and even Hezbollah notwithstanding. After all, they still have other willing allies and clients in Lebanon, ones which they seem able to mobilize at will (the Syrian Social National Party, radical Palestinian groups, small Islamist movements and cells, notto mention some Shia groups as well, perhaps even factions within Hezbollah). If this should happen, the Saudi-Iranian deal could falter, that is, unless it get reworked somehow in order to allow for some jointly-sanctioned action to take place against the Assads – a pretty complicated feat to accomplish even for the likes of Bandar. But it could happen.

In all cases, don’t expect the Assads to go down without a fight, and the "rosy" scenario with which we are presented is not likely to unfold as smoothly as some might think or wish.

A final problem is the fact that the Israelis, as one can detect from Jackson Diehl’s op-ed in the Washington Post,* may not be happy with the Mecca Accord and might attempt to rally US support to their position, which would, as usual, create enough complications to allow for the entire Saudi-Iranian deal to fall apart with all the disastrous consequences that this could bring.

* “Bush administration policy has been to strengthen Abbas at Hamas's expense; the accord undercut that approach and all but ruined Rice's plan to begin developing a "political horizon" at a meeting with Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert today.

Washington tried to set a couple of red lines for the Mecca talks: Hamas, it said, should be forced to accept international demands that it renounce violence and recognize Israel; and its prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh, should not lead the new Palestinian cabinet. Bandar disregarded both.”

_________

Meanwhile, a friend has just been arrested, and a colleague could soon be stripped of his citizenship as a new form of punishment concocted by the sick minds of the Assads and their lackeys.

The Unreasonable Heretic!

2007-02-17T01:33:00.000-05:00

A friend told me not too long ago that some people tend to find my position on the Assads to be somewhat unreasonable. After all, some of their stands and policies, especially with regard to the peace process and the Arab-Israeli Conflict seem to reflect how the majority of people in Syria and elsewhere in the region and the world feel and think. So why we not support them on these matters? Wouldn't this be the patriotic thing to do, regardless of how we feel about their internal policies?

Not from my perspective. If democracy and development are the things that we care most about, then we simply cannot let the fact that the Assads are robbing the country blind, squandering its scarce resources, mismanaging its affairs and depriving its youths of any real chance at making a decent living and of hope in a better future slip out of our mind, no matter how momentarily. Otherwise, we will continue to fall into that all too familiar trap wherein the national cause is given primacy over all other consideration.

For long we have been told that the national cause comes first, I say democracy and development come first. No, I believe that democracy and development are the real national cause.

So, it does not matter in the least to me if the Assads tend to say or adopt the right rhetoric sometimes, so long as they hold on to power through sham elections, laws and constitutions and the sheer might of their military, there is nothing right or legitimate about them or about anything they do or represent. For all practical purposes we have to consider them as evil, even at the risk of sounding too corny or unreasonable sometimes. That’s the way it should be. People who hold on to power in an absolutist manner do not merit our understanding, our nuanced perspectives and our reasonableness, only our contempt and enmity.

The national interest does not benefit in the least from postponing the struggle for our freedom from oppression, for any reason whatsoever. Freedom comes first.

This emphatic stand of mine, however, should not be misconstrued as signifying some kind of appeal to violence or a willingness to resort to it. No. The Assads are not going to drag me to their depraved level. My personal approach will remain nonviolent in nature, albeit somewhat revolutionary.

___________

Speaking of revolutions, the latest edition of BitterLemons-International has a special on the Arab Blogosphere that features an article by yours heretically, two wonderful fellow bloggers from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and a regional correspondent that I absolutely respect and admire.

So, What’s on My Zune?

2007-02-07T00:50:00.000-05:00

In the second part to the interview with Assads (video, text) Diane Sawyer managed to redeem herself slightly at least by raising the issues of the Hariri investigation and human rights. But hers was still a light approach that allowed our very own spineless version of Mr. Bean, with all the awkwardness and none of the charm, to escape unchallenged with such ludicrous assertion as “We don't have such political prisoners” and “So it's going to be democracy, but according to our standards.” Yeah. But, I wonder what sort of standards would a man whose entire family is mired in blood, oppression and corruption have? Any ideas anyone? I guess they are the kind of standards that allow for a dimwitted eye-doctor-in-waiting to be brought in to replace his late artifacts-smuggling brothels-frequenting brother as the heir apparant (or more likely in this case the heir absolument) of the Presidential throne. Nothing to challenge here, ipparently.

On the other hand, with regard to one of those other unchallenged yet equally ludicrous assertions, namely that Syria is “the main player” in stabilizing Iraq, well, if Syria is indeed such a player in Iraq, and if the Top Lion of Syria indeed fears the domino effect of “the chaos” and “the instability,” as he put it, why aren’t the Assads already doing something about stabilizing the situation in Iraq? Why are they waiting to be approached by the US for talks over Iraq? Are they really afraid of “the chaos” or are they afraid of the American troops? Or they simply unable to do anything about the situation in Iraq, but would like very much for the US to believe that they could, so they could carve a deal for themselves? Tony Badran elaborates this point further in his recent post.

On a different, though definitely related note, Seth Wikas of the Washington Institute, points out in his recent article in the Daily Star, to an often forgotten reality with regard to the Golan: the ambivalent feelings of its indigenous Syrian Druze population with regard to the whole issue of the necessity of return to Syrian sovereignty one hapless day. Indeed, the corruption and authoritarianism of the Assads have created the sort of state that no one in his right mind would like to go back to, which is why I am a fool, and which is why the Assads must go. Before, that is, our best and brightest end p living in Purdue, Indiana, as Mrs. Sawyer so eloquently put it, or, more likely, end up being buried in desperate attempts at trying to eke out some meager yet dignified subsistence in increasingly undignified and undignifying conditions.

And with regard to the Golan, let me point out to some other neglected facts and soon-to-be facts, namely: that much of the land on the Syrian side of the Golan has either already been purchased, at the cheapest possible prices of course, by the sons of bitches of the Syrian regime, who also happen to be the sons of high-ranking government officials, with other choice real estate morsels and tidbits being declared public land, meaning that the state will eventually sell them to the selfsame SOBs and their lackeys when the right time comes. The Syrians of the Golan have the prospect of poverty and fleecing to look forward to when peace finally prevails, that is, if the Assads are the ones to be rewarded with it.

Biladi, biladi, biladi, laki hubbi wa fou'adi. Oh my country, you have my love and my heart.

And I will have nothing to show for it. Ever.

PS. This whole episode has given iPod a bad name, I think, if I were an iPod executive I’d sue. iPersonally, I am switching to Zune, and will stick to classical music, classic rock and New Age, with all due respect to Faith Hill and Shania Twain. Keep on Rockin’ in the Free World! Yeah.

So, What Do You Have On Your iPod?

2007-02-05T21:35:00.000-05:00

Imagine this: you are a well-known TV correspondent and you now have a rare occasion to interview one of the main troublemakers in one of the world’s most turbulent and troubled regions, so, what would you do? What would you ask him about?

Well, I don’t know about you, but Diane Sawyer of ABC News (Video, Text) thought it will be a rather wonderful and congenial idea to give this man a platform from which to attack her country’s democratically elected administration, while ignoring the man’s and his regime’s record in oppressing his own population, dabbling in neighboring countries, and exporting chaos and terror, that is, in being one of the region’s the main domino players for decades.

So, there were no questions about the Hariri Investigation, or the situation in Lebanon, or connection to Iran, the sham referendum that brought him to power, the shame referendum that is designed to keep him in power, and about the fact that many insurgency leaders in Iraq are roaming around free in Damascus and talking to foreign journalists and operating their insurgency TV from Syria, not to mention the continuing crackdown against democracy and human rights advocated in the country. After all who cares about these issues, right? Because what inquiring minds really want to know is what’s on this fucking murderous moron’s iPod. For if it is by any chance Shania Twain and Faith Hill, well then, gee whiz, the man must really be good and wholesome like the milk from grandma’s farm ya all. And we can just to talk to him. After all, he is “the son of the legendary Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad, who negotiated with five American presidents” you know, which is offered as a sign of prestige somehow, rather than a mark of eternal shame.

But then, we Syrians, although we look more modern and secular than most other Arabs (except the Lebanese and Tunisians), are still products of the East to Diane Sawyer, it seems, and, as such, we do somehow expect our leaders to lord over us for a long time, and we just looove it when we they do. The fact that we have a Republican system rather than a monarchical one is not seen as an indication of our desire for a responsible government and a peaceful and regular transition of power. Naah, it’s just an accident of history, a little curiosity, like having Faith Hill on you ipod, or riding a bus in London when you are the son of a Middle Eastern dic-fucking-tator. iPleaaaase.

If the interview was intentionally designed to make this “Basher” of our democratic aspirations look good it would not have done a better job. This was not simply a nice performance by our national thug, who had obviously rehearsed every response this time around and paid more deference to why his hired media goons had told him, this was a seriously poor, unprofessional and moronic performance by the ABC team who set this up, or should we just put sole blame on ABC’s own Dame Edna for this?

And so our village idiot ended up sounding like a statesman, did he? Well, how else should a man sound when he is allowed to make such claims as “We are the main player,” in reference to helping stabilize the situation in Iraq without being challenged on it, and “What good is democracy if you are dead?” without actually being reminded that he had done his best from the very beginning to ensure that death rather than democracy should prevail in Iraq, and he is on the fucking public record on this.

Sure his regime’s survival was at stake. But, you know what?, he is a fucking maniacal dictator, his fears in this regard, albeit natural, are not legitimate. People often confuse the natural and legitimate in this case. The Assads’ reactions are often natural, but always illegitimate. The way they took over and (mis)managed the affairs of the state should stigmatize them for life. And the least that representatives of the democratic media can do when they get the occasion to interview such figures is to bear this simple imperative in mind and to press them on it. You don’t get to interview a dictator only to give him a free pass on all the criminal things that he habitually commits. You don’t give him an easy time of it, just because you happen to hate your own democratically elected president, one who is about to be democratically replaced soon, unlike the dictator you are interviewing, or because you find the opposition unconvincing perhaps. Because as a representative of the free media, it is indeed freedom that should be on your mind, and freedom is the agenda that you should be ultimately serving here, and no other consideration should be allowed to weigh in and dilute the issue. Because when representatives of the free media allow for the dilution of critical issues, what chance does freedom, truth and justice have?

But then again, who cares about all this? What do you have on your iPod? iPray do tell.

Heretical Nuances!

2007-02-04T19:18:00.000-05:00

This is a link to some very interesting interview in Damascus with one of the leaders of the Iraqi Sunni insurgents. It shows very clearly how openly the Assads support the insurgents. Still, I seriously doubt whether this revelation will have much influence over the ongoing debate over engaging the Assads, seeing that pro-engagement groups will point to it as an additional reason for why the US should engage the Assads, while those who stand against engagement will see in it a further evidence of why the Assads should be punished rather than engaged. Meanwhile, the death-toll in Iraq mount and Syria’s economic woes, public denials to this effect notwithstanding, will continue to increase.

Another very telling development is this little statement made by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in an interview with Egyptian dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim:

“We do not hesitate to sacrifice our children in the name of our righteous struggle." The Illustrious Mullah said.

Methinks this has always been the problem with our national and religious heroes – they tend to sacrifice their children rather than themselves for the sake of the cause. I, on the other hand, tend to think that the well-being of my children and their generation is the cause.

Yes, I know, the insistence on fighting on against invaders and oppressors and all sort of injustice does carry an element of real risk for the lives of those who believe in the cause, as well as their family members, their friends, and often even, innocent bystanders who just don’t want to be involved (regardless of whether this attitude is right or wrong moral or immoral), but for ideologues like Nasrallah the risk involved needs often to be made a reality, a reality which they can wield to increase their power. Hence the way his statement was phrased: “We do not hesitate to sacrifice our children in the name of our righteous struggle," instead of saying something like: “We will fight on against injustice and occupation even if there is a risk for ourselves and our families.”

To Engage or Not to Engage!

2007-01-30T00:38:00.000-05:00

I have been repeatedly asked before as to my policy recommendations to the current administrations will be. This statement of mine, which I recently sent for inclusion in the European Parliament file on the Association Agreement with Syria, might be helpful in this regard. My approach might be described as a call for public and conditional engagement that puts everything on the table, including the sensitive issue of political reforms, serious political reforms, ones that begin with general amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles and culminate in free and internationally-monitored parliamentary and presidential elections within an agreed timeframe, no longer than 2 years.

Will the Assads accept such conditions? Not when they think there is room to maneuver. The conflict between the European and American stands vis-à-vis Syria, and between different political current within the various governments concerned, as the divide between the neo-cons and realists, not to mention Republicans and Democrats, in the US amply illustrates, is allowing the Assads much room to maneuver. Coupled with their reinvigorated alliance with Iran, their recent vicarious sense of triumph in the aftermath of Israel’s August Folly in Lebanon, and their continued dabbling in the Palestinian Territories, they are even emboldened now and will not likely settle for anything less than that illusive “perfect deal” that can somehow allow for the indefinite prolongation of the rein of a handful of losers over the affairs of 20 million dehumanized creatures mired in manifest misery. If logic does not militate against this, if the people involved themselves do not rebel, I will. I have nothing better to do with my time, I guess.

Call me a Saint Jude, if you like, or a pretentious asshole even, it does not matter. I don’t pretend to be driven by principle alone, or by principle at all, I just don’t know what else to do. If I knew how I can conduct myself differently and save myself and my family from the troubles that my course of action will bring upon us all, I probably would have taken it. But I don’t. So, there but for the Grace of Whoever, go I…

As for the Assads, this post notwithstanding, it does not matter in the least what the US and the EU will or will not do with them, because their fate, in the final analysis, rests with their people (Sunnis and Alawites alike), and, surface appearances notwithstanding, they are not happy, they are not happy at all.

____________

I have titled my brief intervention in this manner because, despite the fact that I am currently a member of the Syrian opposition, and of the National Salvation Front to be more specific, I have always been a strong advocate of signing the Syrian-European Association Agreement. In fact, considering my 3-year affiliation as a consultant with the Syrian-European Business Center (2001-2004), an initiative sponsored by the MEDA II Program, I have personally been involved in translating and preparing many of the reports and studies intimately related to the Association talks, and I have, therefore, managed to acquire a virtual insider knowledge of the process, the way it was conducted by the Syrian side, and the various pitfalls it encountered before it was finally frozen for lack of serious progress.

More so, I have been invited on a number of occasions to speak, both publicly and privately, to various European delegations visiting the country, or to take part in quiet briefings at a variety of European embassies and ministries, for the sole purpose of discussing the viability of the Association Agreement and its potential contributions to improving the human rights conditions and encouraging political and economic reforms in the country. Throughout all these meetings and briefings, my main argument has been and continues to be that it is indeed quite possible for the SEAA to produce some positive results in this regard provided that the European side did not fail to push hard for a greater emphasis on Article 2 of the Agreement, and to do so in a systematic and methodical manner. That is, the Europeans should ask their Syrian counterparts for a clear timetable for reforms, preferably no longer than 7 years, that begins with a general amnesty allowing for immediate lifting of the Martial laws, in effect since 1963, and for the return of all political exiles, and culminating in free parliamentary and presidential elections.

Naturally, my European counterparts thought that this was a bit too much. But my assessment and recommendations were based on the simple observation that the Assad regime has always proven resilient to change, and that the Assads have always wanted to give themselves enough wiggling room to back down on any promise. It is for this reason that all the economic and administrative reforms that took place since the arrival of Bashar al-Assad to power, as meager and inconsequential as they are, were premised on presidential decrees rather than acts of legislator. This means that Bashar can repeal or reverse any decision he made without having to obtain parliamentary approval, not even for formalities’ sake. In this way, he can avoid any potential “embarrassment” that some truly independent MPs such as Mamoun al-Homsi and Riad Seif can cause. Such temperament and mentality are by no means compatible with the inherent requirements of reform, where the basic ethos calls for a real measure of accountability to popular will.

In the case of Syria, the Madrid and the Barcelona processes dragged on for years and produced no tangible results, in part due to the inability of the Syrian side to commit, as many of the negotiators involved on the European side will undoubtedly attest. The Assad regime is clearly more interested in the process than in the eventual rewards, more interested in maintaining power than in accepting the eventuality that, at one point in time, no matter how far into the future, reform should entail a peaceful transfer of power to a democratically elected alternative. If asking the Assads to reconcile themselves to this possibility is too much, then I think the EU should drop all pretense of interest in democratization and human rights in our part of the world.

But, should we grant that making such an “ambitious” request would have been too much within the geopolitical context of 2001-04, I think the current context argues strongly in favor of such a development now. After all, and despite their continued defiance, the Assads are clearly in a much more precarious position today. They are internationally isolated, and the current administration in the US will brook no possibility for talks with them so long as their behavior remains unchanged. Moreover, they are facing an existential threat of sorts posed by the continuing UN probe into the Hariri assassination, among other heinous developments in Lebanon, of which all indications point to high level involvement on part of the Assads. As such, to resume talks with the Assads at this stage over the signing of the Association Agreement have implications that go far beyond economics. It can indeed provide them with a way out of their diplomatic isolation and some wiggling room with regard to the Hariri investigation that could allow high-ranking members of the regime to escape indictment, without compromising the integrity of the investigation itself, not to mention the sovereignty of Lebanon.

If this is the reward that the Assads expect to reap, if this is the reward that the EU is willing to help provide, then the asking price must be high enough to be commensurate with it.

The European Parliament should make a clear and public call on the Assads to commit to a timetable of specific political and economic reforms in exchange for the signing of the Association Agreement and for a mediation role with regard to Syria’s relations with the United States, and the issue of the Golan Heights. The ball should be sent back where it belongs at this stage in the courts of Syria’s rulers. They should be obliged to earn their way out through serious and far-reaching reforms not through blackmail, assassinations, crackdowns and strong arm tactics.

If they cannot deliver on this, then the world has no choice but to reconcile itself to the necessity of their continued isolation. Meanwhile, the Assads, and by turning their back on a public offer of support in exchange for reforms will have been exposed to their people not as heroes of the national resistance, but as dictators interested only in maintaining their power regardless of the cost involved for the people.

Meanwhile, European officials should relinquish that long-standing and unfortunate assumption that dictators can somehow deliver on stability in the region. Nothing could be any farther from the truth. In fact, dictators always need an outlet for the pent-up rage, frustration and violence in their societies, for this reason, they will always export instability to neighboring countries and will always be locked in an internecine territorial feuds. This is what lies behind the Hariri assassination, this is what lies at the heart of Syrian official duplicity in abusing the oil-for-food program and encouraging insurgents in Iraq today, and this is why the Assads will continue to be one of the region’s worst troublemakers for as long as they exist.

But, if the events of the 9/11 have taught us anything, if the various terrorist attacks in Europe have demonstrated anything, and if the continuing waves of legal and illegal migration to the West prove anything, it’s that our region’s problems have long been globalized, we are not the only people who will suffer as a result of the authoritarian, corrupt and inept policies of our leaders, the world will suffer along with us. Indeed, the Assads are as much Europe’s problem as they are ours, and their current tactics are as detrimental to Europe’s interests as they are to ours. It is for this reason that Europe cannot afford to look weak and confused in their stands and policies vis-à-vis the Assads, and it is for this reason that they need to send a clear message to the effect that if the Assads want Europe’s help in saving their hides, they need to learn how to be nice and civilized both to their own people as well as to their neighbors.

____________

This is a link to an excellent article by Guy Taylor, I am quoted somewhere near the end:

“Bashar is not simply a Ba’athist thug,” argues Ammar Abdulhamid, a Syrian author who has lived in the Washington, D.C., area since last year, when, he says, he left Syria after being threatened for criticizing the regime in print. “He is a member of a family that has imposed itself on the country and that conducts policy for its own purposes.” According to Abdulhamid, who now voices his opinions on the English-language blog amarji.blogspot.com, these circumstances mean that the “mafias of the ruling elite” try to co-opt anyone pushing for reform in Syria. “We’re talking about the Internet, but the same rules apply for any reformers,” he said. “Either you get neutralized, you get destroyed, or you get sucked into the game.” Assad, Abdulhamid added, “is part of the game.”

A Heretic in the Spotlight!

2007-01-28T03:29:00.000-05:00

Ammar Abdulhamid of the Tharwa Foundation

Awareness, activism, empowerment, and education. These goals of the Tharwa Foundation are what direct its tireless efforts to develop and strengthen Muslim communities throughout the Mideast. The institution's Director, Ammar Abdulhamid, explains that one of the ultimate objectives is for individuals to make greater political strides, becoming more involved in their governments' futures, and to personally define what they expect from their fellow countrymen and themselves. This Maryland-based non-profit acts as the mechanism to help thousands of Muslims highlight cross-culture commonalities and set aside divergent ideologies. In operation since 2001, the Tharwa Foundation has outlined a number of exciting proposals, such as the Tharwa Institute for Leadership and Tharwa Radio & TV, to launch its business capabilities to the next level. Learn more about the foundation and how you can become part of its ever-growing movement in this week's Non-Profit Spotlight... More.

The Heretic & the Cause!

2007-01-24T20:33:00.000-05:00

I never really had high expectations for the American venture in Iraq, because I have always known that the challenges of modernization and democratization are too enormous to be handled in such manner. Indeed, I do not believe in quick fixes and shortcuts when it comes to such major social transformations. There is no way around the mountain (or the abyss) for us in order to get to the other side, albeit it’s quite understandable that we should hope and pray for one. For the alternative is to do what others have done: go through hell in order to get what we want, what we think we deserve and are entitled to.

But then, some experiences cannot be had for free or on the cheap. All civilized peoples have had to pay dearly for their freedom and their democracy, and so will we. Democracy is not a cure-all, still we need it. It is not cheap, still, we have to get it even if we had to pay with our own blood for it, as we probably will, as we indeed are.

The debate over democracy might be over in some camps, true, but it hasn't yet really begun in the main ones – our streets, our minds, our psyches, our deeper recesses. So don’t count democracy out so soon. Just don’t expect us to get fucked, get pregnant then give birth all in the span of a solitary month!

The US adventure in Iraq and the region has clearly showed us that dictators are mere manifestations of our real problems, that our sectarianism is intrinsic and deadly, that bottom feeders are numerous and murderous and that our social and state structures are all too fragile. Yet, for all this, we need to change. If anything US failure underscores our deep and intrinsic need for change.

So, and while some insist on seeing in the US failure in Iraq (and the region) an ultimate failure for the cause of change and democratization in the region, I see it as the end of an unfortunate distraction and of a unique, though perhaps unnecessary, learning opportunity (at least for those of us who invested themselves in it even while knowing that it cannot possibly succeed). Now we can go back to the real business at hand, the business that only we can and should conduct. If the US, whether under a Democratic or Republican administration, wants to remain relevant to this business, it can always support us. This is what we have wanted all along anyway, the US support of the cause, not its hijacking of it.

Heretical Grief!

2007-01-23T18:43:00.000-05:00

The reasons why I left the US in 1994 and went back to Syria after a 9-year long absence are many, but one of the contributing factors was the fear of losing one or both of my parents while I was abroad. This fear stemmed from two facts: I lost my paternal grandmother who doubled as my nanny really when I was studying in the Moscow in 1984, and all the phone calls that I made in 93-94 to my parents featured announcements of someone close dying: my step grandfather, my younger uncle (a gregarious life-embracing fellow – by far my favorite uncle), and two close family friends, one of whom, the late Syrian actor Yusuf Hanna, was like a second father to me. Not wanting to face another such loss while abroad, I chose to get back to Syria and stay there so I can deal with whatever loss as it happens and be there for those who need me, in both body and spirit, and so that I can take in the loss as well. After all, the passing of my grandma was something that haunted me for many years, my mind kept on treating her as though she was still alive and waiting for me back in her old-style Damascene house hugging Mount Qasayoun.

But then, when my father passed away in 2004, and though I was there for him throughout all his final night on earth, it didn’t feel like I was really there at all, not for him anyway. The vacant look in his eyes should have told me that he was dying, and should have compelled me to stay next to him and chat with him about anything and everything, but it did not. I just checked on him every now and then, throughout that night, taking a small nap in between, and allowing myself to be fooled by the look of recognition in his eyes and the smile that got painted on his face each time I entered his room. He was dying, and I did not want to see it. To top it off, next day noon, I left his side and went to the office, leaving him to the loving care of my mother and Khawla. A couple of hours later I received a call from Khawla telling me that they need me back, I didn’t ask why. I didn’t think why. But I soon learned that my father had passed away. So, I wasn’t really there after all, was I?

Still, when I think of my father these days, and it’s only natural that I should think of him at this point in time, after all January 17 marks the anniversary of his passing (not to mention my anniversary with Khawla), I have no delusions that he is still alive – I know he is gone, I can feel the void. Is that what it means to be there, or almost there?

Perhaps indeed this is the best that can be achieved in the face of such loss. Which, somehow, means that I am now back to square one, having left Syria once again, no matter how involuntary.

This morning, there was another phone call and a brief announcement. A maternal aunt has passed away. Ghada Wassef, 55, a small time actress, diabetic, overweight, gregarious, life-embracing, people’s person, helpful, kind, definitely my favorite aunt, passed away in her sleep due to kidney failure. She had already been admitted to a hospital on the previous day for a sudden increase in blood sugar, a routine occurrence in her case, just as death is part of life’s daily routine, I guess.

And I wasn’t there for her, or for that increasingly lonely mother I left behind. This is another facet of exile with which I have to deal. I can never be there to anyone anymore. Not that being there was any help, to others that is.

I am one of thousands in this situation, I know, yet this knowledge does not matter in the least. My choices in life will continue to bedevil and haunt me, and everyone around me for the rest of my life, and perhaps beyond - an enduring legacy of pain and abandonment. When will they ever make a difference, I wonder, or at least begin haunting those who deserve to be thus haunted?

Will my choices in life ever be justified, or do I have to stumble on blindly to my last days hoping that the path, semi-chosen if not self-inflicted, is, somehow by some reasonable standard of decency, right?

Notes on a New Scandal – in Iraq!

2007-01-22T19:16:00.000-05:00

The situation is getting more serious by the day for the Syrians in Iraq, as many refugees live hand to mouth and spend their time moving from one willing friend’s place to another for safety as the hunt and the raids continue.

Today a new sign of coordination between Syrian and Iraqi security in this regard surfaced when the two sons of one of the most visible Syrian refugees and opposition members in Iraq, Muhammad Bakkur, were arrested in Hama in central Syria. Omar and Sufian had returned to Syria in 2003 following the US-led invasion of Iraq, the Syrian authorities had allowed at the time for a handful of refugees to return home as part of their campaign to polish the image of the regime. Their arrest today denotes the Assads’ growing confidence, defiance and possible coordination efforts with Iraqi counterparts. No wonder Talibani is calling on the US to engage them. The Assholes of the world have always had a pretty good sense as to when it behooves them to unite. This all too unfortunate tendency, it seems, has allowed the Assads to get back to their old habit of hunting opposition figures wherever they are allowed to reach. Failing that, revenge against more easily accessible family members is in vogue again. This should give much food for thought for people in my position, I guess.

On a related note, attacks on Palestinian refugees in Baghdad took place yesterday as well, which makes one has to wonder: first Syrians and now Palestinian refugees, is a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing unfolding in Baghdad? If so, where will it lead? What’s Maliki’s government role in all of this? And what potential backlash could there be among the wider Sunni community (considering that all these refugees are almost exclusively Sunni)? Indeed, the re-engineering of Baghdad into clearly demarcated Sunni/Shia cantons have been taken place for a while now, with some success. Could this trend be part of it?

Should the Sunnis in the region perceive themselves as the target of some organized ethnic cleansing in Iraq, and considering recent developments elsewhere in the region where Sunnis were on the losing end (Afghanistan, Somalia, Gaza, etc.), the implications of such perception for the Global War on Terror and regional stability are very serious indeed.

Infelix Vates.

Blood & Circumstance!

2007-01-18T18:29:00.000-05:00

The attacks on Syrian refugees in Iraq are increasing by the day, scores have been killed so far, and dozens have been rendered homeless or under arrest as terrorists. The campaign is being justified by the Maliki government as a crackdown on terrorists, but these refugees have been in Iraq for decades having been driven out from Syria by their ideological and personal differences with the Assads. As such they have no reason whatsoever to collaborate with the Assads to bring about any instability in Iraq. Indeed many of them are organized opposition members. Some are in fact affiliated with the National Salvation Front.

Coming at this particular point in time, following Iraqi president Jalal Talabani’s trip to Syria and his meeting with his Syrian counterpart among other top Syrian officials, and following the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on security between Syrian and Iraqi officials, the current bloody crackdown is prompting many Syrian Iraqis to see a potential connection here, and the outlines of a sinister plot against them. Indeed, are Iraqi security and military officials helping the Syrian regime settle some old scores with Syrian opposition members in Iraq? While it is difficult answer this question with any certainty, the fact that the Assad regime refuses to allow these Syrian refugees back to their motherland at a time when virtually hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees are allowed to flood Syrian cities tend to give credence to this perception.

But this situation shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone. In fact, and regardless of the accuracy of this perception at this stage, arrangements like these, ones that will allow for the silencing of opposition members even beyond Syria’s borders, are indeed the kind of quid pro quos that engagement with the Assads is bound to produce. This is exactly the kind of price that the Assads will demand. An agreement with the Assads will need to be signed in blood, Syrian blood, Iraqi blood, Palestinian blood, Lebanese blood, American blood.

No, this is not meant to exonerate America from its own responsibility with regard to the current bloodletting in Iraq, but it merely seeks to underscore that correcting one bloody policy cannot take place by advancing another. This is what got us into this mess to begin with. The only way forward is to actually proceed forward not roll the clock back to some “magical time” when realist policies turned a blind eye on the various acts of repression and mayhem that regimes, such as the Assad’s, unleashed on their people. This world has grown too small for a policy of willful blindness to go unpunished for long. The world these days seems to allow at least this one certainty.

Talking Lions! Walking Snails!

2007-01-16T12:41:00.000-05:00

With regard to the current controversy generated by the revelations in Haaretz of secret talks between Israeli and Syrian representatives spread out over a 2-year period between mid 2004 and mid 2006, I would like to make the following points:

* I was indeed aware of the early efforts and contacts made to hold talks between Syrian and Israeli representatives in Madrid. If anything, the year of 2004 was the year for quiet overtures between the two governments, and I had already commented on my always-and-forever independent part in such endeavors earlier. I had nothing to do with this particular initiative, however, and am really surprised that the talks did last for as long as they did and produced an actual “agreement.”

* The denial by Syrian officials that such talks did indeed take place, and the reaction of so many people commenting on this news in a variety of Arabic forums and websites, if anything, serve to demonstrate the validity of the arguments I made in my recent article in the Forward, namely: that peace with the Assads at this stage would be tainted, and that the Assads are quite aware of that. For this reason, the Assads will talk the talk, but they will not walk the walk. So, if this leak to the Haaretz was meant to show that the Assads mean business, to me, the reactions to it perfectly illustrate why they can’t.

Notes from a Conference!

2007-01-13T15:06:00.000-05:00

* You can always hold our leaders to their words, for they always speak in good faith, right until they act in bad one.

* In our region, if not the world, everyone holds everyone else by the balls, no one is in the habit of keeping one’s hand to oneself, for we perennially covet what our neighbor has, even when he is not so well-endowed.

* Our national disease is that we are all so poor in spirit.

* I see hope as I see life – as a condemnation, a prison sentence, a necessary evil which I have to endure until release comes, be it in the form of death or insanity.

* We have long reached the point where we have to divest ourselves of all leaders, national and religious, and burn the whole lot of them, and not only in effigy. It is about time that our leaders tasted some of the suffering they have been inflicting upon us.

* Moderation is not an ultimate virtue, and should not be embraced as such. There is no ultimate virtue. We are all too lacking, all too human, to dabble with ultimates. But then, perhaps that’s why we are so obsessed with this kind of dabbling.

* Moderation is not a virtue in itself. Nothing is virtuous in itself.

* Moderation is a means towards an end, if it cannot deliver, it should not be embraced.

* Virtue is always utilitarian even when people think and claim that it isn’t.

* You don’t do the right thing because it is the right thing, you do it because you’re getting something out of it, even if only your peace of mind.

* Moderation is often a veil used by the most self-righteous Machiavellian elements among us to hide the true nature of their designs, not to mention their duplicity and their cowardice.

* Under authoritarianism there is no virtue, and moderation is a crime.

* I may not win my freedom or find the desired justice in the here-and-now, but I should start fighting for them and always push for their fulfillment in the here-and-now, otherwise the fight will never begin, and they will ever be fulfilled.

* Freedom and justice temporarily deferred are freedom and justice forever deferred.

* We will never be ready for democracy unless we begin experimenting with it.

* I shall strive to balance between my choice of means and the nature of my desired ends. But I should still keep my options open, and my enemy guessing.

* Sometimes, when the fire is so big and threatening, you have no choice but to fight it with more fire.

A Not So Heretical Consensus!

2007-01-09T02:19:00.000-05:00

For long time, people who read this blog tended to classify some of my views as reflections of some personal isolated stands, unique only to certain members of the opposition, especially outside of Syria. This, however, is not simply inaccurate, it is downright false.

In reality, Syrian opposition groups, working inside and outside the country, have long adopted certain united stands on many of the issues involved in the struggle for change in Syria. Indeed, ever since the appearance of the Damascus Declaration on the scene and the formation of the National Salvation Front, the political discourse of Syria’s better organized oppositional coalitions has indeed been harmonized. Whether this was done by a careful act of coordination, by an independent assessment of certain realities on the ground, or by a combination of both is something worth wondering about since it might help US officials adopt a better strategy for dealing with Syria in the near future.

Indeed, and by way of connecting certain long-neglected dots, let’s remind here of a certain forgotten sequence of events.

First came the Damascus Declaration, a document authored and adopted by a variety of internal opposition groups and figure, calling for regime change in order to save the country from the adventurist policies of the Assad regime. Then came the formation of the National Salvation Front which subscribed to the Declaration. Third came a conference in Washington D.C. organized by the Syrian National Council, a US-based opposition group. The conference was unique in that it managed to bring several well-known signatories of the Damascus Declaration to take part in it the go back to Syria and communicate with the rest of the signatories. Other notable figures from the Damascus Declaration joined the conference by phone, including Riad Seif (mere days after his release from prison), Walid al-Bunni and Suhair al-Atassy. The fourth step happened a month later when the Syrian National Council threw its lot with former Syrian VP Abdul Halim Khaddam and Muslim Brotherhood leader, Ali Sadreddine al-Bayanouni, and formed the National Salvation Front.

Now, all that is left to connect all these dots in order to form a harmonious sensible whole is to bring to attention the fact that the various points that have been elaborated by me in my recent two articles have just been elaborated again in a new statement (Arabic) recently released by the Damascus Declaration. The statement condemns the regime’s adventurist policies that made the country get stuck in the bottleneck with no way out in sight, they warn against the regime’s pro-Iran policies, and warn against the regime’s false interest in peace with Israel etc.

So, what does this mean? Simple: the views often elaborated here do not reflect the personal views of some adventurist, as some might paint me, but the consensus of some of Syria’s most respected opposition figures and most organized opposition coalitions both inside and outside the country. As such, and as US policymakers continue to wrangle over the best policy course that needs to be adopted vis-à-vis Syria, the views often elaborated here do warrant serious consideration.

The Year of Living Farcically!

2007-01-02T01:48:00.000-05:00

The year of 2006 has been quite a strange one indeed. But then any year that starts with the defection of a Khaddam, the long time VP of an embattled regime, and ends with the execution of a Saddam, the father of all VIPs of a fallen one, is just bound to be strange I guess.

But no, there is a quality here that goes beyond the strange and the bizarre and right down into the tragicomic, if not even the farcical.

For this year witnessed the transformation, nay, the transmogrification, of our long established national charlatans and villains, both alive and recently hanged, into long-awaited national saviors and saintly heroes, sometimes reluctantly but often wholeheartedly and popularly endorsed. And we all fell into the trap of this endorsement by aligning with this or that set of equally questionable figures on our increasingly impoverished and farcical political scene, often with eyes wide shut, or blindfolded more likely with fear, ignorance, wishful thinking and too many vested interests, real and/or imagined, material and/or psychological, in the potential outcome, and sometimes with eyes wide open, pried open in fact, perhaps for the very aforesaid motives.

In this regard, I lay no claim to innocence and seek no refuge in any alleged good intentions on my part. Such defensive stratagems are nonsensical, inconsequential and often even dishonest. After all, in popular imagination and perception, - and where else is politics played out? - we are all tainted now, the idealists and well-intentioned more so than any others. Attempts at self-defense and justification are but exercises in futility at this stage.

Therefore, the only assertion I will make in this regard is that I have long known that the odds have always been more in favor of such disastrous development than any other. The quality of the decision-makers involved on all sides was and continues to be just too mediocre for one to expect a different outcome, and popular awareness and understanding of the issues involved continues to be flawed and hostage to the whims and influences of a myriad unscrupulous characters, and to the undying lure of certain popular myths, beliefs and misconceptions. Meanwhile, the challenges that we face, political, social, economic and developmental, remain much too enormous than most people are willing to acknowledge. As such the proposed solutions, no matter how realistic, moderate, reasonable and pragmatic they appear to be, have always tended to fall much too short of what is required to make even the smallest adjustment in the disastrous course that lies ahead.

To say that the fate of so many hundreds of millions of people is at stake here does not appear as a romantic exaggeration to me, but a downplayed reality that is coming back to haunt us all with every passing day.

This is probably why I ended up venturing into this “gamble”, because it is really not a gamble at all as far as I am concerned. From where I stand, the way our various plans and schemes are unfolding seems to reflect a certain inevitability (albeit in objective socio-historical rather than metaphysical terms) than a gamble, calculated or not. In other words, I can see no way out of or around the looming and potentially disastrous confrontation, necessitated by the global clash of values, expectations (mostly consumerist in nature) and deeply held beliefs (mostly medievalist in basic ethos and outlook). In fact, everything that we do at this stage seems destined to help chart our path right into the thick of it, perhaps not as fast as some of us dread, but definitely not as a slow as many of us would like to think.

With America’s increasing troubles in the region, the continuing reaffirmation of sectarian identities there, and the new sense of legitimacy now ascribed to the positions and persons of national leaders and spokesmen of the new resistance doctrine, indeed, with the popular adoption of the concept of stand-off as a necessary and sufficient victory in the political discourse and popular awareness, the sun of this long period in the East and West is now about to set. What world will emerge out of the inevitable darkness is anyone’s guess.

So, how can we, the foolhardy few who still think that they can and should compete for the role of “national” saviors where it counts, on the grounds and in the face of all odds, and not necessarily, if at all, in popular imagination (where the battle will, for the foreseeable future at least, be always won by thugs and charlatans) manage a conflict that will take place in the darkest recesses of our minds and souls, not to mention our actual streets and neighborhoods? The only real strategy that can be recommended, it seems, is one of continuous experimentation with various approaches and mechanisms until we stumble, one hapless day, upon the most effective and viable ones.

Meanwhile, the least of our risks and worries should be how we will end up being labeled, not to mention often used and always abused by the various forces competing in our midst. For this, too, is inevitable. More importantly though, this happens to be a two-way street. Indeed, with careful planning, we could do some labeling and using of our own and, if we are not careful, we could even do some abusing. After all, playing god or savior is never a safe exercise, and the risk of falling under the delusion of self-ascribed grandeur is much greater than any other in this particular venture.

Indeed, caught between the fear and ignorance of most segments of our peoples, the corruption and authoritarian predilections of our rulers, and the constant profiteering and ignorant dabbling of external powers, we, the liberal reforming democrats (or however we choose to label ourselves these days) risk something that is much more serious than loss and defeat, we risk becoming part and parcel of the very destructive mechanisms that are currently at play in our midst.

In order to avoid falling into this particular trap myself, or, to be more specific, in order to climb out of it while there is still time, I should probably focus over the next few weeks and months into making some necessary course corrections. Course corrections, I said, not about-faces or jumping-ships or turning-on-dimes, I am neither a political gymnast nor a career oppositionist, I am just a heretic in search of relevance, belonging and peace of mind at continuingly troubling and often farcical times.

Facilis descensus Averno.
(The descent to hell is easy)

Assad’s Olive Branch Can Bear No Fruit!

2006-12-27T23:45:00.000-05:00

Ammar Abdulhamid Fri. Dec 29, 2006
Forward Forum

According to an article in Time magazine this month, I am the central figure in some cockamamie plot to overthrow the Syrian government. The plan, apparently, is to undermine Bashar al-Assad’s regime through the ballot box, starting with the parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2007.

But as every Syrian knows, these elections tend to be quite staged and inconsequential. Perhaps the American officials who concocted the classified plan for regime change believed they could make it appear more credible by assigning a primary role to a dissident like myself. No one, however, could exude the kind of aura needed to cover the naiveté of the proposed scheme.

If nothing else, this half-baked plot exposes how much the United States is struggling to develop a coherent policy toward Syria. Washington is clearly unable to grasp the reality on the ground, both in Syria and across the Middle East — and nowhere is this disconnect more visible than in the naive insistence, by the Iraq Study Group and others, on linking progress in Iraq to the revival of Syrian-Israeli peace talks.

If Israel returns the Golan Heights to Syria, the advocates of this line argue, the Assad regime will become more agreeable to helping the United States in Iraq and to reining in Hezbollah and Hamas. But little consideration is given, at least officially, to the fact that Assad may not be in a position to help achieve any of these things once the United Nations’ investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri is completed.

This open secret has led many to believe — with ample justification — that despite the Iraq Study Group’s emphasis on obliging Damascus to abide by all relevant U.N. resolutions, the Assad regime will ultimately be rewarded with a free pass on the Hariri assassination. Indeed, there is an implicit acknowledgement among all advocates of talks with Assad that the regime’s real interest lies more in killing the Hariri investigation than in retrieving the Golan. But since this matter cannot be acknowledged publicly by either Damascus or Washington, returning the Golan is made out to be a key to solving the region’s problems.

Why, some might ask, should Israel care about all this, if in the end it gets something out of the deal — such as the containment of Hezbollah and Hamas?

For one, it is not really clear that Damascus actually can deliver in this regard, seeing that the real financial backer here is Iran. So, unless the Assad regime suddenly becomes willing to turn against Iran, it is unlikely to cause a serious break in the flow of arms and funds to Lebanon and Gaza.

No matter how desirable this turnaround might seem in the eyes of American and Israeli policy-makers, it remains an unlikely course of action for Assad. The alliance between the two regimes dates back to the early days of the Iranian revolution, and the security and economic dimensions of the relationship have been developed for years.

Iran invests hundreds of millions of dollars in Syria, and annual bilateral trade tops a billion dollars. More importantly, Iranians have been able to heavily infiltrate the Syrian security apparatuses, to the point where Tehran has the ability to manipulate existing differences among different members of the Assad family. Today, Iran is both a security threat and a lucrative business partner to the Syrian regime — and both sides are well aware of it.

The fact that Iran has so much influence on the Assad regime likely means that Iranian concerns would filter into talks between Israel and Syria. Considering the nature of relations among Iran, Israel and the United States at the moment, it is not at all clear that diplomacy with Damascus would be productive.

And that’s not all that could hamper Damascus’s ability to achieve peace. There is the Assad regime’s growing nationalistic jingoism, as well as the fact that the ruling Alawites represent less than 10% of Syria’s population. And, of course, there’s the ongoing Hariri investigation.

This might mean that even if Damascus does agree to sit at the negotiating table — which itself is far from a given — discussions could drag on due to the Assad regime’s inability to commit to specific concessions. Any concession to Israel, or to the United States, would likely be held against the regime by its domestic critics, meaning that Assad would be hard pressed to settle for anything less than a perfect deal.

Indeed, it was just such an impossible quest that made then-president Hafez al-Assad — who was a far more credible and pragmatic leader than his son — walk out on talks with President Clinton in 2000. How reasonable, then, would it be to expect that the embattled Bashar Assad will accept what his respected and feared father could not? One need only look at how the younger Assad has tried to appropriate Hezbollah’s perceived victory in Lebanon to grasp that at this stage, he is more interested in burnishing his militant credentials than his diplomatic ones.

Yet even if Assad were to sign a peace treaty with Israel — which, again, seems rather hard to imagine at the moment — such a deal would almost certainly be viewed as tainted by most Syrians. Any concessions made to the Jewish state would be portrayed by critics of the regime as Assad preserving his power at the expense of the national interest.

What exactly this would mean for the future of Syria is hard to say, but one can get a pretty good idea by looking next door, in Iraq and in Lebanon. With communal lines being drawn ever darker, the minority Alawites’ rule in Syria is far from guaranteed.

As such, peace with Assad may not necessarily mean peace with Syria. Indeed, a peace treaty might not even outlive the regime. So unless Israel, the United States and the international community are willing to assume the role of protector, it is unlikely that peace with an Assad-ruled Syria will prove enduring. Syria cannot make peace with anybody, least of all Israel, until it first makes peace with itself.

Ammar Abdulhamid, a Syrian blogger and author, was forced into exile in 2005 for criticism of the Assad regime. He is founder of the Tharwa Foundation, an independent initiative focusing on diversity issues in the Middle East, and is a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy.

Is Dialogue with Iran and Syria Worth It?

2006-12-25T22:26:00.000-05:00

Ammar Abdulhamid
(Spanish, Russian, French, German, Czech, Chinese, Arabic)

Despite frequent claims to the contrary, the fundamental problem in the Middle East is not intervention by the West. On the contrary, the real problem is that, for all their dabbling, the Western powers seem capable of neither war nor dialogue. This leaves everyone in the region at the mercy of the Middle East’s oppressive regimes and proliferating terrorists.

Advocates of the Iraq war lacked an understanding of the complexities on the ground to wage an effective war of liberation and democratization. As a result, their policies merely ended up eliminating Iran’s two major regional rivals: the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regime. This presented Iran with a golden opportunity to project itself as a regional hegemon, and Iran’s leaders are unlikely to let this opportunity slip away.

Advocates of dialogue with the Iranians and their Syrian allies, like former United States Secretary of State James Baker, labor under the delusion that they can actually reach an understanding that can enable a graceful US exit from Iraq and help stabilize that wounded country. The delusion is based on two false assumptions: that the Iranians and the Syrians can succeed in Iraq where the US has failed, and that the international community can afford to pay the price of ensuring their cooperation.

True, Syria and Iran are playing a major role in supporting Iraqi insurgents, and Syria is still encouraging the trafficking of jihadists and weapons across its borders with Iraq. But the idea that these activities can be halted at will is naïve.

For one thing, the interests of the Shia communities in Iraq and Iran are not the same. Iraqi Shia have never accepted Iranian dictates, and many took part in Saddam’s war against Iran in the 1980’s. After all, the Iraqi Shia are Arabs, and if they are now willing to coordinate their activities with their Persian counterparts, their main goal will always be to secure an independent course as soon as possible, even while they carry on with their internecine disputes within Iraq. Iran is in no better position than the US to convince them to resolve their differences.

President Basher al-Assad of Syria faces a similar dilemma. Although he has opened Syria’s border to jihadists and has allowed Saddam’s supporters to operate freely there, that choice may not be entirely his. Syria’s aid to Saddam in maneuvering around the United Nations’ oil-for food program brought Iraqi money to inhabitants of the border region, who have always been closer in customs, dialect, and outlook to their Iraqi neighbors than to their fellow Syrians. In the absence of government investment, local inhabitants’ loyalty went to Iraqi Baathists who helped improve their lot. Indeed, even local security apparatuses have been unwilling to comply with dictates from Assad and his clique to seal the borders.

In these cirumstances, neither Syria nor Iran seems capable of delivering anything but mayhem in Iraq. What, then, would the proposed dialogue between the US and these states achieve other than continue to empower their corrupt yet ambitious regimes?

The story gets more complicated when one considers the UN inquiry into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. Assad wants nothing more than to see this affair forgotten – and the proponents of dialogue think that they can give him what he wants in the hope of breaking Syria’s alliance with Iran.

But that is merely another erroneous (not to mention amoral) assumption. The alliance between Syria and Iran dates back more than two decades, and was explicitly reaffirmed by the two ruling regimes as recently as January 2005. Indeed, the two regimes are now joined at the hip. Assad’s recent refusal to attend a summit in Tehran with his Iranian and Iraqi counterparts was a mere tactical move designed to appeal to the proponents of dialogue.

In fact, Iran has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Syria, and annual bilateral trade tops a billion dollars. Irani’s growing influence over the Syrian security apparatus is well established, and Iran is funding an effort to create Syrian Shia militias to compensate for Assad’s sagging support in the army and in the minority Alawite community.

Assad cannot turn his back on all of this. No deal would be sweet enough, even if it included the return of the Golan Heights. For Assad and his supporters, survival is more important than sovereignty.

Still, to read the well-known names of commentators and policymakers who are recommending engaging Syria and/or Iran is a testament to how inconsequential and cut off the Western powers have become from the realities on the ground in the world’s most turbulent region. That, it seems, is the price of their arrogance.

Ammar Abdulhamid is a Syrian author, blogger and dissident. He runs the Tharwa Foundation, an independent initiative that focuses on diversity issues in the region.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.

The Rhoids!

2006-12-23T00:18:00.000-05:00

So here I was crouching head-down on my belly in the Doctor’s chair, my ass hoisted in the air in a very un-reassuring position for a shy reclusive and heretical buttocks, when it suddenly hit me, no, not the intrusive instruments of the doctors perianal conspiracy, but the sudden realization that the problems with my ass, if memory served me correctly, seem to have come about around the same time as my problems with my Assads, which, indeed, made perfect sense to me, seeing that all involved are indeed full of shit.

But then my realization went deeper than that when I remembered that I can actually date my first serious bout of hemorrhoidal pain and bleeding back to the early days of the US-led invasion of Iraq. I, then, had a series of “dry runs” coinciding nicely with my first stint at Brookings in mid 2004. But, and beginning in mid January 20005, things went down hill and colon upon my return to Damascus, with the onset of that long period of incessant interrogations by Syria’s various security apparatuses, and my incessant defiance thereof. Consequently, a surgery became necessary in April - the bleeding stopped - a death-threat inevitable in June -the throbbing pain came back - and exile a relief in September - the bleeding of anus and soul returned, and never looked back.

My bleeding is but a reflection of the turbulence around and within me, my anus a barometer. This world is going indeed to shit, and, if some had their way, so will my life.

The latest ramification of the Time’s article is the embellishment in an Arabic site run by another troubled Syrian soul in exile, a journalist and a graduate of the Syrian prison system who have developed his own unique way of coping with his own growing disillusionment with the Syrian regime and his own messianic predilections, Nizat Nayouf. His way allows him to quote “widely knowledgeable sources” in Syria, while maintaining a semblance of objectivity and stating that their claims "are rather difficult to verify." indeed. The “widely knowledgeable sources” in Syria claim that I am a triple agent of sorts playing all sides, including the US Administration, the regime and the NSF, and that I have secretly recorded NSF meetings, and sent the recordings to the Presidential Palace in my Damascus, through my mother, the well-known actress Muna Wasssef who, naturally, is very "close to the Palace."

The source also identifies the Tharwa Project as the vehicle of the US conspiracy, albeit it admits that our funding initially came from a Dutch organization connected, according to "widely knowledgeable sources" in the Netherlands this time around, to the Protestant-Jewish lobby.

In fact, however, I never attended any of the NSF meetings, because, here I am the center of a CIA covert plot to bring down the Syrian regime and no one has seen fit so far to speed up the approval of my asylum application and give me a goddamn passport. I took part in establishing the NSF virtually, I have never yet met Khaddam or Bayanouni, and other than the US-based members of the NSF, I only met those who came here for occasional visits. Now, I should think that that would make it pretty hard for me to get any recordings of NSF meetings, unless, of course, I had accomplices. This is what the new version of the report will likely claim in some future date.

As for my Dutch donors, well, actually, they happen to be a branch of an international Catholic organization, namely the well-known Pax Christi, known for its peacebuilding and humanitarian activities all through the world, even here in the good old USA.

Conclusions:

* The widely knowledgeable sources remain the bane of our existence in this world. They fuck up war. They fuck up peace. They fuck up objectivity. When they are real, that is. More often, however, they are nothing more than tattered disguises for our growing sense of insecurity and paranoia.

* We all live under the delusion of being right and good most if not all of the time. And though I tend to question myself often with regard to my basic motives, intentions and means, I cannot claim to be any less susceptible to this tendency than any given one of us. For this reason, I have no option but to muddle through the dark days and ways that lie in front of me, stumbling from one sudden realization to another until I make some sense of it all, or someone makes some sense of me.

Ouch Doc, yeah, that really does hurt.

A Heretic in the Wind!

2006-12-20T22:40:00.000-05:00

A recent article in the Time paints me as the central figure of some cockamamie covert plot to overthrow the Syrian regime. But, and while I'd really like to see our illustrious regime overthrown and reconciled to the dustbin of history (to borrow a term that is so dear to the hearts of regime spokesmen), news of my involvement in such “sinister” plot come as news to me as well. I was never aware of that fact that I was that creative. I think I should take up writing again, soon.

Meanwhile, I am, at this stage, a member of the board of the Tharwa Foundation USA, which was recently incorporated in Washington to conduct human rights and democracy activities along lines similar to our Tharwa Project in Syria with its focus on diversity issues. Tharwa Foundation USA will be the recipient of funds from a variety of donor organizations in the US, but nothing that directly comes from the US government (where our donors get their money, however, is their problem). Moreover, the Tharwa Foundation will not be carrying out any partisan activities, such as supporting any particular political candidate, party, or movement inside or outside Syria, or anywhere in the region (we have representatives in Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, Morocco and the Gulf).

Besides, parliamentary elections in Syria are too farcical and tightly controlled to become the center of any meaningful opposition work or action. For them to be put at the center of a plot to overthrow the Syrian regime is ludicrous. If there is someone who thinks along these lines in the administration, then heaven help us.

My affiliation with the National Salvation Front has nothing to do with Tharwa, especially the branch in Syria, where the Tharwa team has always been critical of this recent aspect of my activism, albeit they accept my freedom to make my choices in these matters just as I accept theirs.

Indeed, Tharwa came to light in Syria in early 2003, following 2 years of preparation. The NSF, on the other hand, was established in Europe in March 2006. Tharwa emerged as a regional civic project that support dissident views, and is often run by dissidents. Still, it has no partisan affiliation with any existing political group inside or outside the country, and does not represent itself as a political operation anywhere. In fact, its members come from a variety of political backgrounds, not to mention ethnic and religious affiliations.

The Time story, therefore, is definitely not well-researched and tends to read too much into too little and stitches together disconnected pieces of a nonexistent puzzle. The current administration has not yet formed a coherent policy vis-à-vis Syria, albeit they are opening up more and more to the Syrian opposition, the NSF in particular. But that only means that we have been talking more often, nothing concrete has so far come out of the talks except for a general agreement that the NSF is an important and credible opposition movement whose views and basic expectations warrant to be factored in whatever policy that the Administration ends up adopting with regard to Syria. NSF members in Europe are conducting similar activities there as well with their local governments. Indeed, the NSF recently opened an office in London.

Still, I don't really mind in principle being the central figure of a rumored covert operation, provided it is substantive and real. This one is just too bloody farcical, and I would like to believe that I am smarter than to be involved in something like this. I was exiled from Syria less than 15 months ago – not enough time in this day and age for one to lose his grip on the realities he left behind.

Everybody in Syria knows of the staged nature of the parliamentary elections there, exposing this fact to an external audience is important, of course, and it should be done, and it will be done I know, with or without overt or covert US support, but the results of this activity will not have a major impact, if any, on the standing of the Assad regime vis-à-vis the Syrian population, who have long grown accustomed to this periodic song-and-dance.

Nevertheless, should the Time story cause someone in Syria to worry, for whatever reason, then, it is good. But if it made them laugh it is even better. For I noticed that the Assads are at their worst when they are confident and joyful, so they might as well dance naked around the campfire, as far as I am concerned (I wouldn't mind doing that myself actually. It's been a while).

As for the opposition, well, we have to admit that we are still relatively weak with limited grassroots appeal. But our weakness is more than compensated by the moronic policies of the Assads, not to mention their avarice, this is indeed what keeps us in the game, and this is the one constant that has been working for us all along, albeit we cannot keep on
counting on it. Indeed, I believe that the NSF is slowly moving beyond that, which is why it finds itself so much in the news lately. But then, we have legitimate complaints vis-à-vis the Assads regime and our point of view merits an audience and merits support. Ignoring us and legitimizing the tyrannical and corrupt rule of the Assads is not realism, it is downright duplicitous and as equally moronic as the policies adopted by the Assads themselves.

But then, there are indeed plenty of morons all around. Some believe in farcical engagement justified on the basis of real politick, others in no less farcical warfare advocated on the basis of certain undying messianic expectations. Then there are opportunist morons who wouldn't mind scavenging around for a tasty morsel, and idealistic morons who think that they have to find a way to chart a path around all those moronic policies out there in an effort to salvage what can still be salvaged from the impending wreckage by way of mitigating the overall disaster and in the name of some ideal that keeps on militating within their souls.

I like to believe that I belong to that last category of morons. But there are those who will feel more comfortable putting me in the former. Be that as it may, I am only 40 years old, and I am going to be around for a while through the thick and thin of it, and if people can't see things my way today, perhaps, in a few years time, I will have created the sort of reality on the ground that can lend more credibility to what I and my dissident colleagues stand for.

On the other hand, stories like this, coming at a time like this, yearend and all, cannot but make me look back at the last few months of my fledgling political career, and yearn, really yearn, for early retirement. I enjoyed life more when I was just a heretical poet and author waiting for one or two of my misguided colleagues from the Time of Ignorance of yore, who, still high on atavistic religiosity rather than joi de vivre, would come and kill me while I lounged by the Sheraton poolside in Damascus with my equally heretical wife, kids and mother sipping on that odd mixture of lemon and beer that we are all so fond of in the family, and the country.

Oh well, I have to stop daydreaming I guess, there is some covert scheming waiting to be done back in the office.

Cheerio.

***

More on this story with a quote by me here. And this is an article that I recently wrote and which is being widely syndicated in a number of languages.

The Flipping Moment!

2006-12-18T19:04:00.000-05:00

Indeed, the Assads of Syria are currently being wooed by one and all, American Senators, European officials, and Arab leaders, but soon, I'd wager, everybody will be wowed by how little the Assads actually have to offer and by how bent they are on overplaying their hand, just as they have done on so many occasions over the last few years.

The Assads don’t have it in themselves to “flip” really. Flipping requires a certain family consensus that in light of existing family dynamics is very hard to reach. The interests of different family members still diverge along personality lines, individual ambitions and business interests. A suitable new arrangement or accommodation has not been reached yet, and will not likely be reached anytime soon, if ever.

Meanwhile, the current consensus on the necessity and usefulness of the alliance with Iran and Hezbollah was reached by default – the alliance has been a hallmark of Syrian foreign policy for decades now. Different family members simply lapsed on established positions and policies and stuck to their guns. The fact that events seemed to have justified this choice of theirs will argue in their individual minds that sticking to these policies is the best thing to do at this stage. So, they will do nothing but grandstand and will continue to do nothing but grandstand as the flipping moment fades away over the horizon.

This is why President Bashar told his Italian interviewer recently that, although Syria can do a lot to help the US in Iraq, considering that the Assads have such “excellent relations” with so many of the actors involved in the Iraqi scene, the US should also “talk to Iran.”

Meanwhile, those who think that they can talk some sense into the Assads should learn from the experience of Senator Bill Nelson, who was vilified in official Syrian press for claiming after the end of his visit to Syria that he had had a sharp exchange of views over Lebanon with the Syrian President, an assertion that has nothing to do with the rules of "politics, diplomacy and morality," according to the Syrian daily, Tishreen, that went on to list Nelson among those "two-faced" US officials who pay visits to Syria for purposes related to partisan politics in the US. Well, perhaps they got that last point right. Baathists are not all and always as dumb as we think. So, unless one is willing to grovel at the feet of the mighty Assads of the Middle Eastern jungle, perhaps there is no point in talking to them at all.

Indeed, the Assads will overplay their hand. We can always count on them doing just that when things seem to be going their way, even with Iranian coaching. It's a habit. It's well-nigh genetic.

A Call for Action!

2006-12-14T13:05:00.000-05:00

Well, it seems that a stream of senators is planning to follow in the footsteps of Senator Bill Nelson and go to Syria to engage the ever so charming Ass…ads. Well, I say, let’s give them a piece of our minds about that. No, we may not be able to discourage them from undertaking such a “noble” endeavor to reach out to the hardened criminals of the world in the hope of achieving peace and stability, but we can at least convince them to avoid the mistakes of Senator Nelson who did not bother to talk to the press afterwards or raise any contentious issue.

We need to convince these people to address both in private and in public the issue of worsening conditions of human rights in Syria, especially the plight of denaturalized Kurds, and to call for the freedom of all political prisoners, an end to the ongoing campaign of crackdown and intimidation against all activists and opposition members, and allowing political exiles to return home to live in freedom and security. They also need to encourage the Syrian regime to cease its efforts to destabilize the democratically elected government in Lebanon, and to review its dangerous connections to the Iranian regime and unsavory terrorist movements in the region.

These are the addresses and numbers of the people involved:

U.S. Senator Chris Dodd448 Russell Building Washington D.C., 20510Tel: (202) 224-2823 Fax: (202) 224-1083

U.S. Senator Arlen Specter 711 Hart BuildingWashington, DC 20510Tel: 202-224-4254

U.S. Senator John Kerry 304 Russell Bldg.Third FloorWashington D.C. 20510(202) 224-2742

U. S. Senator Bill Nelson 716 Senate Hart Office BuildingWashington, DC 20510Phone: 202-224-5274Fax: 202-228-2183

We can refer in this regard to the recent statement by President Bush with rgard to the human rights situation in Syria:

For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary
December 13, 2006

President's Statement on the Government of Syria

The United States supports the Syrian people's desire for democracy, human rights, and freedom of expression. Syrians deserve a government whose legitimacy is grounded in the consent of the people, not brute force.

The Syrian regime should immediately free all political prisoners, including Aref Dalila, Michel Kilo, Anwar al-Bunni, Mahmoud Issa, and Kamal Labwani. I am deeply troubled by reports that some ailing political prisoners are denied health care while others are held in cells with violent criminals.

Syria should disclose the fate and whereabouts of the many missing Lebanese citizens who "disappeared" following their arrest in Lebanon during the decades of Syrian military occupation.

The Syrian regime should also cease its efforts to undermine Lebanese sovereignty by denying the Lebanese people their right to participate in the democratic process free of foreign intimidation and interference.

The people of Syria hope for a prosperous future with greater opportunities for their children, and for a government that fights corruption, respects the rule of law, guarantees the rights of all Syrians, and works toward achieving peace in the region.

Middle Eastern Realities! (1)

2006-12-12T21:59:00.000-05:00

Every new conflict in the region becomes inextricably linked to the ongoing Arab-Israeli Conflict as well as western imperialism in the discourse and tactics employed by the various regional actors invovled, who are often more interested in prolonging the said conflict. Festering old wounds are always a good distraction from developing new ones. However, the real panacea here does not lie in treating the causes of one set of wounds at the expense of another, as so many experts end up recommending, but in tackling the real issues involved: the development and democracy gaps. Any realism that attempts a song-and-dance around these issues represent nothing more than a cop-out mechanism, a running away from the real challenges ahead, and will only make the problems worse in the not-too-distant future. For things are moving at a much faster pace than they used to, and any problem that gets neglected today will haunt us all in the near morrow.

The Death of Moderation!

2006-12-04T00:22:00.000-05:00

What can be said about the current developments in Lebanon except that we might be seeing the prelude to a civil war? What could really be more telling than this?

But yes, I can praise the March 14 forces for showing so much restraint and from refraining to challenge the current show of force by Hezbollah and supporters, the pro-Syria demonstrators, by mounting an equally impressive show of their own. But this will be adding more fuel to the fire, and already several agents provocateurs, some of which reportedly Syrian, have been involved in trying to steer the crowds into doing something stupid such as storming the Serail. The restraint shown by the March 14 forces is indeed wise and commendable.

The challenge, however, lies in the ability to maintain it over the long hold.

Restraint may not prevent violence indefinitely, however, especially if the other side, or at least certain elements in it, is/are intent on provoking it. But restraint could serve to demonstrate clearly to the international community which side needs to be blamed for the violence and, therefore, contained, and which side merits to be supported. Admittedly, however, if civil war should break out, this may not account for much in the overall scheme of things.

Some in the region are begging for huge crisis that can allow them to avert being held accountable for their crimes, and retain their positions, no mater illegitimately gained. This is not about any legitimate demands or concerns; this is more about their abuse by capricious elements on the highest level of governance and society in several states in the region, but mainly, in Lebanon itself, as well as in Syria and Iran.

Yet, there are those who would suggest rewarding the evil-mongers, to ward off the greater evil, as they contend, as though this policy has not been tried for decades now, to no avail. Falling back on more of the same is a sign of weakness on all sides, and will only serve to embolden the worst among us. Let's not underestimate the mayhem that they could do, that they will be willing to do, if further emboldened. Isnt' it enough for us to see how willing they are to push things to the brink?

Indeed, in the age of asymmetric warfare, and pure unadulterated thugary, no power will remain unchallenged no matter how technologically superior. Why? I think Marlon Brando put it best in his monologue in Apocalypse Now:

"I remember when I was with Special Forces...Seems a thousand centuries ago...We went into a camp to inoculate the children. We left the camp after we had inoculated the children for Polio, and this old man came running after us and he was crying. He couldn't see. We went back there and they had come and hacked off every inoculated arm. There they were in a pile...A pile of little arms. And I remember...I...I...I cried... I wept like some grandmother. I wanted to tear my teeth out. I didn't know what I wanted to do. And I want to remember it. I never want to forget it. I never want to forget.

And then I realized...like I was shot...Like I was shot with a diamond...a diamond bullet right through my forehead...And I thought: My God...the genius of that. The genius. The will to do that. Perfect, genuine, complete, crystalline, pure.

And then I realized they were stronger than we. Because they could stand that these were not monsters...These were men...trained cadres...these men who fought with their hearts, who had families, who had children, who were filled with love...but they had the strength...the strength...to do that. If I had ten divisions of those men our troubles here would be over very quickly. You have to have men who are moral...and at the same time who are able to utilize their primordial instincts to kill without feeling...without passion...without judgment...without judgment. Because it's judgment that defeats us."

Of course Marlon Brando’s character “had” to be killed at the end, as the very idea of civility militates against amorality. Civility does condone at occasions recourse to barbarous behavior, but it will never accept it as a way of life. At one point or another, people have to feel guilty about their barbarism, otherwise they could never be civilized. The lot we are dealing with is not the kind that will feel guilty about anything, otherwise they would not be risking taking things this far. This is not a peaceful protest, this is an act of intimidation, one meant to draw violence in order to unleash greater violence, one that is designed to be Act One of something bigger, much bigger.

Of course, this is an argument in extremis, there is usually much grey involved in most situations. But these are extremist times when extremist agendas are unfolding. You can cut-and-run, or you can face the music. Peacemaking requires teeth, not prayers nor wishful thinking, nor even… realism. Take a bite now, or gnash your teeth later. Moderation has been killed.

A Tragicomedy of Errors!

2006-12-03T00:51:00.000-05:00

Voices are being raised on a daily basis tying progress in resolving the current situation in Iraq and the standoff with Iran to a peaceful conclusion of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The most recent such call came from none other than Graham Fuller writing in the Winter issue of the Washington Quarterly (not available on the Internet). But, and while Fuller makes many excellent arguments with regard to the current dynamics in the region, his perspective, albeit far more nuanced and inclusive than most, is still too narrow.

Solving the Arab-Israeli Conflict is not a cure-all for the region’s myriad problems and will not denote the end of conflicts therein. The situations in the Sudan, Somalia and Algeria did not emerge as a result of the AIC, nor did the sectarian problems in Lebanon and Syria, nor the specific conditions that prevailed in Iraq and Afghanistan in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The claim by many in the region that the US went into Iraq and Afghanistan to execute an Israeli agenda is a reflection of the usual conspiratorial mentality so prevalent in the region and that reduces the complex dynamics of the American decision-making process to a single often over-inflated cause.

This is not meant to argue, however, that the AIC should be ignored. On the contrary, like all other conflicts in the region, it begs to be effectively addressed and resolved now. In fact, if regional stability and mounting an effective anti-terrorism campaign are really what is at stake here, the AIC can no longer be treated in isolation from other conflicts and challenges in the region, for these conflicts have now become intermeshed.

Indeed, ever since the establishment of the HISH (Hezbollah-Iran-Syria-Hamas) Alliance, the ability to address the AIC in isolation from other outstanding issues and conflicts in the region has become a well-nigh impossible task.

Can the Golan Heights issue be tackled in isolation from the issue of the Shebaa Farm? Can the Assads regime be engaged while avoiding to address the issue of the UN inquiry into the Hariri assassination and Syria role, old and new, in Lebanon? Can the issue of the Shebaa Farm be tackled in isolation from Hezbollah, its leaders and their particular vision and personal ambitions? Can any of these issues be tackled in isolation from Iran’s regional influence and interests, not to mention its relation to the world’s powers? Can they be addressed in isolation from Saudi interests? Can the role of al-Qaeda and other extremist and terrorist groups in the region be ignored? Can the fact that a new Taliban seems to be emerging in Somalia at this stage not have an impact on regional developments, especially when Somalia becomes a new training grounds and shelter for terrorists, just like Iraq is fast becoming as well and Afghanistan has up until recently been? Wouldn’t the main goal of the new wave of terrorists be to waylay any kind of peace talks, not to mention talks about peace talks taking place in the region?

The answers, I believe, are all too obvious, and all too ominous.

So, what can be done? Well, considering the nature of the actors involved on all sides, no realistic policy alternatives can frankly be recommended at this stage. The sorely needed international will to hold a new and expansive conference on the challenges posed by regional developments is simply nonexistent. Yet, even should such an event take place today, the powers involved are likely to opt to fall back on the usual “realistic” arrangements that empower regimes and betrays peoples, leaving the real issues unresolved. As a result, the Development Gap separating the two worlds will continue to increase, and so will popular frustration, anger and resentment as well as communal tensions – that is, the very things that fuel the current conflicts and ongoing terrorist activities.

There is a need for major international conference to draw the outlines of a new international system that takes the post-Cold War realities in mind and allow for the emergence of new regional and international powers in a peaceful manner. We have seen something along these lines after WWI and WWII, but not after the Cold War, and as a result, we slipped back into a multi-polar Cold War, a fact that is preventing any realistic peacemaking from taking place, anywhere. The few “success stories” that some might flaunt here, namely developments in the Balkans, have come at a high price, have not been easy to achieve, have been the results of a concerted effort by a real multilateral coalition that was painstakingly put together over a period of many months, and sometimes years, and the final results themselves are still all too fragile.

Indeed, if no new international arrangement is worked out, and soon, no peacemaking efforts are likely to prove effective (and no peace making can be effective without emphasis on developments, human rights and democratization), and the best that can be accomplished will be a hudna of sorts, – a temporary reprieve or cessation of hostilities that will not last long enough to satisfy anyone or to help accomplish anything tangible, other than the ability to create more mayhem.

That is what I believe to be the only realistic policy alternative that I can make at this stage. Until there is an international will to adopt such a comprehensive approach, which is likely to pose as many new challenges as it offers to resolve, though, hopefully, it will also least introduce a mechanism for dealing more effectively with these new challenges, we will continue to inch, if not occasionally leap, our way towards regional, if not global, implosion.

Why A Heretic’s Blog?

2006-12-01T01:16:00.000-05:00

In a recent and not too friendly exchange concerning my alleged affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, two interesting things emerged:

For one, once people have committed themselves publicly to an erroneous assumption and passed judgment on the basis of this assumption, it becomes very difficult for them to back down and recant later, not to mention to actually correct their mistake, even when their basic assumption is shown to be demonstrably wrong. For this reason, and despite the noble efforts of some commenters who actually bothered to do a little background check before jumping to conclusions, to some I now remain a possible crypto-Islamist sent to infiltrate the Democratic crowd in Congress.

The basis for this “nuanced” assumption, and this is the second point that emerged, is the name of this blog – A Heretics Blog. For if I had really seen the light, why did I not call my blog the Apostate’s Blog?

I think this is an interesting question really, and I should attempt to respond to it here, for this might clarify a few things about me, regardless how people will still end up classifying me at the end of the day.

Indeed, why not an Apostate’s Blog, after all, I am indeed an apostate, in the sense that I no longer believe in Islam (or any other religion or that matter)?

This is my two-cents.

While heresy is indeed a necessary transitional phase that every believer has to go through before finally finding himself an apostate, becoming an apostate is not the inevitable end-product of heresy. In other words, heresy is not necessarily conducive to apostasy. Indeed, it could simply lead to new interpretations of the faith, on an individual or communal basis, leading in the latter case to the emergence of schismatic movements within the faith.

In this regard, it is indeed legitimate to observe that the basic tenets of some of these movements might become so radically different from those of the “original” faith, as to represent, from the point of view of a neutral observer, new faith systems. But, and while a neutral academic observer may not have a problem classifying schismatic movements in such manner, the adherents of these movements, and those of the traditional faith, may beg to differ.

For we should be mindful here of the pejorative connotation of the terms: heretic and apostate. Indeed, the protagonists of new interpretations of the faith seldom regard themselves as heretics and/or apostates, these labels are often employed by their detractors, from other schismatic movements or from the adherents of the “original” faith. Believers often see their new interpretation of the faith as a legitimate extension of some original impetus or drive embedded in the faith (the renewalists), or as a return to the original nature of the faith (the fundamentalists and the puritans. Or in modern day parlance in our region, salafis and wahhabis).

Only a person like me, who is out to make a point by issuing a head-on challenge to traditional modes of piety and thought by advocating freedom of conscience, religion, expression and opinion, will be willing to endorse the use of the term heretic or apostate with regard to himself.

Indeed, in my case, I opted for the term heretic, because it was in heresy that I found the instrument of my freedom. If I advocate anything is the right to heresy. Apostasy, on the other hand, and while important to me personally, seems to represent a certain conclusion that may not be suitable to all. Indeed, most other heretics that I know still prefer to adhere to Islam, or to be more specific to their new and heretical version/interpretation of it, which appear much more suitable for the times at hand, from their perspective.

Muslims are not required to abandon their faith all together to be able to adjust to the requirements of modernity. The Christians surely didn’t. For no matter how unsuitable traditional faiths seem from a more rational perceptive, faith remains, in essence, a psychological phenomenon and the human psyche is all too complex and most people are quite capable of working out their own particular mental and intellectual stratagems to balance between the irrational requirements of faith and the all too rational realities of modern daily living.

Be that as it may, we have to bear in mind here as well the fact that not all heretical ventures are actually liberal, not to mention liberating. Indeed, many heresies can be quite disastrous, and tend to be much more problematic than the original faith, which the heretics found wanting. Indeed, Bin Ladin & Co. are quite the heretics, from the perspective of both the adherents to the traditional faith and the renewalists, not to mention the objective academic observer who might find their interpretation of Islam incongruous with the examples set by the “original” founders of the faith. Indeed, the heresies of Bin Ladin & Co. are not exactly what is needed for today’s Muslims to overcome their current helplessness, marginalization and backwardness. On the contrary, Bin Ladenism, its offshoots, and all similar developments in the ranks of the believers, is making life worse for them. But while most believers seem to be aware of that with regard to Bin Laden, things are not that clear with regard to people like Hassan Nasrallah for instance, who might just be far more dangerous, as he manages to bring atavistic heresies into the mainstream of our lives.

Still, heresy is the product of independent thought, and, as such, it’s the only thing that has the potential of freeing us from the clutches of ignorance. Almost every known thinker, philosopher and scientist was a heretic by his days’ standards and perhaps even by ours. It is for this reason that I advocate heresy, while reserving the right of people to take it all the way to apostasy if they want to. By naming this blog of mine A Heretic’s Blog rather than An Apostate’s Blog, I sought to make this point, which, perhaps, may not have been as obvious as I thought.

Of Exile, Guilt and Messianic Aspirations!

2006-11-28T20:51:00.000-05:00

I seem to be on my way back to the spotlight again, at least for a brief spate. I have been quiet for far too long this time, but I am gradually but surely being pulled out again from the doldrums of administrative work to the kind of activism I am more accustomed to and comfortable with.

So, recently there were a couple of quotes and references to me in the Wall Street Journal, the Boston Globe and the Kansas City Star, and now a short essay of mine (reproduced below) has just appeared in the current issue of Witness Magazine, a prestigious literary endeavor supported in part by the International Institute for Modern Letters with which I am affiliated as a fellow. But I do encourage everyone to support this important endeavor and actually buy the whole issue which contains more than 40 wonderful essays, short stories and poetry collections, written by a group of exiles, or “exilians” to borrow the term of Wole Soyinka unearthed by Chris Amani. Other contributors include suc fitrures as Hasanthika Sirisena, Er Tai Gao, Joan I. Siegel, and Fernando Garavito.

Of Exile, Guilt and Messianic Aspirations

Guilt is a would-be messiah’s constant companion, so, naturally, as a man mired in messianic expectations, - and how could a liberal heretic working within the context of a traditional Arab-Muslim society not be so afflicted? – I am riddled with guilt.

Now guilt is quite the interesting emotion. One can feel it both for acting and for refraining from action. But things can get a little more complex when one examines the motives involved.

In my case, my basic motivation was my constant obsession in remaining true to myself. But in doing this, and in following the dictates of my conscience and taking them to their logical conclusions, a process that took me on a long journey through different modes of religiosity and heresy, I ended up turning my back on the very foundations of my culture. I have made myself irrelevant to the very people that I sought, and seek still, to change. Somehow, and in being true to who I am, I stopped being true to my people and to my calling. But then, can I really be true to my people on their own terms? How can be a messiah then? How can I save the world?

For yes, even a secular heretic like me can still speak of a calling, of salvation and of messianic expectations and aspirations, of a deep-seated desire to be the awaited messiah, the savior of all, the fountain of undying hope that our humanity might still amount to something good. When one’s guilt stems from such a predicament as mine, the predicament of having a living and kicking conscience and a burning spirit of free and critical inquiry, messianism cannot lag far behind. Indeed, messianism is indeed intrinsic to the whole affair.

As such, if I am, at some instance, riddled with guilt, I am simultaneously buoyed with messianism. Yes, you can actually take faith out of the Arab. His Messiah Complex, however, is a completely different matter, especially in these desperate times for the Arabs when both the religious and nationalist radicals and the sociopolitical liberals seek to make themselves relevant, the first by force of arms and archaic laws and customs, the others by force of reason, that all too neglected and abused commodity.

So, is it any surprise really that my messianic aspirations should get me where I am today?

Exile.

Trying to be relevant – when everything about you is so alien, and hence irrelevant, and when you are guided by a principle that prevents you from betraying yourself, a principle that puts your individuality above what most, if not all, people around you perceive as representing the common good, while you have a different understanding altogether of what this common good actually is – might as well be an exercise in futility, a desperate attempt at seeding the darkside of the Moon. So be it. I have been working against my own inborn and growing cynicism for all my life it seems. And look where that got me!

Exile!

Internal exile, alienation, external exile, more alienation. Some people are not born to belong anywhere it seems. Yet the whole point of messianic aspirations is to be able to belong somewhere, at some point in time, somehow, to something that you can believe in, because you have built it yourself.

In this respect, both the sociopolitical liberals and the religious and nationalist radicals are the same. A certain messianic ethos unites us both. But our methods tend to differ, and so does the quality and scope of our respective visions. Indeed, and while there will never be a room for us, the liberals, in a radical’s world, there will always be a room in our liberal world for all the radicals, barring those who crossed over to terrorism, of course.

For the world everywhere seems devoid of a soul until you breathe your own soul into it; only then can you actually belong to it. And belonging is too precious a gift to be denied to anyone no matter how different he/she happens to be. Both the radicals and we are indeed entitled to belong, to seek to belong, to try to build the world that we can belong to. In the interim, we can only belong to the community of family and friends that we built around ourselves, or that we accepted. Everything else is exile.

Exile, then, is both a choice and an imposition.

When I gazed for that solitary moment deep into my interrogator’s eyes, the eyes of that allegedly dashing 50-something general clad in civilian attire and sporting a Saddam-like moustache and a stern smile, stern enough to befit the brother-in-law of the President, the head of his military security apparatus and the number two man in the country, I realized the limitations of my messianism: I cannot save the world, at least not at that point, but I can save my family, not to mention myself. I could have settled for silence or cooptation, I guess – a death threat having already been hinted at as a possible third alternative, - but I managed to subtly maneuver my way into exile, planting it as a fourth alternative into my interrogator’s sympathetic mind.

I can live with exile. Indeed, I can be true to myself in exile. I have always been in exile anyway, even whilst in my all too warm and loving motherly womb, I swear. My adopted family has as well. Indeed, it is our sense of exile that united us all at one hapless point: the exile in Khawla’s eyes, in Oula’s smile, in Mouhanad’s tears. We will carry our sense of exile wherever we go, after all, we are a family of messianic heretics, and our heresy(ies) might be just be the only home we can ever really have. But the guilt emanating from the various difficulties, no matter how little and mundane they happen to be at times, that my precious threesome is now facing in external exile as a result of my own actions, choices and maneuvers in life, is quite burdensome at times. So is the guilt of having made it out, of having had the luxury of choosing exile, rather than settling for what has been laid out in front of me, as was the fate of so many of my colleagues.

But there is also a little envy at play here, an envy of their ability to continue to maneuver from within and to, occasionally, prick the system, perhaps until it bleeds, one day.

All dictatorships are hemophilic, once you prick them they bleed to death. If only I can still help prick mine.

This thought continues to haunt me here, in my external exile as I am still yearning to achieve some relevance there, in my internal exile. Yet, to be able to accomplish this, I now have to become relevant here first. I have to learn how to maneuver here as well, so that, here too, I wouldn’t have to settle for what it is laid out in front of me and could still remain true to who I am. I have managed to achieve this before here. I am as much a product of the good old U.S.A, as I am of Syria. I am of the East and the West, proportions notwithstanding. If my exile is ever to know an end, I have to be relevant to both worlds, I have to belong to both, I have to breathe my soul into both, and I have to save both, save me from both and save both from me. I have to be a multi-faceted messiah, it seems, to make all this work.

This seems like a losing battle, I know. But, what better battle is there, these days, for someone so riddled with guilt, so buoyed with messianic aspirations, so obsessed with being on the right side of his own personal history, and so envious of all those who can still make a difference in life so as to dwarf us all?

But I want to walk among the giants, so I can put an end to my guilt, and my exile, if only for a little solitary moment before the parting.

The HISHee Rebellion!

2006-11-23T01:58:00.000-05:00

The assassination of Pierre Gemayel is not some haphazard ill-timed event, but a carefully calculated one meant to help push Lebanon further and further along the path of internal implosion. And the HISH (Hezbollah-Iran-Syria-Hamas) Alliance is definitely to blame here, the particular considerations related to their particular decision-making and implantation strategies notwithstanding.

The current summit on Iraq, which Tehran is currently hosting is another calculated event organized by HISH with the purpose of helping close ranks on the US presence in Iraq and their entire regional adventure. On the short run, however, HISH spin-doctors might make it appear as though the Alliance is actually taking a more proactive approach towards stabilizing the situation in Iraq thus helping establish a better negotiating position vis-à-vis the US.

But what is actually taking place is an attempt to hijack Iraq from the US, making US position there quite untenable by weakening its allies and uniting its detractors under a coalition affiliated with HISH. Pretty soon, the political scene in Iraq will be divided into two major currents, an embattled one made up of the last few pro-US statesmen and officials, and the a pro-HISH current made up of all parties opposed to US-presence in Iraq, a coalition that might actually grow to attract and accommodate many Sunnis, both Islamists and Baathists, in due course of time. (Initially though, the alliance of Islamists and Baathists might linger as a third current).

Both major currents will be multi-ethnic in essence, albeit the Shia will figure more prominently in them, by sheer force of demographics. Kurds might also figure prominently here, as many of them seem convinced of the need to plan a post-US strategy that could safeguard the gains that they have already made on the grounds. The US does indeed stand to lose its last major allies in Iraq, as it seems to have outlived its usefulness for them (which is in essence a favor returned. The Kurds do feel that were betrayed by the US and several western powers repeatedly before).

These moves will leave the US very little room to maneuver. As things stand right now, it is indeed up to HISH to grant the US a graceful way out, or not, depending on the price the US is willing to pay. And nothing less than everything is now acceptable to the HISHees. Good luck with engagement.

One option that the US has is to do some immedaite escalation of its own, both militarily and diplomatically. But this is more likely to backfire and prove equally as disastrous, unless its NATO allies are willing to back it, which they are not. None of them is willing to engage in all-out regional war, which is what the current HISHee brinkmanship is all about.

A less humiliating exit strategy might be to out-Baker the Iraq Study Group and withdraw without any talks with anyone, leaving the HISHees, among other regional and international powers, to handle the Iraqi mess. Should some prominent Iraqis indeed crossover to this HISH Alliance, the US position will receive some justifications, at least on the domestic front, seeing that such a move would be interpreted as a sign that Iraqis are willing to tackle their problems on their own by talking and reaching agreements with their trouble-making neighbors. Indeed, the Iraqis have already made an agreement to establish diplomatic relations with Syria, after more than 25 years of strained relations. Coming at this particular point in time, this is an interesting move indeed.

True, a withdrawal by the US forces at this stage will undermine, at least temporarily, the position of the March 14th coalition in Lebanon, as the Assads and Hezbollah will be encouraged to unleash their wrath even more wantonly they have done so far. And true, the move could hamper all regional efforts at reform and democratization for a certain period of time. But, seeing that the other options that the US has at this stage might still lead down this same path, the move may not be as defeatist, not to mention immoral to the eyes of some in the Bush Administration.

Indeed, if the Bush Administration should ever adopt the withdrawal option, this might be exactly how they would end up doing it. They will not talk to anyone, they will make any concessions.

This move will give the HISH Alliance another one of those pyrrhic yet divine victories they are so fond of, for they may or may not be able to help control the mess in Iraq, and this aside, they will still be vulnerable to all sort of international pressures with regard to issues such as the Hariri Investigation, Iran’s nuclear program, Hezbollah disarmament and the situation in Gaza.

Meanwhile, the US is bound to receive much blame for its policies, but it will be simultaneously courted by all and sundry in the region and Europe to return and help stabilize the situation. This will put the US back on top of things again, and will allow American officials to ask for serious cooperation from their regional and NATO allies in preparation for Round Two of the conflict. For there will of course be a Round Two. And a Round Three, and a Round Four if necessary. The HISHees will not lay quiet, and they will rather press their perceived advantage to the fullest.

For the HISH, armed with a heavy doze of hubris, will prove too unruly for most powers, and all would realize the need for breaking it, despite the legitimacy of some of its claims.

True, European interests may not coincide with those of the US in this. But Europe's interests cannot be served by accommodating all of the HISHees, they can only accommodate Iran, a non-nuclear Iran to be specific. But Iranians leaders are too proud, and they are unlikely to concede to European demands on the nuclear issue. This is why Europe will ultimately have to turn back to the US for succor. Without a credible coalition and a credible threat, discussions with Iran will go nowhere. Yes, Iran will have to be acknowledged as a major regional power, they sacrificed a lot to get where they are today. But they have to do it without the nukes, and without this Alliance. Hezbollah will need to be disarmed, the Assads will need to go. Hamas will need to moderate its tone, so progress can be made in Gaza. To achieve this, Europe needs the US as much as it needs it.

As such the withdrawal that I am talking about here is merely tactical and will not serve as a major strategic shift in the thinking of the current administration. I don’t believe this administration is ready to review it entire strategy in the region, but they do urgently need to revise their tactics, so, I am throwing this entire idea in the fray for to generate debate on the two hot topics: what is really happening in the region at this stage? And should the US do about it on the short and long terms?

Addendum: The Somalia Link

The deeply flawed report by the UN on HISH arms sales to Somalia may not be off the mark all together. In reality, it is indeed in the interest of the Alliance to expand its scope, and Syria has for long had relations with Somalia even through these troubled times, this is why you find so many Somali bananas in the Syrian (and Lebanese) markets. For bananas are indeed the main trade item for the Somalis, and not Uranium. But banana sales can still bring enough returns to fund the low-tech warfare going on in Somalia, and now the Islamic Courts Union is in control of this trade. But, since my friends in Syria and Lebanon can still purchase Somali bananas, this new state of affairs does not seem to have had any negative impact on trade relations between Syria, Lebanon and Somalia. In due course of time, the ICU could indeed be recruited to join the HISH.

Is this an exaggeration? Well, just consider the ongoing security cooperation between Syria and the Sudan, and Iran and the Sudan, especially with regard to the situation in Darfur. Visits by Sudanese security officials to the capitals of Syria and Tehran are as regular as clockwork, and have been for a couple of years now. As all sides seem to have their troubles with the international community, and with the same main actors in it (mainly: the US, Britain, France), the emergence of such cooperation is indeed all too natural. Somalia and the Sudan are well-nigh members of the HISH, a fact that will become clearer in due course of time and should help sound alarm bells.

Addendum 2:

This article in the Wall Street Journal quotes me on the potential impact of the Iraqi Study Group report on the situation in the region, especially with regards to the Assads. Basically, I say that the Assads feel empowered by the mere possibility that the reports will recommend talks with them, and as such, they are more willing than ever to push their perceived advantage. By continuing to prove themselves as troublesome, the Assads hope they can project themselves as invincible and indispensable.

A New Cabal Rising!

2006-11-11T02:38:00.000-05:00

Who are the realists?

Well, if memory serves me correctly, and it does, they are the selfsame crowd that supported the Afghan mujahideen and facilitated, and downright aided, the emergence of Bin Laden and Taliban. This strategy did serve to humiliate the Soviets, no doubt about that, but it did also, well, help plant the seeds for 9/11.

Policies have consequence. And Short-term ill-considered policies have far more devastating consequences on the longer run than people realize. But US officials have been notoriously lax when it comes to thinking about long-term effects of their policies. The realists in particular seem to suffer from this tendency.

A colleague has recently related to me that relates an interesting yet all too real anecdote about the current nominee for Minister of Defense, Robert Gates. He said that in an interview with Canadian TV back in 1993, Mr. Gates was asked about whether he, among other colleagues in the Bush I administration, had ever thought about the consequences of their support of Islamists during the Reagan years, not to mention the early years of the Bush Administration. Did they ever ponder what the consequences of empowering these extremists Islamic movements would be? The interviewer wanted to know. Mr. Gates replied: “No.” The interviewer asked again: “You mean you never thought about it.” Mr. Gates replied again: “No.”

So, are the realists thinking about the long-term consequences of engaging and, therefore, empowering the Assads? Hell, are they even seriously thinking about the real short-term impact of such a policy, or are they simply locked in that arrogant wishful assumption of theirs that the Assads could be won over, and that they could indeed be, not just helpful mind you, but very helpful, in saving the US from itself and from its idiotic misadventure in Iraq?

Anyone cares to hazard a guess?

During my recent talk at Brookings, one of the attendees, a well-known and respected former diplomat, asked me whether I did not think that US diplomat are smart and clever enough to be able to convince the Assads, once they engage them, of them of the usefulness of breaking away from Iran.

That’s the real problem here. US officials, their ideological predilections notwithstanding, think always that they can outsmart their way out of any mess that they outsmarted themselves into. They come to this “game” with their smug confident attitude and want us to have faith in their wisdom, because, hey, they know things about our own realities that we somehow don’t. They invest their egos in this “game,” while we invest our lives. They gamble with the lives of 300,000 or so Americans, while we are forced to see their three or so hundreds and raise them a few hundred millions more.

Now the neo-cons, because they had a place for us, Arab democrats, in their plans, that is, when victory was eventually achieved, asked us for our advice then ignore it and proceeded to do what they were inspired to do, expecting us to adjust all the while, or, from their point of view, catch up, because of course they knew better. The realists, however, won’t have to play this game with us, because the place they have reserved for us in their particular schemes is right there on the margins of things, in exile or in the dungeons of the ruling regimes. This is where everybody thinks we belong anyway. To everybody’s loss.

For while we may not have all the answers, not by a long shot, this is still our region, and these are still our peoples, and we are the liberal secular progressive democrats here, for all our shortcomings. We are the only ones who can bridge the gap between our two worlds. Relegating to the sidelines and keeping us there, will only serve to perpetuate this conflict or clash, not solve it.

Meanwhile, and according to Syrian officials, the country has no prisoners of opinion, the mysterious death of Ali Kan’an, the brother of the late and very much suicided General Ghazi Kana’an, was just another suicide, and the cancellation of a public conference attended by American religious leaders critical of the Bush Administration, who went to Syria “bearing a message of peace to the Syrian people” was meant to actually “encourage deeper bilateral dialogue” with Syrian counterparts. Oh yeah, this lot is engageable.

Indeed, the showdown in our part of the world has often been more a battle of wills than a battle of wits. If the realists want a return to the status quo ante, the Assads and their Iranian allies, have long moved on. They want more. They always wanted more. Not just their survival. They want a resolution to all outstanding issues, they need that, and they think they are well-positioned to get it. Then they will ask for more.

You don’t want to deal with these types from a position of weakness, and you don’t want to give them more than you take from them – they need to be downsized, not empowered. And mechanisms for their eventual change have to be introduced into the equation, no matter what.

But for whose benefit am I really writing this now, when I know for sure this time that no one will listen, and many will just vilify?

No my friends, antagonists and sparring partners, I will not cease to blog, but I will give more thought to my choice of themes from now on.

Heretical Odds & Sacrificial Ends!

2006-11-07T02:54:00.000-05:00

So, all tests came back negative, and the two more scheduled for the future appear to be too routine to warrant fretting about. I remain both ulcer-free and cancer-free. I am more gnawed by angst than by disease, it seems, and my symptoms, no matter how painful and bloody, continue to be mostly psychosomatic. No one dies of that, no one dies of hemorrhoids, and no one dies of gastritis. And I am no longer too young for any of these things, but I am getting too old to think that I can still afford to ignore them.

So, while Khawla and my doctors conjure up a new dietary lifestyle for me, one that I will most surely find impossible to fit within everything else I have to juggle these days, I can finally go back to my beloved and necessary hobby of blogging – of emptying my soul out for the benefit of those hapless specks out there who remain interested in perusing them for reasons that continue to be unfathomable to me. Who’s punishing whom here?, I can never tell. But I can tell you this, my two ends, that is, my mouth and my anus, have witnessed enough punishment recently, and they deserve some rest, albeit none is forthcoming. I am doing some punishment as I type.

So, what is the best way I can return to abusing myself again? Let me see… How about wasting my breaths on some something totally foolish and idiotic, not to mention soul-poisoning, like politics, especially Syrian politics?

And a lot has been happening in this regard recently. But most of it smacks of too much bullshit to warrant any direct dabbling or handling on my part. This is why I will restrict my return to a more active blogging-style to the following points:

* The recent White House meeting with representatives of the National Salvation Front was, contrary to attempts at undermining it by many, quite a success and indicated a growing willingness by members within the current administration to assume a more open posture towards one of the most important and pragmatic Syrian opposition groups in exile. This openness is not restricted to members of the National Security Council. Indeed, and over the last few months, we have had quieter endorsements from all relevant decision-making centers within the administration. No, this does not mean that the Administration will be holding direct talks with Khadddam and Bayanouni soon, for tactical and ideological reasons on both sides. But contacts with the NSF through its liberal members will now take place regularly and on a high enough level to make it worth our while at the NSF to make point of acknowledging them at this stage.

So, people can denounce, speculate, object, interpret, analyze and dismiss the fact and nature of these contacts to their hearts’ content, but, and at the end of the day, the fact cannot be denied: there is indeed a new kid on the block these days, a new player that, whether people like it or not, and for better or for worse, will make quite on an impact on the scene of Syrian external opposition. Attacks, denunciations, vilifications from all sides are more than welcome and encouraged. And please, interested ones, be as profuse, profane and vociferous about it as you like. Free publicity is appreciated.

Let’s not forget in this regard as well that similar high level contacts have taken place in Europe as well, and in the region itself. The NSF will open an office in London soon, and soon thereafter an office in DC. Whether people are going to engage the Assads or not, we still have to be ready. We still have to be relevant to whatever process that unfolds. Personally, I can finally say that I am, come what may.

* There was recently a resurgence of talks about a deal that is being cooked with the Assads. Perhaps an effort in this regard was indeed made by the British, but then, and as the French tell us, it did not pay off. Perhaps the Assads are too confident to accept the pitiful deal the British were offering, and perhaps, the one element that the Assads want to see included in the deal is exactly the one element that no one can deliver at this stage: an end to the Hariri investigation. Be that as it may, for now, there is no deal, and the Hariri investigation continues to remain as the major source of headaches for the Assads wary.

* Indeed, the age of dragging dictators by their hooves to trial may not be over yet. This is what the jailed heroes of the Syrian opposition suggested yesterday upon hearing the news of the Saddam verdict. Michel Kilo, Anwar al-Bounni and Kamal Labwani were quite outspoken despite their growing physical fragility following days of hunger strikes and a physical assault on Labwani by one of the criminal inmates.

A Heretical Contribution towards A New World Order!

2006-11-02T02:19:00.000-05:00

This whole divide between neocons and realists, between democracy-advocates and engagement-advocates is in fact quite meaningless and rather beside the point. For neither side has what it takes to make a difference in the problems of our beleaguered region, not to mention the world, or to make any serious progress in the war on terror. Both sides tend to recommend policies that are in essence nonsensical and will pave the way for further deterioration of the situation not only in our part of the world, but everywhere.

This split reflects a serious identity crisis that plagued and continues to plague the US in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of what I would call Phase I of the Cold War, since I believe that the Cold War is still very much with us having only transitioned from a mostly bipolar to a clearly multi-polar confrontation, involving the EU, Russia, China, and to an extant Japan, on the global stage, various regional powers, such as turkey, Iran, Indonesia and India, and the continuingly enigmatic Canada and Australia, still in search of global role and identity.

For, indeed, the identity crisis seen in the US has its equivalent elsewhere in the world, and not only among First World states, but also throughout the “nether” regions of the world, with Islamic terrorism being one manifestation of it. And all sides are, in effect, busy exporting their particular identity crisis and many of its necessary consequences to the world at large. In the absence of the institutional framework upon which the emerging New World Order can be based, this export commodity is having a devastating effect upon the peoples of the “nether” world.

The need for launching new processes and embarking on building a New World Order was considered in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. It is very telling, however, that the US administration at that time was unwilling to pursue its victory to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime for fear that this will create serious problems and rifts within the international coalition that was established at the time. This was symptomatic of the fact that while the world could agree on a coalition to return to a certain status quo ante, it would have major problems when force is used to effect regime change, regardless of the justifications involved. There was something missing in the existing equation, the rules of the UN themselves, to allow for that, and no one wanted to venture something new.

The peace process launched in the Madrid conference in 1991 and which lasted until 2000 was another way for trying to create new realities in the Middle East that ended up in failure, for a variety of reasons. But one of the most important reasons, yet least studied ones, is the fact that Europe, Russia, and the US have failed to cooperate together effectively in this matter, and occasionally seemed to compete and to undermine each other’s various initiatives. This helped drag out the talks and gave much leeway for radical forces and spoilers to intervene. The reasons for this inability to coordinate between even allies, old and new, was the fact that similar processes or need for such processes to take place existed elsewhere in the world, and the interests of the various international powers involved often conflicted and the UN, in its current format, did not provide the adequate avenue for arbitration between the different parties.

For this reason, different powers acted, directly or inadvertently, as spoilers with regards to each others ambitions and designs. The US and Europe opposed Russia in Chechnya, and competed with Russian interests elsewhere in the Caucasus and Central Asia, so Russia opposed US and European plans in the Middle East. China wanted the world to agree with its stance with regard to Taiwan and to accept China as a new superpower and all the trimmings involved, the US and the EU are having a hard time accepting this with all its ramifications, so China opts to act as a spoiler on a variety of issues.

Different powers have long staked their territories long before the emergence of China, but now, China wants in. China wants a share of the spoils and of the international decision-making process. This situation is eerily reminiscent of the position of Germany in the early 20th Century, but there are many differences as well. The current forms of hegemony and territoriality are fare more subtle than they used to be, and China’s role as a spoiler is also more subtle.

The failure of existing international institutions to help provide a new way for the international decision-making process and international arbitration encouraged recourse to such new institutions as the G8 summits or expanding old ones such as NATO. It also encouraged the formation of temporary coalitions and recourse to unilateral actions when a situation warranted.

Obviously this state of affairs is creating many problems and is impeding the resolution of so many conflicts around the globe. What the world today needs in order to create a New World Order worthy of the name is to create the suitable conceptual and institutional framework for it. Indeed, before we can speak about new Marshall plans for this or that region, or new Madrid or Barcelona processes, not to mention effectively contemplate engagement processes that can actually deliver the desired fruits and not backfire and blow up in all our faces, the world needs a new world conference similar to the ones that took place of yore at Versailles and Yalta.

The conference should focus on the need to agree on a new set of rules, arrangements and institutions that can help establish the overall framework of the desired and needed New World Order. We cannot keep on stumbling on from one crisis to another in this manner. This state of affairs does not augur well for the future at all, and will not hold for long. Indeed, the conceptual vacuum that exists today in the realm of international affairs will surely pave the way for large-scale confrontations, several of which are bound to take place in our region, and one seems to be in the offing indeed for the very near future. Nuclear weapons and the greater subtlety of contemporary politics notwithstanding, world wars are not completely out of the equation yet, as we like to believe, so we cannot yet afford to rest on our laurels. Hell, when it comes to peacemaking, we don’t really have that many of them.

Engaging Syria – Opportunity or Ambush?

2006-10-24T01:48:00.000-04:00

The following is a bullet-point summary of my recent presentation at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. The "other side," so to speak was represented by my favorite sparring partner Joshua Landis.

* Just as is case with military engagement, political engagement has its rules. The following is one such rule: when dealing with corrupt authoritarian regimes, especially when they seem to have some ideological motivation, no matter how minimal, you do not give more than you take, lest you end up creating a problem in the future that is bigger than the one you were trying to resolve.

* The fact that Syria and Iran are important and vital in the region does not necessarily mean that the regimes are engageable or that the rules of the proposed political engagement are practical and conducive to the desired results: peace and stability in the region, and some tangible progress in the Global War on Terror, as this latter seems to set the overall context for the current US intervention in the region and the entire democracy drive.

* Those who speak in favor of engaging the Assads tend to posit them as national leaders, but, while one can make a somewhat credible argument for Hafiz al-Assad as having been a national leader, for all his glaring faults and shortcomings, Bashar & Co. seem more motivated by personal greed and power-lust than they are by national considerations. No, this is not meant to say that the Assads are completely devoid of national convictions and interests, but they often tend to confuse these interests with their personal, family and to a lesser extant, communal interests, often erring on the side of the purely parochial and personal.

* Those who argue for engaging of the Assads seem always willing to concede to them, even before any talks have taken place, not only the Golan, but also Lebanon, parts of Iraq and the Palestinian territories to the direct or indirect control of the Assads. But, it is not clear at all why it is in the US interest to concede so much to a corrupt and authoritarian regime that has made a business of defying the US for decades now? How can such concessions make the Assads less willing to defy the US? And what guarantees are there that the Assads will not mismanage the affairs of their “acquired” realm, and not grow more ambitious and problematic in the future?

* The callousness with which the Hariri Investigation is treated by engagement-advocates is really remarkable here, as they all seem to be quite comfortable with the idea of undermining an international legal proceeding. How can states in this region be expected to respect each other’s boundaries and sovereignty when the international community seems always willing to cave in to the demands and the blackmail and extortion tactics of the more thuggish and rogue elements? We want the states of this region, Israel included, to conform to agreed international norms and conventions, not international norms to conform to the regional and local penchant for cruelty and lawlessness. The insistence on holding this region accountable to a different and ethically inferior set of rules will only serve to perpetuate these rules.

What is even more callous in this regard is the unwillingness to consider the potential impact of killing the Hariri Investigation, and so soon after the killing of Hariri himself, on Lebanon. Such development will likely pave the way for the eventual implosion of Lebanon and will leave Hezbollah virtually in control of Lebanon. How are US interests served by this, and how are the prospects of regional peace and stability served by an imploding Lebanon, or one that is under the control of an Islamist organization?

* The above points should be taken in conjunction with certain hard-to-neglect-yet-somehow-always-neglected developments that have taken place over the last few years, namely: the recent removal of two main traditional rivals of Iran from the scene, namely: the Taliban and Saddam regimes. As such, the confrontational approach of the current administration have served to prop up the Iranian regime. Now now engagement-advocates are suggesting that we prop up the Assads regime and Hezbollah, Iran’s main regional allies. Considering all this, one cannot but wonder in this regard: are Americans policymakers actively and purposefully engaged in an attempt to recreate the Persian Empire, or are they just diehard masochistic morons?

* Engagement advocates speak of engagement as if it were a simple mechanical task. They forget that engagement has been tried before and failed, not only during the reign of Hafiz al-Assad, but even under Bashar, as negotiations related to the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, an all-carrots agreement in essence, dragged on for more three years, having been stalled under his father for five. Then, and as a result of Bashar’s confrontational stance vis-à-vis the US-led invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration pressured the EU to add a special clause to the agreement concerning the banning of all WMDs. This put an effective end to the negotiations at the time.

Why did the talks drag on for so many years on such a clear-cut agreement? Because implementing the economic reforms necessitated by the agreement would have impinged on the interest of the ruling elite and would have opened the system, both politically and economically, at a much faster pace than the Assads, the control freaks that they are, would have been comfortable with.

In the same vein, peace talks, once started, are also likely to drag on and on, regardless of any initial promises, commitments and assurances made. This will give the Assads and their Iranian backers enough time to wait for the breaking up of the existing international coalition against them seeing that the Russians and Chinese are already not on board, that the Europeans are of 25-30 minds about anything and everything, and that the Americans are of two minds, sometimes equally unenlightened. On the other side, you have two dictatorial regimes who discuss their strategies and tactics behind closed doors, not in open think tanks and weblogs.

* Can the Assads be useful in the Global War on Terror? Considering that one of the main handicaps of the Assads regime is its essentially minoritarian sectarian character, its ability for undertaking secular reforms has always been undercut. Indeed, and despite, if not because of, the showdown with the Islamists, among other oppositional groups, in the late 70s and early 80s, the regime was forced to develop a dual containment strategy with regard to the country’s Islamists and majority Sunni community in general.

With regard to social and educational issues, regime policies straddled the well-defined traditional lines of Sunni doctrine and sharia law and encouraged their dissemination all over the country, using the country’s obligatory religious studies curriculum and allowing for the establishment of public schools that emphasized religious education and Qur’an memorization.

But, with regard to the more politically active currents, the regime encouraged the adoption of a special arrangement that allowed Islamist terrorist organization to use the country as an operational base and safe-haven while executing its actual operations abroad, often in congruence with certain perceived interest of the regimes (the regime employed the services of secular nationalists Palestinian grounds in this regard as well). In other words, the Assads exported their Islamist problem. Seeing that they have recently fallen on this habit with regard to the situation in Iraq, there is every reason to believe that they will continue to do so for the foreseeable future, even if engagement-advocates granted them everything they wanted. The Assads’ perception of their Islamist threat is always alarmingly high because the whole development is seen through a purely sectarian prism. As such, the Assads’ actual role in the Global War on Terror is extremely negative, since their preferred method for combating terrorism is to export it, and make it somebody else’s problem, preferably the United States.

* Conclusion: taking all of the above points under consideration, it become clear that the current proposals for engaging the Assads will fall far short of achieving the desired objective, and could indeed easily backfire. For all the proposals seem to violate the spirit and letter of the main rule of political engagement highlighted above, as they tend to give far in excess of what they could take. They will save the Assads, dust them off and prep them up as a new and quite dangerous regional powerhouse, which along with its close and recently empowered allies the Iranians and Hezbollah, can pose tremendous threats for US interests and for the prospects of regional stability and peace. Moreover, and rather than constituting some tangible progress in the Global War on Terror, engaging the Assads is likely to make the problem worse, for in the battle of perceptions, engaging the Assads will be viewed as a reversal of an all-but declared policy of regime change on part of the US, not to mention France, and this could only further encourage and empower the terrorists.

* Recommendations: if engage we must, engagement should be done within the context of an overall regional approach that will not leave much room for spoilers and will not ignore the issues of international legality and legitimacy as it pertains to the full implementation of all relevant UN resolutions, including those related to Israel, and/or the need for serious political and economic reforms in most if not all states involved. Representatives of opposition movements, civil society, democracy and human rights activists as well as public intellectuals should be included in the talks as counterweight to the regimes and to make the real interests and concerns of the peoples of the region truly represented. Haphazard approaches aimed at satisfying the needs of only one party without much thought for the potential internal or regional ramifications will backfire. The mere public consideration of such approaches is already having a negative effect on the region and serving to embolden the stances of rogue actors and regimes, the Assads a case in point.

A Heretical Release!

2006-10-18T23:01:00.000-04:00

A press release issued by the Reform Party of Syria on October 18, 2006 claims that Ammar Abdulhamid, a Nonresident Fellow at Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, will be opening an office in Washington DC on behalf of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and/or the National Salvation Front (NSF). This is false.

Mr. Abdulhamid is not a member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and has never been. He is not opening and will not be opening an office for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and/or the NSF in Washington DC. Mr. Abdulhamid is a founding liberal member of the NSF, a broad-based pragmatic coalition of Syrian opposition groups and independent liberal activists.

Ammar Abdulhamid is a Nonresident Fellow at Saban Center for Middle East Policy, where he provides analysis and commentary on Syrian politics, Arab democratization, and US-Syrian relations. He previously served as a Visiting Fellow in the Saban Center, during 2004 and then from September 2005 to March 2006.

Mr. Abdulhamid is also the director of the Tharwa Project, a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving public information and discussion regarding diversity and human rights issues in the Arab world.

Saban Center for Middle East Policy
The Brookings Institution

Surreal Heresies!

2006-10-16T23:27:00.000-04:00

My take on Syrian politics have often been compared to neocon stands, and I have been often accused both in private and in the comment section of this blog of advocating war against the Syrian regime. This is recent response to a private criticism that echoed the above themes:

To me, my take on Syria has nothing to do with Zionism or neocon thought, it is about the reality we have to deal with in Syria on a daily basis. I cannot ignore this reality, or, to be more honest and accurate, my perception of it, simply because it coincides with that of some neocon thinker here or there. The Assads are the way they are, a brutal corrupt clique that will do anything to stay in power, I didn’t make them this way and I don’t see why they would, of their own volition, and in the absence of any pressures, choose to change their behavior. If there are those who want to ignore this reality and deal with the Assads as if they are some reasonable statesmen guided by consideration of national interest, then, I have the right to say that these people are wrong and are bound to screw things up for us, as a people, even more that the current administration, which might indeed be employing wrong tactics, but they are, at least, making the right assessment, namely that the Assads are unchangeable irreformable thugs.

But if some, while acknowledging the fact that the Assads are thugs and still want to talk shop with them, in the name of real politick and all that, then, this is extremely problematic, because, as 9/11 clearly demonstrated, empowering such figures is no longer detrimental to the interests of the peoples of the region only, but to peoples everywhere. For in this shrinking world our problems, our dissatisfaction, our dejection, our rebellion end up assuming an international character and our ire end up focused on external parties and powers, just as easily as it is focused on the internal actors, if not more so, a matter that is facilitated by the constant brainwashing to which we are subjected, certain messianic cultural traits, and good old-fashion human nature.

The corruption and authoritarian nature of the ruling regimes are serving to break the civil fabric in our region and are driving populations into recoiling onto primordial modes of belonging and extremist modes of thought. This, in turn, creates existential problems for the regimes which they can only address by encouraging their exportation elsewhere in the region and the world. This is why the Saudis back the establishment of wahhabi and salafi currents all through the world, and this is why the Assads, driven in particular by their minoritarian background which precludes any possibility of reform, or internal legitimization of their position, have gotten in bed with so many Jihadi movements in the region, back in the good old 80s, and now.

On the other hand, and if people want to wax critical of the current US administration, that's quite fine by me, but I caution against letting our criticism turn, or be turned, into an endorsement of policies that are bound to be equally disastrous. The reality is neither the neocon nor the liberals have a clue of how to handle the current crisis. Their continuous political bickering on so many issues not related to the Middle East, mostly domestic, is serving to recreate Cold War conditions in the region, where regimes attempt to ingratiate themselves to one side of the argument in the hope of relying on it to check the other side when it comes to certain critical decisions pertaining to the region.

Add to this, the continuing inability to coordinate with the allies in Europe, to carve place for China and Russia in the global decision-making process, or to come up with a new vision for NATO that will allow it to compensate for the shortcomings of the UN, not to mention actually coming up with a new vision for the UN itself, because, in the final analysis, this is what is really at stake here when we talk about a New World Order, and you have the recipe for a virtual disaster, the brunt of which will be felt by us all.

Unless there is a sufficient international will to tackle the challenges highlighted above, so that a real reform/peace package can be submitted to the peoples of the region, with real carrots and real sticks, for people tend to forget that this is not an either or situation, and the willingness to use both when needed, the only thing that the current politicking can produce at this stage is to move us from one disaster to another to yet another, until we hit the big one.

When it comes to real preemptive efforts, human beings have always proved lacking. We can only preempt in retrospect. But when it comes to plunging headfirst into disaster, we have always been proactive.

This is why I don’t bother much to criticize the Bush administration, what’s the point? My recommendations are too surreal for any administration to warrant serious consideration, and any criticisms I might have will simply be used as fodder in a meaningless political battle that will serve no real purpose, as far as I am concerned at least. The only reason I bother to criticize our side of the equation is my desire to find like-minded people with whom I can work and cooperate with regard to my surreal projects, including Tharwa.

A Few Heresies in Honor of the Ramadan Season!

2006-10-15T03:09:00.000-04:00

Ramadan. The most hedonistic time of the Muslim year. So, hedonistic, in fact, it might as well be called the Muslim Christmas or Hanukah. Indeed, human nature, when given the chance, tends to bastardize all rituals and observances meant to celebrate our loftier desires and yearnings. So be it. I really don’t have much problem with this particular human contradiction. I much rather the heterogeneity of individualized bastardization than the homogeneity of collective ritualistic observance.

But, and judging from the few made-for-Ramadan TV series that we can catch on cable (being unable to install a satellite dish in our apartment and follow the Ramadan scene more closely), this heterogeneity is rapidly becoming superficial, and is under serious threat of diminishing to the point of insignificance.

Year after year, TV series, especially Egyptian ones, become more and more infused with so much male chauvinist and traditional religious values that one has to seriously wonder if a systematic effort is not actually involved here. For while many complain with regard to the increasing explicitness of pop videos, in reality, pop videos can inspire more guilt in the soul of at a teenager who has been raised all his life on traditional values than they can inspire rebellion against said values. And now, we have TV series that increasingly consecrate traditional values, serving a purpose that is diametrically opposite to the one that was entrusted onto them by the secular Arab regimes in Egypt and Syria in particular, with many of the same actors and script writers, not to mention political leaders, still involved.

And while, this observation might hold more true with regard to Egyptian series than Syrian ones, which continue to betray some pronounced secular sympathies, the gap between the two artistic communities is rapidly closing, as is the gap between religious and nationalist currents in the country and the region. Being an Arab is becoming more and more synonymous with being a Muslim even in Christian Arab minds. As such, you either rebel against both, or you end up embracing both. No, this does not meant that Christians are converting to Islam, or that they will convert to Islam, people are never that mechanical in their reaction to things.

But many Christians are becoming as conservative and anti-secular, if not anti-western, as Muslims in the region, a fact evidenced by their current tendency to turn towards their religious leaders for inspiration and guidance rather than their political ones. Those Christians who cannot accept this state of affairs are emigrating in increasingly large numbers.

As to how this plays out in the artistic community, it is indeed quite interesting, and somewhat painful, to see how, in the hope of postponing the inevitable or softening the blow, or out of complete ignorance of what is actually at stake (which is more often the case, especially with regard to younger stars), Christian actors are choosing to praise the very values that will soon prove quite inimical to their basic rights as citizens. It is equally interesting and saddening to see how the same actors who have championed the more secular values at one point now seem to be advocating the more traditional and religious ones, perhaps by way of preparing themselves for the encounter with their maker.

Virtue has no secular side to it these days. Virtue is purely Islamic. The “father knows best” attitude of earlier shows, after all, we have always been a male chauvinist culture, is now being defended on Islamic grounds. In other words, father knows best, because he is following the word of God, Who, of course, Knows Best. Rebellion against the authority of the father is now more sacrilegious than it has ever been. Modern values of individualism and free expression are condemned as a priori wrong and evil. No argument in this regard takes place, the plot presupposes that they are wrong and, more importantly perhaps, that people know and accept that they are wrong. Indeed, plots are constructed in such a way that leaves the viewer no choice but to agree with the conclusion.

Women in these series, especially when independent and not so enthralled with their motherly duties, or with the “fact” that a woman’s calling is to be a “good” mother above all, are invariably portrayed as sluts.

No. These series are not some Islamic versions of Hollywood Christmas classics. Nor are they a celebration of traditional family values. They are a rejection of and a systematic attempt at demonizing modern values. Hollywood classics, for all their simplifications and occasional pitfalls, are quite humanist in nature, rather than purely Christian. There is no humanism involved here, but a missionary zeal that is no longer constrained to the religious channels.

No. contemporary Arab pop culture is not a liberating influence, but an instrument of mobilization that now not the only the nationalist regimes but also the religious currents are using to reject modernity and western influence.

Israel and Syria: To talk or not to talk…

2006-10-12T22:01:00.000-04:00

"Greetings from your Israeli reader and occasional correspondent. I'd be interested in hearing your views on the following matter.

Shimon Peres, Israel's inveterate devotee of the peace process, has ruffled a few feathers in the Prime Minister's office by calling for negotiations with Syria. This, in response to an apparent spate of newspaper interviews by Assad suggesting the peace process could move forward (ignoring, or winking an eye at Assad's simultaneous beating of the war drums). A prominent conservative Israeli economic columnist made an argument this morning in the economic supplement of Haaretz that now is the time for Israel to play the Syrian card, since Assad is opposed to Muslim fundamentalism, and peace with Israel could move him away from his alliance with Iran.

[These points come as] compelling arguments for Israelis politically adrift after the collapse of both the Oslo process (Barak) and unilateralism (Olmert). [They are] even more compelling for the Israeli left whose entire ideological fabric has been torn asunder. The questions this raises are obviously quite serious. Are Assad's flirtations a ruse to defuse international pressure over the Hariri assassination, an opportunity to move him in the right direction by use of a carrot, or both? Would heating up the Syrian-Israeli peace process strengthen a corrupt regime by shattering its isolation, lead to a simultaneous internal thaw and subsequent democratic change, or both? Would an Israel-Syria dialogue weaken the Assad-Ahmadinejad axis or allow it to continue under conditions of reduced international pressure? And as far as the hopes of the Israeli peace camp is concerned, is Assad another Sadat or another Arafat? No, you don't need to answer in black and white terms, but I'm sure these questions are relevant to the democratic camp in the Arab world as well as in Israel. Look forward to hearing from you."

________

Hi there,

These are some very interesting questions indeed. Let me put things in this succinct and to-the-point format:

* It will very embarrassing for Israel and the international community to embrace Bashar now only to discover in a few months time, when Brammertz issues the final report, that he, or high-ranking members of the regime, are actually involved in the Hariri assassination. For this reason, it would make much more sense for all the actors involved, the Israelis, the Europeans and the Americans, to say that negotiations with Syria could indeed take place but only following the conclusion of the investigation and depending on its outcome and on how the Syrian regime chooses to conduct itself in the interim period, and after. This is a very reasonable position to assume, and it shows that the international community, not to mention Israel, is not willing to jeopardize and waylay an ongoing investigation by embracing a suspect regime.

For attempting to actually “kill” the Hariri investigation, or to manipulate it by watering down its final conclusions is destined to backfire as it will end up sidelining the last few liberal figures and movements in the region, and will serve as a further argument in the arsenal of extremist forces regarding the hypocrisy of the international community, and the US in particular for all its democracy rhetoric.

** People will be wrong to conclude that the Assads' apparent desire to negotiate with Israel denotes a willingness to break with their Iranian backers. On the contrary, talks with Israel will be closely monitored and coordinated with the Iranians, and will serve as another instrument in the hand of the Iranian leaders to weaken the emerging international alliance against their nuclear designs, and to prevent its consolidation, by allowing the Iranians leaders to cast themselves in the garb of regional peacemakers.

How?

Well, when public meetings and consultations continue to take place between the Assads and various high level Iranian officials all through the talks, and when some elements pertaining to Iranian concerns be put on the table, including certain issues related to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Shebaa Farms, the Iranians can go on a PR campaign meant to polish their image making them appear more reasonable and pragmatic. Indeed, and in due course of time the successful conclusion of the talks will become intricately linked to launching negotiations with Iran as well.

Now, there is nothing necessarily wrong with that, especially if you reconciled to accepting Iran’s “right” to develop its own nuclear program, and if you are willing to believe that weapons are not part of the plans, or that regional stability is still achievable even with a nuclear Iran, and that Iran’s nuclear successes are not going to inspire similar ambitions across the region (including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, etc.) But if you have a problem with any of this, and if you are seriously thinking about ways to isolate Iran, then, you should really be aware here that peace talks with the Assads are in no way conducive to this end, and that they might in fact backfire.

*** We should also bear in mind that the Iranians could create a lot of problems for the Assads should they contemplate charting an independent course at this stage. They have too much riding on them. But, I do not think that this is a major concern for the Iranians really, for they have managed to establish a firm grip on the Assads to the extant that Syria's foreign policy is today being effectively drafted in Tehran. As such, negotiations with the Assads will come as indirect negotiations with the Iranians, and perhaps a (necessary?) prelude to them.

****As for empowering a corrupt and authoritarian regime, I wouldn’t worry too much about that, I think the Assads are beyond empowerment at this stage, peace or no peace. There is nothing that they or anyone else can do that will prevent the implosion of Syria at the not-too-distant future. But I will elaborate on this matter in a future posting.

Few personal notes on the making of suicide bombers

2006-10-09T17:23:00.000-04:00

Much has been written and said about the phenomenon of suicide bombing recently, and though only recently launched, the Tharwa Commentary could not but address the issue. For this reason, I thought, it might be useful to share the following thoughts with a wider readership in order to shed some lights on this important phenomenon, which I primarily view as being quite psychological in nature.

Indeed, spoken as a former Muslim extremist, I think I can probably contribute a few personal insights into the making of the would-be suicide bomber– the fate that I was lucky enough to elude.

The disaffected, the maladjusted, the alienated, the outcasts, the neglected, the oppressed, the maltreated and the marginalized, who come from a certain community, will always find ways and means derived from the basic traditions of their community to express and vent their frustration. People always feel the need to justify and legitimate their actions to others, especially when their actions come to disrupt certain accepted norms, or fly in the face of accepted values. It’s no surprising that the first thing they would do in this case is to look for whatever precedent, quotes or duly forgotten and neglected aspect of the common faith and traditions and use that to justify their actions.

Once such internal modes of justification are absent, or, once they prove insufficient, they would then turn to external sources, or invent their own arguments. The absence of justification will not cancel out their desire to rebel, reject and protest. The desire, the readiness and the willingness come first. Then comes the justification.

The process is not always so well-thought out, intentional and willful of course, but it is all too real and, to me, quite familiar.

Naturally, the reasons for the disaffection, maladjustment and resentment differ from one person to another, but there are several traits that are quite common to all: jealousy, covetousness and a desire to belong, to be accepted, and to shine.

We (if I am allowed a momentary lapse into my old frame of mind) want what others have, that sense of empowerment they appear to have, that sense of ownership over the world. We say that we rebel against injustice, and perhaps we do, but only in part, the other part side of our rebellion is our desire to trade places with our oppressors and become ourselves the oppressors. Hence the violence we are willing to reek upon the world. And hence our animosity towards the US, the most powerful country in the world. The fact that it has interests in our region and that it is often willing to pursue them even at the expense of our basic rights sometimes is an additional, albeit important, element behind our hatred. But the willingness to hate America because it is powerful is far more guttural really.

But, even in the Brotherhood of the Faithful, as the disaffected will soon find out, to their utter horror and dismay sometimes, there is still a lot of room for disdain, ostracism and stratification. One’s position is not always so empowering and does not always mean that one can be part of the inner circle where all the important decisions are made. Transparency is almost completely absent here, despite an occasional, and necessary, show at consultation of the wider membership, a fact that is justified on the not so unusual grounds of necessity and security. After all most circles are either being hunted down or operate under severe restriction and duress. Yet, and while this justification is accepted by many, the same people who would not accept such a justification when deployed by the ruling regimes, others will still seek a greater access into the decision-making circle, or they will opt to form their own circles which may or may not continue to remain affiliated with the original circle. Interrelations are not always that friendly either, and mutual recriminations are more the norm than the exception.

But radical groups have a heightened sense of danger and purpose, this allows for the adoption of certain transitional arrangements where focus of all cells remain focused on the external enemy, most of the time.

Once violence is adopted by a group of the disaffected as a legitimate means to express frustration and deliver the message, violence becomes also a way for one to gain greater legitimacy and credibility and move up the ranks within the group. The greater the disaffection, the greater the violence and the nihilism involved. Living in this world is the closest thing to a worldly Paradise the believer can ever have. To most, this will satisfy and suffice. The risk and hardships involved will only sweeten the deal by serving as a further evidence that salvation and purification are actually being earned with every passing moment, regardless of how mundane the effort is. Even the simple (or usually simple) act of defecation becomes actually “holy” here, not only because one has to observe the usual rituals and ablutions involved, but because the entire context is now holy.

Living as part of the Brotherhood is like living on the periphery of the real heavenly Paradise itself, you can smell the scent of it on almost daily basis, and the yearning for final acceptance will only grow with every passing day.

But and for the more idealistic members, the fake nature of it all, is bound to strike them sooner or later, the contradictions between the more criminal aspects of the entire enterprise, in which most other members will revel, and their romantic notions and desires will continue to haunt them, until they either lead them out, or further in.

The first alternative is the more difficult one, of course, as you end up losing everything, with no guarantees that the real world, which you so willingly abandoned at one point, will be so welcoming and accepting, or that you can adjust to it somehow this time around. But in order to have the luxury of even contemplating such an option, luck and time are needed. Yet often, time and luck are but luxuries which many the many young jihadis are deprived.

This brings us to the second path, the path of martyrdom through the suicide attack. For, in order to move further in, and the talk here is about the condition, the mental framework and the frame of mind that lead one to this path to begin with, not the group as a structured entity, one has to become a more perfect embodiment of the ideals one’s preach, but necessarily practice.
For, one might be dejected with oneself as well, and this is not to be taken lightly as a factor. Sexual urges, for instance, will continue to bedevil one, and no matter how many ways the jihadis find to accommodate this within the limits of the Sharia, sinning, in one’s mind and heart at least, is all but unavoidable, and the weight of this sin within the holy context in which one now lives, is that far more heavy. Reconcile yourself to dying through a suicide operation though, and the whole burden might seem a bit lighter for the interim.

A martyr is often then, but not always, an individual who is dejected with the very cause he espoused and the very people with whom he threw his lot in this world, and often, he is dejected with himself as well. But his desire to commit this ultimate act of "sacrifice" is not necessarily fueled by despair and guilt. More often, hope plays a more motivating role, hope that through this act (and only through this act for those driven by guilt) one can actually cleanse himself, cross that bridge and earn entry into the real Paradise, where one's belonging is eternal, and, more importantly perhaps, unconditional. Well, at least, once you are in.

The Slide!

2006-10-07T00:05:00.000-04:00

Signs continue to bode ill for the future of regional peace and stability. Indeed, it now seems more likely that the recent terrorist attack against the US embassy in Damascus has actually been real, not staged. But note that the Syrian authorities no longer link the attack to Jund al-Sham, the bogus group indirectly set up and “cleverly” manipulated by the Syrian military security apparatus over the last few years. Rather, the attack is now attributed to a new group of Syrian expatriates who have recently returned from Saudi Arabia, with the ideas of a certain unnamed Saudi cleric filling their heads.

The more one think about it then, the more the whole development seems like the case of the proverbial chicken coming home to roost, or an all too predictable case of “what goes around comes around.”

For long the Assads have blackmailed the Saudis, among other “Gulfies,” by threatening terror and mayhem, while relying on their well-known abilities, made legendary in the aftermath of Hama 82, to deal effectively with any potential payback or backlash at home. I dread to think that, seeing that the credentials of the new Assads in this regard have not been effectively established yet, despite the chain of assassinations in Lebanon and the continued crackdown against all opposition at home, there is a real chance that the Assads might yet be called to task for their adventurist behavior in the last couple of years through a new externally sponsored internal challenge (as has often been the case of course).

Indeed, and while many are predicting that Lebanon will be the scene for a renewed regional settling of score, Syria might just emerge as the more likely theater of operations in this regard, or, at least, an additional one (additional, that is, to both Lebanon and Iraq, if not Afghanistan as well. Through in Somalia and parts of the Sahel for good measure).

Seeing that none of the major players currently involved, especially Iran, the US, France, Israel and Syria, is likely to reverse its particular policies helping pave the way to this impending showdown, with all the external and internal implications of it, the only way that I can see to spare Syria from the looming mayhem is for the Assads to be taken out through an internal move, that is, to put it more precisely, a coup. This is probably what former VP Abdul Haleem Khaddam had in mind when he called upon the Syrian military to rebel against the Assads, using the commemoration of the October 73 “victory” as an occasion to do it.

I say, while it might be very tempting to shoot the messenger in this regard, it will do people well to heed the message itself. Otherwise, we are almost assured of disaster.

Admittedly though, the likelihood of anyone being even capable of heeding any such message at this stage is next to none. The weakest players on the scene are, nonetheless, strong enough internally to survive an immediate challenge. Or so it seems. Good for them, bad for Syria.

For if we are to avert the impending disaster, someone gotta give: if not the Assads, who? And if not now, when?

___________

On a completely unrelated note, I would like to thank Yaman Salahi for reminding me that I am actually an author, and not a political analyst.

Democracy vs. Engagement!

2006-09-28T01:34:00.000-04:00

In the aftermath of 9/11, democracy became a catch-word that was repeatedly enunciated by various American officials and commentators, from the President down, and brandished as some kind of magic weapon that can help make the differenced in the Global War on Terror. In the process though, Democracy was reduced to a single aspect of it, namely elections that, more often than not, produced undesirable results by empowering inherently non-democratic actors thus complicating the Administration’s push for greater political openness and reforms in the region.

This much has already been established, and criticizing the Bush Administration on these points is understandable, legitimate and necessary, especially considering the fact that we have still two more years to go in which much can still transpire, both positive, if new more nuanced approaches are adopted, or negative, if current tactics continue to be deployed unrevised.

But criticisms in this regard, however justified, will remain hollow and unproductive, if no clear and realistic alternate policy approaches are put on the table. To simply introduce a new catch-word on the scene, namely: Engagement, might make for some good sound-bites, and might indeed work within the context of the American electoral processes, and perhaps, Israeli ones, still, this is quite insufficient to help tackle the serious and critical problems involved in GWOT.

Indeed, engagement, with its current reduction to pure pragmatic containment, will likely prove even more naïve and disastrous than the democracy approach of the last 5 years, to the extant that muddling through using the current policies of the Bush Administration might make more sense.

How so?

Well, when engagement becomes all about containment, with no vision pronounced for addressing any of the real underlying issues in GWOT, the potential for empowering the wrong players and for abuse of the entire process of engagement becomes all the more likely, if not inevitable.

In order to understand how this might work, just consider what seems like the basic stand of the pro-engagement crowd, namely: their adamant dismissal of the very possibility that some sides may not be as engageable as we want them and need them to be. This opens the door for abuse of the process of engagement by dragging talks on and on without an end-game in sight. Meanwhile the regimes involved will be empowered to act as wantonly as they can get away with so long as they manage to maintain certain façades that will fool the pro-engagement crowd because they seem eager to be fooled.

For even before the talks are underway, engagement advocates have already conceded, in their various pronouncements, articles, op-eds and blog-posts, many of the basic demands of the regimes they want to engage without getting anything back in return, not even promises.

Take the Assads regime in Syria as an example of how the pro-engagement crowd proposes to do things. Indeed, in this case, the list of concessions seems to include: a readiness to bury the UN inquiry into the Hariri assassination, and a willingness to see the entire country of Lebanon returned to the Assads’ control, in anticipation of the Assads’ help in disarming Hezbollah, controlling radical Palestinian groups and stemming the flow of Jihadi elements and funds to Iraq.

But the most important concession of all is the complete abandonment of any push for reform and democratization in Syria. The position of the Assads as the rulers of Syria will be legitimated, and all serious talk of reform will be consigned to that old “dustbin of history” that the allegedly socialist Assads are so fond of. Opposition members, human rights and democracy advocates, the critical position that most of them adopted vis-à-vis the Bush policies in the region and vis-à-vis their own country notwithstanding, will be decimated so thoroughly that the cause of modernization, democratization and secularization of the country will be set back for decades.

The impact of such a turnaround on whatever remaining support that the US still enjoys in certain reformist quarters around the region will be equally devastating of coursem, as other regimes follow the Assads' lead. The US will have no real friends left in the region, and only charlatans and blackmailers to deal with. For, this is indeed what the Assads are, in the final analysis, and this is what their policies have been all about for decades now. Even the pro-engagement crowd concedes that, as many of them continue to deploy Godfather analogies to the entire situation. Engagement advocates simply hope that engagement will encourage the Assads to change their spots, eventually, though they fail to tell us how the Assads can actually manage such an unlikely feat, and who will eventually emerge as the Michael Corleone, of the family (and let's bear in mind here that the Michael Corleone's project for legitimizing the family business failed, as he was continuously sucked back in) .

Meanwhile, those who call for engaging Syria but not necessarily Iran, try to justify their Syrian-engagement policy by claiming that it is necessary in order to wean the Assads off of their newly-recovered Iranian dependency and take a step towards isolating Iran and weakening its influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon. The possibility that the Assads might just be too weak at this stage to turn against Iran, that such a course might indeed be suicidal for them as it might lead them into an internal showdown and/or a conflict with Hezbollah (not to mention the radical Palestinian groups, including the radical wing in Hamas led by Khalid Meshaal, who now get the bulk of their financial support from Iran) for which they are no more ready than the Israelis have been, is simply not factored into the calculations of the pro-engagement crowd.

Little intelligence indeed seems to be factored into the calculations here and much faith. So how different is the pro-engagement crowd from their neo-con foes?

While the Democracy Faith seems to have been based on the assumption that authoritarianism and corruption in the Broader Middle East and North Africa Region seem to play a role in encouraging international terrorism, the Engagement Faith is premised on the assumption that authoritarian regimes are much more capable of cracking down on terrorists than democracies can. The facts that authoritarian regimes, due to their endemic and gargantuan corruption and their mismanagement of the economy are actually driving their populations further and further into the folds of Islamist extremism, and that this state of affairs leaves the regimes involved only one realistic option to deal with this problem on the short run, namely: to export it to other neighboring countries and the world by allowing the radical elements to take their violence elsewhere, are, once again, not factored into the equation.

But so long as policymakers continue to base their calculations on faith, wishful thinking and unjustifiable expectations rather than intimate knowledge of the new complexity of the region and reliable intelligence, and so long as policymakers in the United States in particular continue to lay a nihilistic partisan game, despite the serious nature of threats involved with regard to the US interests on both the short and long runs (not to mention the interests of the peoples of the region), and so long as US policymakers fail to coordinate their plans and policies with their European and regional allies, at least through NATO, if not the UN (and NATO seems more preferable here), and so long as there is no acceptance, on part of one and all involved, of the reality that the challenge of terrorism requires longer term commitment and planning, then the region will simply move from one disaster to another and the impact of that will be felt all over the world through increased acts of terrorism and mayhem.

War Cries!

2006-09-23T03:10:00.000-04:00

Cool heads do not seem destined to prevail in the region these days. They are too few to begin with. In fact, I can only count one: Fouad Seniora. The hot heads, on the other hands, are too numerous to list in toto, but they surely include: Mahmoud Amhadinejad, Hassan Nasrallah and Bashar al-Assad. The first has just wasted his fifteen minutes in the UN by failing to offer anything of substance to advance his country’s cause. Grandstanding may get you a few laughs and applause (a la Chavez, I guess), but not understanding or support.

Meanwhile, the last two has just performed a bizarre sort of a Laurel and Hardy act by threatening UNIFEL and slamming all their opponents in Lebanon, accusing them of treason and of being agents for Israel, which is not only dumb, but very unimaginative on their part.

Still, what we see here is coordination in action once again, the Radical Alliance is upping the ante once again, and the ground seems set now for a Round Two of sorts with Israel. For, everybody wants to provoke the beast again. Everybody needs a distraction.

I wonder what sort of guise the provocation will assume this time!

We, the Barbarians!

2006-09-17T03:33:00.000-04:00

Have all leaders, religious and political, in the so-called Muslim World, become illiterate all of a sudden? Or are they intent on using every little opportunity that presents itself to prove in deed what they continue to deny in words, namely: that Islamic civilization and culture are dead, and that Muslims are adamant on continuing their head-long descent into barbarity?

Pope Benedict XVI did not write some long anti-Islamic treatise, but delivered a brief lecture, whose text number less than 3500 words, in which he referred to Islam in only two places, at the beginning and end of the lecture. Anyone who bothered to read the entire text should be able to see that the two references were not meant as some theological condemnation of Islam itself, but of the circumstances surrounding its historical emergence onto the scene, which indeed raise some important questions about the relationship between faith and violence.

In raising this issue, the Pope does not betray any signs of ignorance regarding Islam, as the early chorus of critics has contended, on the contrary, he is quite aware of the oft-quoted Qur’anic verse “there is no compulsion in religion.” But he is also aware of the fact that this verse appeared at a time when “Mohammed was still powerless and under threat,” and of the fact that, later, when Muhammad grew more powerful, new instructions appeared in the Qur’an concerning the obligation of holy war. He was also aware of the different treatments accorded in this regard to the “people of the Book” and the “infidels.” But, to him, that still does not excuse Muhammad’s command “to spread by the sword the faith he preached,” in the words of Byzantine Emperor Manuel II, as quoted by the Pope.

At a time when much violence continues to be wrought in the name of Islam, and at a time when Muslim jurists remain remiss in their duty to voice a unanimous and clear condemnation of this tendency, this is indeed a very legitimate issue to raise, especially within the context of the call that the Pope later made for conducting intercultural dialogue and for accepting the continued relevance of faith, in all its varieties, to the modern world. By simply attacking the person who raised this question, Muslims all over the world have shown that they are not ready for dialogue.

For if the only thing Muslims can do at this stage is to resort to violence and protests whenever their faith is criticized, whether by internal figures and reformers or external pundits, what sort of role or niche are they carving to themselves in this world?

Why can’t Muslims take a more proactive approach to these matters, and organize some sort of a periodic meeting where certain problematic issues, such as jihad, apostasy, freedom of conscience, academic freedom, relation between Islam and the state, not to mention the ever problematic issues of gender relations and sexuality, are continuously addressed and the Muslim positions on these matters is continuously refined?

True, there will be many dissenting voices, but if enough known scholars gathered and proposed a document that can be used as a reference point by states and regional and international organizations, then, Muslims all over the world will be in a much better position to present themselves as true partners in the making of contemporary civilization, rather than some troublesome relics and throwbacks.

We cannot just continue to give ourselves the right to criticize others for what they have done and continue to do us, without giving them a similar right to criticize us for what we have to done and continue to do to them. This is a simple corollary of the Golden Rule to which both Christians and Muslims subscribe, and it makes perfect sense in this case. But if we are to continue to blind ourselves to the realities of our history, and of its impact, real and perceived, on others, then, we will have no moral right to present our case vis-à-vis the injustices committed against us at this stage.

The Muslims were up in arms not too long ago when the Vatican apologized to the Jews for the way they were treated by the Church all through history. The Muslims immediately demanded that the Vatican issues a similar apology to them for the Crusades. Just like that, Muslim leaders and jurists were willing to forget all about their own occupation and Islamization of previously Christian lands. Many of them did not, and do not still, all attempts at explanation notwithstanding, see the embedded irony and contradiction in this stand of theirs.

Such is the level of our conviction in our own righteousness that we leave no room for any doubt to protrude into our minds and souls regarding the sacred nature of our history and our beliefs. We do not review anything. We do not revise anything. All intellectual analysis in our parts has ceased to exist a thousand years ago it seems. The sporadic attempts at reviving it throughout the last Century have come to naught. The few that are still being made today seem even more pitiful. The Islamic currents that exist today have no real intellectual component or analysis at its core, but mere assertions, usually expressed in the negative, that are better presented in the form of bullet-points.

As for the secular currents out there, they are indeed pure products of western ideologies. No real attempt has so far been elaborated to explain them within the context of the Islamic historical experience. Perhaps such an undertaking is indeed impossible at this stage, seeing that the cut-off between these traditions and whatever Islamic precedent in this regard might just be insurmountable. But, perhaps we really don’t need to tie these ideas and ideologies to Islamic precedents. Perhaps what we need to do is simply to elaborate them using our own unique voice, and on the basis of our own present and historical experiences. Perhaps we just need to learn how to think again even if from scratch, because, in some instances, especially when we are not dealing with the hard sciences, we really need to reinvent the wheel in order to better appreciate it.

So, perhaps the meeting I proposed above should be organized by liberal intellectuals instead, in cooperation with those Muslim jurists, such as Gamal al-Banna, who have shown enough courage, creativity and adventurism to become true partners in a new process meant to finally bring us into the modern era.

We cannot afford to be silent anymore. True, our protests have succeeded in getting the Pope to apologize and recant, and before that, we did manage to punish the Danes over the cartoon controversy, but that is not because we manage to earn any understanding or appreciation for our point of view, but because we have found a way to terrify the world. We have become the barbarians of the modern world. People will fear us, but they will never respect us, or accept us as equals, or appreciate the legitimacy of many of our grievances, no matter how far and wide we spread our terror.

Moreover, our barbarism will give the civilized peoples of the world more excuses to dabble in our lives, ignore our just demands and needs, and impose their will upon us. For, as history has repeatedly shown, when barbarians are not able to be the destroyers of civilizations, either because they are not powerful enough yet or civilization weak enough yet to allow for that to happen, as indeed is the case at this point in time, then, they become the ultimate and unsympathetic victims thereof. Indeed, there is a high price to pay for the foolish pride we continue to harbor within us, because we have nothing to show for it anymore.

Don’t Be Too Quick to Thank the Assads!

2006-09-12T22:27:00.000-04:00

Previous “Islamist” attacks in Syria have always looked suspicious, even staged, to most onlookers and analysts, their particular sympathies, be they pro-regime or anti-regime, notwithstanding. The reason for this was the choice of target, namely: empty buildings. Now, we have a seemingly more credible attack in terms of target selection, but the choice of methods and tactics is truly problematic.

For blowing up gas containers will not cause even a dent in the heavily fortified walls of the American Embassy, and the only people who are likely to be hurt in such an attack are the security guards outside, and the line of innocent bystanders, mostly Syrians, waiting to apply for an American visa. Moreover, the pictures we saw on TV indicate that the car exploded at the entrance of the narrow alley where people stand in line, near the iron gate that leads into the Embassy, that is, in the area of least people concentration and least likelihood of being affected by the explosion. Add to this, the fact that one of the cars used in the attack was a van.

The problem with this is latter fact is that everybody in Syria knows that vans are simply not allowed to pass through certain sensitive areas and neighborhoods, and the Malki and Abu Rummaneh neighborhoods where the US Embassy is located, alongside many other western embassies and the domiciles of so many diplomats and high level Syrian officials, including our Illustrious President (may Allah increase him in stupidity and cut his reign short), are definitely the prime areas in this regard.

As such, for a van to simply waltz into the neighborhood is not exactly something that will go unnoticed by security agents. Indeed, security vehicles will be dispatched within seconds of the initial sighting to intercept the hapless vehicle. So, we have a situation here where either the terrorist group involved is made up of a bunch of buffoons and nitwits who thought that they could somehow rush into the Embassy and blow it up with gas containers before anyone could stop them, or we have to conclude that the entire event was intended and set up to fail from the very get-go.

Naturally, I tend to favor the latter alternative, simply because the marriage between the Syrian intelligence apparatuses and certain Islamist elements and the way these elements are used to further certain interests and policies of the regime is well-established by now. In fact, the case of the Syrian Turkmen smuggler-turned preacher, Abu’l Qa’qa’, is a clear testimony to this effect.

Indeed, the man had operated quite publicly in the 2003-4 period and helped recruit and send young Syrian and Arab jihadists to join the “resistance” in Iraq as part of the semi-official campaign that was underway at the time. But, and when the stench grew too strong for the authorities and they came under increasing pressures to curb the flow of jihadi elements to Iraq, and whatever public recruitment activities that were taken place at the time, Abu’l Qa’qa’ changed his tune and reinvented himself as a businessman and a philanthropist, He even did a few public appearances and interviews with the semi-official press at the time, before he all too quietly disappeared from the scene. But taped lectures by him resurfaced a few months ago when the authorities raided a suspected Islamist cell in the aftermath of the attack on an empty security building near the headquarters of the Syrian public TV in Damascus, an attack widely believed to have been staged as well, as it coincided with ongoing attempts to rally public support for the Assads. The authorities said at the time that Abu’l Qa’qa’ had, very conveniently, slipped out of the country.

Indeed, throughout the last few years, Islamist activities, both in Syria and neighboring countries, have been very conveniently timed to suit the interests of the Assads. This one is no exception. At a time when the future of the Syrian regime is still being debated, a reminder of the potential role that the Assads can play in the war against terror might be useful, at least for those who are willing to believe in the impossibly ludicrous.

Of Historical Musts & Clashing Desires!

2006-09-09T04:16:00.000-04:00

Perhaps, for people who never heard of democracy, passing through a transitional phase of enlightened despotism was necessary and perhaps even a natural part of their societal evolution.

But for people who have been exposed to democracy, not to mention modernity, no matter how indirectly or vicariously, and for people who know it through direct experiences and contacts, even if they do not completely appreciate its complexity and its demands on them, the task of achieving it through a necessary period of dictatorial transformations becomes that much more complex.

For those who crave democracy would not want to wait for generations to build the necessary cultural framework for it, and those who fear it would not want to establish any of the necessary reforms and framework for its introduction. Meanwhile, those who crave modernity would not want to wait until the society learns to appreciate it democratically and on its own pace and terms, and those who don’t would would want to resist it on a popular level, as they often have the greater share of popular sympathy and approval.

Can we really have both modernization and democratization as simultaneous processes that can reach an acceptable level of fulfillment in the span of a single lifetime to appeal to all those impatient souls out there?

The West had the luxury of experimenting and stumbling, though not blindly, for many decades and centuries until it worked out democracy and found itself embroiled in modernity. It all happened in fits and struts and then more fits and struts. We have no other choice to follow the same rocky path. But some of us would be lost in their yearning for a faster fulfillment of it all, for they cannot ignore the finished product that they can examine with their naked eyes and insist on reinventing the wheel from scratch when the whole truth of it is right there for all to see. Furthermore, they can also see how impossible and out-of-character it will be for the rest of the world to simply wait for us to catch up with it on our own pace and terms.

No, the world will not wait for us to learn and assimilate its new cherished truths at our own pace, just as we did not wait for it to learn and assimilate ours so long ago. There is no real malice, spite or design involved here, at least not a malice, spite or a design that is conscious of itself all the time, and of all the implications of the various horrendous decisions that gets made in the name of progress, the historical must and the plain greed that are part and parcel of it. What is involved here is the sheer folly that emanates from our own humanity and from the very structures and institutions that give our lives meaning and us a sense of belonging.

We, the sentient inhabitants of this earth, are a desperate and fractious lot indeed, a pitiful lot, an over-aspiring lot. Our interests, values, yearnings, beliefs, needs and desires will forever clash, and we will constantly walk all over each other, intentionally and not so intentionally, whenever the need should arise, all our principles and sense of humanity notwithstanding.

After all, the West did not have the luxury of working out its modernity and democracy unmolested. Neither shall we. Albeit the external dabbling which we have to endure is on a radically different scale than what that the West had had to endure with regards to both quantity and quality. And the pace of it all is maddening and merciless.

No, we, the peoples of this unfortunate region, seem destined to be more like the Native Americans in their fate – much of who we are will likely become extinct by the time we are modernized and democratized, whether we like it or not.

In fact, most of us don’t like it, and are, therefore, putting up quite the fight. That is indeed what lies at the heart of international terrorism, especially Islamist one. Oh, we, as a culture that is, will eventually go into that good night all right, terrorism notwithstanding, following the lead of our long dead civilization. But we won’t go gently. That’s the point. Death often has pangs, even when it is collective, no, especially when it is collective.

Most of us are simply too attached to the old ways to allow for a gentle fading away. They didn’t have time to see the wisdom of change, or appreciate its necessity and its potential benefits, or take part in making it so they can feel that they own it somehow. And they never will. Even if they did, enough of them will still hold out to share enough of their pain and frustration with an equally hostile world. It’s their belief system, after all, that is at stake here, it’s everything that they are, including in many instances, their very livelihood, and the world cannot accommodate it anymore, it cannot accommodate the particularities of their basic desires, wants and needs, not in practical terms any. In theory, accommodation is almost always possible. But in practice, we are just too human to let it happen.

So, we will indeed change in due course of time, and we will be changed as well. In fact we are already changing and being changed, though some of us at a faster pace than the rest. And some of us, though not always the best, will survive this. But most of us, though not always the worst, will die, at least in the cultural sense.

The survivors might still call themselves Arabs, Muslims, Kurds, etc., but the only thing that will be recognizably Arab, Muslim or Kurdish about them will be their assertions in this regard, and perhaps even their languages. This will more likely suffice most of the time, except for those few moments when a deeply buried nostalgia resurfaces, invoked, perhaps, by the sight of the few remaining vestiges or the few surviving holdouts who opted for a quieter form of rebellion.

An Afterthought

Does anyone think that the just despots of the West would have introduced any reforms, had they known that these reforms will eventually destroy the entire systems they have built or inherited, and would change the entire way of life with which they were familiar and which they, perhaps, revered?

I think that the main difference between the just despots of the Old West, and the current despots of the Middle East lies in the fact that contemporary Middle Eastern leaders know very well where reforms will eventually lead, which is why they can never be just.

Will We Survive?

2006-09-08T04:57:00.000-04:00

Are peace and stability at any cost always good?

No, I am not posing this question, because I have an agenda in mind, or because I am seeking to advocate some sort of a violent action in the region. Rather, I am asking this, because I feel we are drifting closer and closer to more regional wars and mayhem in the next few months and years, both due to external and internal pressures. I just wonder whether this is necessarily a bad thing, or at least, whether this is the only bad thing.

For the peace and stability that all “realists” seem to be advocating for us are premised on purely political grounds, and is bound to deny us any possibility at seeking any kind of improvement in the situation of basic human and political rights across the region. It will thwart any possibility of establishing a more responsible and accountable form of government, as it is bound to put all democracy and human rights activists and political dissidents at the mercy of regimes that have traditionally showed them none.

As such, the peace and stability that are being proposed for us might work for all actors, including the ruling regimes and the powers-that-be, US, France, China, Russia, Israel etc. Hell, they might even put some food on the table for a short while as far as most people are concerned. But neither the liberal actors, nor the radical and extremist elements, most of all the jihadists, will be happy with this situation. For, none of them can advance their agenda in the shade of the kind of peace and stability that our illustrious regimes can produce.

But, and while the jihadists can always opt to rebel and work their mayhem, even if their numbers were small (and let’s not forget here that the number of Muslim Brotherhood members who opted or violence in Syria in the late 70s and early 80s, numbered only a few hundreds), the liberals cannot do that. For most, such violent rebellion would represent a betrayal of the basic ideals being advocated. But for others, the very few others who might contemplate violence, such rebellion requires a certain psychological and ideological conditioning that they simply seem to lack, at least at this stage. As such, they are more likely to turn suicidal than murderous.

Meanwhile, working on a nonviolence alternative in the hope of producing another color or flower revolution might simply be an impossible undertaking in countries where the civil society is well-nigh dead. Still, it represents the only hope that the liberals really have, if they are to remain true to themselves. But even should such a revolution take place, and albeit the liberals will most surely take an active part in organizing it, alongside other elements, including leftist and nationalist currents and moderate Islamists, no liberal will likely emerge as the leader in any of the existing states. The societies will remain too conservative to allow for that.

These are not opportune times for the liberals. But then, the times will never become opportune on their own. They need to be made so. The liberals need to earn their luck. If they cannot have much of a direct influence over how things are likely to turn out at this stage, and if they seem about to be sold out to the regimes even, the best that they could do is to try to conjure mechanisms for surviving and even growing underground.

For in the final analysis, both the peace and the stability of the realists, and constructive chaos of the neocons, not to mention the pure mayhem of the extremists and jihadists, spell doom for us, liberals. Lacking the ability to break the status quo as a result of our own independent initiatives, the best we can do at this stage is – survive.

The Heretic & the Cross!

2006-09-05T04:40:00.000-04:00

Throughout history and in our constant attempt as species to do what is right and heroic, we more often end up doing what is totally wrong and downright foolish, because we often confuse what is sensational with what is right, and what is purely selfish with the common good. In order to avoid this unfortunate pitfall, we have to constantly remind ourselves that doing right is more often a punishable crime, at the least in the societal if not the strictly legal sense, than a celebrate act of heroism, and that selflessness is often interpreted as stupidity and weakness and the selfless will more often become victim of his very penchant to do good.

Therefore, if we cannot do good for good’s sake, we will forever remain miserable as the wait for the eventual rewards could last a lifetime. Else, we will all too easily stumble into doing what is purely selfish, regardless of our original intentions. Good should always be its own reward, and heroism should more often be sought in the daily victories that one can achieve over his baser instincts and the chronic temptations of daily subsistence in the age of crass consumerism. And if salvation is to make an appearance in our life, and if it is indeed part and parcel of it, we should know that it will not be heralded by some heavenly trumpet calls, but will rather creep upon us at a pitiful pace and will never be the glorious affairs that we think it or want it to be. Heroism is more often lackluster and subdued, and the heroes are ordinary people that can be encountered every day, all around us, bearing no distinguishing marks but that of their goodness, if we are still willing to see it, that is, and have not grown too cynical about its all too real presence among us.

The souls of these heroes are often riddled with guilt and even a sense of defeat, for all the daily victories that they have accumulated. For, to them, every failure is a failure too many and the price of most victories is often too high. And what is accomplished will forever fall short of even their most modest expectations. This is the price for having a living conscience, I guess, and for striving hard to learn how to listen to it as closely as possible. This is also the natural price for having an inborn drive for achievement and for seeking to strike some sort of balance between the calls of it and the dictates of one’s conscience. The heroes might appear saintly to us, but they remain sinner to themselves. And so they should, lest they become megalomaniac and nullify the effect of every good they have done.

Does all this sound all too pretentious on my part? Perhaps it is. But then, which one of us does not really harbor such righteous pretensions within him/herself? We need these pretensions to keep on believing in ourselves and in our ability to distinguish right from wrong and to do some good in this world. True, these pretensions might be a bit overblown in my case, but then I never denied the reality of my Messiah Complex. But I also never used it as an excuse to ignore the possibility that I could be wrong with regards to almost everything I believe in. I go on because I keep on doubting myself, though hopefully at the right time, and I do not see in my ability to pull myself out of harm’s way in a timely fashion, or to recover so quickly after a mishap, any justification for what I do or believe in. I believe that I have always been lucky, but I long stopped taking my luck as some clear sign of divine favor. My inadequacies and mistakes are too numerous and I have become all too aware of them for me to believe in such a nonsensical notion anymore. My Messiah Complex has more often served to save me from me, because no one else will likely be so interested or inclined.

Yet, I am as interested in self-redemption as I am in the redemption of humankind, but I do believe that each one of us is ultimately responsible for making his/her own destiny. We can help each other, yes, and we should, but, in the final analysis, each one of us has to choose separately if he/she wishes to help or be helped. Our redemption as a species is both an individual and a collective responsibility, and is an all too human undertaking, and a never ending one. And yes, for all the oppression in the world, we do have a choice, and we do have the power to choose. But as to whether we have the courage, the will, the backbone, the moral fiber, the adventurous spirit, the principled stand, the knowledge base to choose, not to mention make an informed choice, well, this is a different matter all together. Unfortunately though, it is also quite relevant to the crisis at hand.

There are indeed too many clashing interests around, too much greed, too much ignorance, too little gumption, too radical and xenophobic visions, for anyone to accommodate anyone these days, for anyone to make any rational choice. Indeed, I seriously doubt that humanity has ever made a rational collective choice by design. It is always in the aftermath of a major disaster, in those few and rare moments of tragedy-induced sobriety that people and states can actually make some rational choices, albeit on the most limited scale imaginable. Too much reason dulls the human spirit it seems.

But to put things less cynically we should probably say that too much reason impinges on the enduring interests of the ruling regimes, strains the forever limited imagination of the masses, who will forever be preoccupied with their basic wants and needs, and disturbs the basic belief systems of the religious and intellectual elites, whose very neuroses will continue to be premised on the need to feel and be and claim to be, as vociferously as possible, righteous and right. As such, accommodation rather than acceptance is the best arrangement that can ever be achieved at any given time. And these are not very accommodating times.

So, what could people who suffer from a deeply-rooted Messiah Complex do in such troubled times? What they do in all other times, I guess - carry their crosses and plunge right ahead. What other choice for them is there really? Silence and quiet contemplation of the madness around them/us might work for the acetic but not for the heretic, for the angels but not for the messiahs, for the luminaries, but not for the tortured souls. I think the world needs both. And pretension or not, presumption or not, I think I know where I fit in all this. I always have.

Heretical Correspondences (Part 1)!

2006-09-02T01:57:00.000-04:00

…If our leftwing intellectuals think of themselves as the walking martyrs of the modern Arab cause, and the last standard bearers of the values of true social justice and true cultural integrity, however they define truth and integrity, and if this stand of theirs should get them some popular sympathy someday, though I won’t hold my breath, we, the liberal intellectuals, I mean the really liberal intellectuals, the ones who are too secular even for socialist tastes and too concerned with individual rights to accommodate any faith, are simply-put the modern-day scarecrows and ghouls who will be despised by one and all long into the future even if, no, especially if time ended up proving us right.

We have become simply too cut off from our alleged cultural roots to be understood and appreciated. Indeed, people simply don’t understand why we insist on claiming that we are still Arabs, although, we no longer subscribe to that ethos of vainglory and victimhood that has long become part and parcel of modern Arab identity. To them, modern Arab identity is a faith, a very defined faith, with its own values system, its own moral code, its own esoteric teachings even that only the initiates can learn and appreciate through some sort of refurbished catechisms. There is no room for introspection here, only the illusion thereof. And we are damned because we can no longer share that illusion.

We have become too liberal to continue to remain victims to this particular illusion. We have become too liberal to fit in the national vision and plan of all the rest – the leftists, the Islamists, the regimes, the powers-that-be, and the powers-that-simply-can-never-be.

Meanwhile, it is clear that our own vision for the region, which, contrary to popular beliefs and perceptions, does not consist of a simple act of copy-and-paste of all things western, is in itself too esoteric to be fulfilled in our lifetimes. For modernity has already been exported/imported, in all its western glory, all that remains is for it to be thoroughly assimilated. Considering the state of the product being digested, and the very state of our digestive system these days, the process is bound to be quite difficult and painful.

So, the best that we can ever be at this stage is to be the perennial fly in the ointment of all the rest, and hope that by sheer sweat, and some blood perhaps, we can start some new fermentation process that can spark the advent of it all. And we might just end up being the true awaited messiahs. Indeed, we can never be too liberal for the Messiah Complex, and that is why we still care about the region, and that is why we are still Arabs, the new Arab faith notwithstanding.

The Alawite Question!

2006-08-31T04:13:00.000-04:00

An interesting guest-post on Syria Comment raises the all too important issue of Alawite rule in Syria from the hence missing Alawite point of view. The post does a good job in summarizing Alawite concerns, and poses certain questions that members of the other communities in Syria are required to answer in order to convince the Alawites to take part in changing the situation in the country and turning against the Assads.

Indeed, the issue of the Sunni-Alawi Divide, or the Alawi-Everyone Else Divide if you like, is one of the main issues, if not the main issue, that needs to be addressed if peaceful change is to have a chance in the country. I have dealt with this issue on this blog repeatedly before, but I have to say that, oftentimes, the comments have tended to be too general and, hence, uninspiring.

I now believe that the best way to debate this issue is to hold a closed forum of well-known intellectuals and dissidents with the purpose of coming up with a draft for a national pact or charter where all these issues are directly addressed. We can, then, demand that Syrian opposition groups sign on to it. Those who do will be invited to attend a general conference (independent figures will come by themselves, while groups will be asked to send a delegation made up of no more than 10 representatives) where elections will be held to form a government-in-exile consisting of a parliament, a PM and a small cabinet.

The combination of a national charter and an elected government-in-exile might prove a good formula for attracting popular attention and support from across the political and communal spectrum in the country.

But, and in the process of discussing the relevant issues we need to take heed of several points:

* Despite the suspicion that many Alawites have vis-à-vis the Sunnis, in reality few Sunnis are actually anti-Alawites. Indeed, most of the dissidents in Syria are Sunnis, and for the first few years of Bashar rule, they would have been more than satisfied had he simply enacted some necessary political reforms. Since many of these Sunnis are actually secular, albeit rather conservative on many social issues, the continuation of the Alawite rule for a few more years would have served as a guarantor against Islamist rule. In reality, however, this was quite a delusional line of thought, and a way for Sunnis leaders to cop out on their responsibility towards their own community. For no one can really contain somebody else's fanatics. Be that as it may, the window has closed on this matter now. Most Sunni dissidents and opposition figures, inside the country and out, has moved on to adopt a full-fledge commitment to regime change.

* We also need to bear in mind that the perceptions with which we are dealing, while popular in their relevant quarters, are not necessarily historically accurate. Take the Alawite complaint about Sunni maltreatment of their ancestors for instance. This is simply a gross generalization. Indeed, both the abusing feudal lords in question and the abused peasants came from various communal backgrounds, including Christian, Ismaili and Sunni in addition to the Alawites. In fact, to this very day, relations among Ismailis and Alawites tend to be rather strained on account of this legacy, as evident by the various clashed that took place in late 2004. But demographics being what they are, Sunnis, on both sides were overrepresented. We still have to deal with the popular perceptions, of course, but we, the community leaders, whether elected or happy with this designation or not, cannot afford to subscribe to them ourselves. Otherwise our ability to hold meaningful discussions amongst ourselves will be severely undermined.

* It should be obvious here that should democratic elections eventually take place, they are bound to pave the way for a greater, even dominant, Sunni role in the decision-making process, demography being what it is. So, if people cannot deal with that, then, they’d better stop saying that they are really interested in democracy. But, and rather than betting on developing a system that will continue to sideline the majority, and hence increase their communal identification, we need to come up with certain new arrangements that are meant to prevent the rise of any form of authoritarian rule whether perpetrated in the name of a certain majority or a minority, however defined. A system of checks and balances based on public accountability, transparency, rule of law, and respect for basic freedoms is required here.

* A role for army meant to preserve the above system, as is the case in Turkey, might need to be envisioned here, even mandated for a certain period of time, to alley the fears prevalent among the various minority communities, not to mention the secular Sunnis, their political affiliations notwithstanding. But even this cannot be tolerated forever. In the final analysis, we all need to learn how to trust each other again and to build bridges between various communities and institutions that are meant to improve inter-community ties (our activities at the Tharwa Project come to mind here).

* The status quo is not going to hold forever, change is going to come sooner or later, and it will, in fact, be coming sooner than any of us might expect. After all, this 2006 AD not 1006 AD, things tend to happen at a rather faster pace. Dynasties do not last for 100 plus years anymore. So, the Alawites should advantage of the fact that they are in control at this stage, and should attempt to design the best possible deal for themselves. The more they wait, the more frustrated and radicalized the Sunnis will get, and the harder the possibility of holding talks and reaching agreements. Indeed, we should be mindful here that just as there are currents within the Alawite community that are suspicious of change, there are also currents within the Sunni community that want it at any price, an are wiling to wait for the right moment to get it all. These Sunni currents are currently flourishing in the country thanks to the patronage of the Assads who think that they can control them. This is quite delusional of course. The only people who can contain these Sunni fanatics, as we have noted above, are the Sunni moderates, and the only way for the Sunni moderates to be empowered to do so is through a deal with the Alawites that will give them the role in the decision-making process that is more commensurate with their demographic and economic realities. Just as the Sunnis cannot get rid off the Assads on their own, the Alawites cannot contain the fanatic Sunnis on their own. Now more than ever, the moderates on all sides need each other.

In the struggle to contain the looming crisis ahead we need to learn that time is not on our side, and that the only way it could come to our side is when we initiate the right process and take charge of our lives. We have not done that in quite a while now, and look where we ended up!

Should Syria and Israel Start Peace Talks Now?

2006-08-29T05:54:00.000-04:00

My latest contribution to the Creative Syria Think Tank is up and running, alongside those of my dear friend, Ibrahim Hamidi, Patrick Seale and Ghayth Armanazi. As usual, people can read and vote on the various contributions.

How should the two countries plan for the talks in order to enhance the chances of success? What other related issues should be dealt with as part of the final solution?

In order to answer this question in a meaningful manner, we should bear in mind that neither Syria nor Israel can actually plan such a major undertaking without first consulting their respective allies and supporters, namely Iran and the United States. Moreover, we should not be oblivious here as the current regional context in which these talks are to be held, namely: the ongoing investigation into the assassination for former Lebanese PM, Rafic al-Hariri, and the current stand-off with Iran regarding its nuclear programs and its regional ambitions.

Looking at the issue of talks from this prism raises several important points: can Syria conclude peace with Israel without the approval of its only remaining regional ally? Can the Assads really turn their back on their Iranian backers, not to mention Hezbollah, Hamas, and other radical groups that stood by them in their time of need?

As a matter of principles the Assads have always been willing to betray their allies and stab them in the backs, the Palestinians and the Lebanese have closet-full of stories in this regard. But then, principles are not really what’s at stake here, this is more about the realities that now exist on the ground, realities that are much different than those that existed back in 1991.

Indeed, in the interim period, especially in the years following the rise of Bashar al-Assad to power in Syria, relations with Iran assumed a different dimension for Syria. The parity between the two regimes gradually dissolved in favor of Iran, until, and in the last year, the entire relation was transformed, if not transmogrified on account of that little voodoo that Bashar & Co. managed to do, into a master-client relationship, along of the lines of the existing relations between Iran and Hezbollah. Worse. While Hezbollah, as a non-state actor, is free to develop its own tactics and plan its own moves, so long as they occur within the strategy set in cooperation with its main backers in Iran, and to a lesser extant, Syria, the Assads, in their newly acquired status as vassals, seem more obliged to pass all major decisions by the Iranians at this stage.

Syria and Iran has signed a mutual defense pact, which both sides seem to take pretty seriously, albeit for different reasons. Moreover, Iran is currently supplying the Syrian Republican Guard with much new and advanced weaponry, especially rockets and missiles. (Iran and, to a lesser extant, North Korea are Syria’s only remaining arms suppliers at this stage. The Russians talk about sending weapons, but so far no action has (has) taken place). As such, major decisions made by the Assads will have a major impact on Iran, more so than Hezbollah’s. Iran may not go to war on the Assads’ behalf, but they will try to support them by supplying them with arms, and motioning their allies in Lebanon and Iraq to bring the situation in their respective countries to a boil when circumstances warrant. The Iranians have also been quite busy since the visit to Syria by Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, buying up loyalties in the Syrian army and security apparatuses, by putting various business deals in the way of high-raking generals and their front men, including both Assef Chawkat and Maher al-Assad.

Indeed, the graft and corruption aspect in this entire sordid affair plays a very important role here, which should not be surprising really considering the Assads’ penchant for confusing their private business interests with the national interest. Iran now has major investments in Syria in a variety of sectors, including car-export and manufacturing as well as supplying different types of machinery and supplies to Syria’s rundown factories.

From all the above, it becomes clear that the notion that the Assads can act independently of the Iranians at this stage is nothing less than absurd. There will be hell to pay should they even try. The Iranians can play them against each other, can undermine their hold on power by activating their myriad agents in the country, and they can even create a crisis of legitimacy for them inside the Alawite community. After all, all these Iraqi and Lebanese preachers from Qom who have been busy converting Sunni villages to Twelver Shiism, has also been equally busy communicating with their Alawite counterparts, and many local Alawite shrines have been renovated thanks to donations from Iran, despite the religious differences between the Alawites and the Shia.

The Iranians then, got the Assads by the balls, by the throat and by everything they can lay their hands on, and they have no plans to let go anytime soon, if ever. They simply have too much riding on the Assads and on their potential usability as Iran’s first line of defense to let them stray too far.

(Let’s bear in mind here the fate of the late Lebanese President, Bashir Gemayel, after he signed a peace agreement with Israel contrary to Syria’s wishes. Iran will not let Syria go solo for very much the same reasons. They need Syria to keep on singing their tunes until their own problems with the international community are resolved. Indeed, Hafiz al-Assad’s shoes as a playmaker in regional politics were not filled by his son Bashar, but Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is the one who holds all the important cards now, and the current confrontational mood we see today in both Syria and Iran is the result of well-orchestrated policy on his part).

Popular perceptions will also play a role here. For having whipped up nationalist fervors to such a high extent in the last few weeks over the developments in Lebanon, the Assads simply cannot afford to turn their backs against their former allies so callously. Indeed, the Syrian public may not care much about the Iranians per se, but it does care about Nasrallah. Of course, the Assads cannot turn their back on one without the other. Betraying Nasrallah after confiscating his victory will be too damaging to the Assads’ internal image, which has, all of the sudden, become somewhat bright due to the Assads’ nationalist stand and their fallback on the rhetoric of national resistance.

The Assads simply do not have the strength and flexibility needed to turn on a dime and reverse all their erstwhile positions and actually get away with it.

Not that they are really inclined to do any of this. For in reality, the Assads realize that Iran is their only backer and they cannot just give up on it. On the contrary, their “faith” in this relationship has emboldened them to take rhetorical stands, not only vis-à-vis the US, France and Israel, but also Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Moreover, the Assads are also too paranoid to take a gamble on the basis of Israeli and US assurances, should they ever materialize that is, and they have plenty of reasons to justify their paranoia. They are already under international isolation and the Americans have been openly talking about regime change in Syria for years now. Since this is, naturally, the product of a Zionist conspiracy for them, they cannot trust Israel as well.

We also need to factor here the reality that the Assads might just be more interested in a return to Lebanon than to the Golan, and they will probably spend more time negotiating on this matter than on anything else. Indeed, the recent defiant and bellicose speech delivered by the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, focused much more on the Lebanese issue than on the Golan. Lebanon is simply much more profitable to the ruling clique than the Golan could ever be.

Bashar waxed even more belligerent and confident in his interview with Dubai TV, in which he criticized the Israelis and the Bush Administration, declared his opposition for deploying peacekeepers and monitors along the Syrian-Lebanese borders, and asserted that popular resistance will be the option should the peace process remain halted, and that the upcoming weeks and months will be decisive in this regard.

For all these considerations, then, the only possible way for talks to take place is through a new regional peace process, one that has to include Iran as well. The region needs to have all of its outstanding problems address and resolved now, a piecemeal approach will not work, because the issues are interlocking and there are simply too many states and parties around that can play the role of spoilers, if they had to.

Yet a Madrid II will not be enough here, for the US will lose all credibility it has left, should it back a purely political process, one that does not take under consideration the need for political reform and openness in the countries involved. What is needed here, then, is a mixture of Madrid I and the Barcelona Process, with monitoring mechanisms and some manner of holding states accountable to their failure in living up to their commitments, especially with regard to internal reforms.

But, unless Israel, the US and the EU are willing to sit down and negotiate directly with Iran as well, then peace in the region has no chance and bilateral talks between Israel and Syria, should they ever take place, will go nowhere. The very notion is indeed ludicrous.

(But just for the sake of argument, let’s imagine that the Assads did indeed decide to take parts in peace talks, the Israelis still need to ask themselves this: with the perception of victory that the Assads have at this stage, with Iran on their side, with the possibility of opening the Golan Front now on the table, and considering the fact that, for the first time since 1967 at least, it is Israel that seems to be testing the waters for launching peace talks, what sort of attitude will the Assads bring with them to the negotiating table? Will they really be in a mood to compromise? Or, will the Israelis be willing to give the bulk of compromises this time around? True, the Syrians and the Iranians will be confident even should wider talks occur, but considering the complexity of the issues that will be involved in that case, initial triumphalism will soon be offset by the need to make some tough compromises).

Other complicating factors in this regard is the fact that the Iranian leadership seems hell-bent on developing its nuclear program regardless of what the international community has to say about that, this may not leave much room for compromise here. Meanwhile, the UN inquiry into the assassination of Rafic al-Hariri, which is quite an independent activity no matter what the conspiratorial minds in our region happen to think, will likely produce results that are too embarrassing for the Assad regime and which the international community cannot ignore, even if it wanted to. The whole affair is simply all too public.

So, taking all the above under consideration, how realistic is the prospect for such a major initiative in the near future?

Well, considering how regional and international actors have spent the last few years making diplomacy irrelevant, through a combination of unilateral actions and preemptive moves, all halfheartedly implemented and callously and poorly managed, the reactivation of the role of diplomacy at this stage seems to require more leadership skills and a much clearer vision than what is currently available in all relevant quarters.

So, ladies and gentlemen of the policymaking circles in the world, enjoy the fruits of your labor for the last few years, and be brave enough to face the consequences of your policies. Indeed, instead of fooling ourselves into thinking that peace is still possible, by some miracle, let’s just prepare for the oncoming war, which we have made all but inevitable. There is nothing worse than being taken by surprise when all hell breaks loose.

Waiting for the Next Move!

2006-08-27T17:22:00.000-04:00

The recent declarations by Nasrallah, Ahmadinejad and Assad mark a noticeable decrease in the levels of bellicosity and belligerence in comparison to their erstwhile discourse. Indeed, none of these men has backed down from his declared stands on the all too important issues of resistance and the nuclear capabilities, but their statements did, nonetheless, contain some startling reversals of recent positions and attitudes.

For when Ahmadinejad declares that Iran does not pose a threat "to anybody, not even to the Zionist regime," a mere few weeks after he had called for its destruction, one really has to wonder as to the real significance of this apparent contradiction. Is it only meant to buy time, or has the Mullah establishment opted to adopt a softer more pragmatic stand vis-à-vis the Zionist entity, on the basis of their own assessment of the results of Hezbollah War?

And when Nasrallah himself declares that he would not have ordered the capture of the two Israeli soldiers had he known that the Israeli response would be so destructive, that the South will not witness any manifest sign of militarism while the Lebanese army is there, and that Hezbollah is not preparing for new showdown with the Israelis, this definitely marks an important acknowledgement of the changing realities in Lebanon as a result of the recent “victory.”

And seeing that Bashar had already attempted to back down from his recent dismissal and assault on Arab leaders, one really cannot ignore the emerging pattern here. The key figures in the Resistance Alliance are clearly acting in unison and in accordance with a clearly laid out strategy drawn by the Iranians.

The Alliance is moving to capitalize on its perceived victory by trying to sound more soft, reasonable and pragmatic and, hence, appealing, to some segments of the policy-making community in each one of the key countries involved in the current crisis, especially the United States. The move is designed, naturally, to buy time, enough time, two to three more years to be specific, to produce that first bomb, to conduct that first test, and to change the entire dynamics of the situation and allow for the final emergence of a full-fledged regional power, complete with satellite states and all, that has literally and figuratively been dying to do so ever since that blessed revolution of ’79, if not really before, after all, the Shah had had his regional dreams and ambitions too.

Will the world allow for this emergence to take place, or will it seek to delay or even abort it once and for all? The next few weeks might carry a semblance of an answer. But for now, the momentum seems to be on the side of the Alliance.

__________

We have just reactivated the "Virtual Syria" (Arabic) blog on the Tharwa Community, and just launched the "Whereto, Syria?" (Arabic and English) blog.

Of Grand Visions & Miniscule Leaders!

2006-08-21T21:01:00.000-04:00

Many Israelis seem to be interested in advocating talks with Syria these days, including my former colleague at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Avi Dichter, not to mention my other former colleague, but always the friend, Flynt Leverett, who wrote quite an analysis of US foreign policy in the latest issue of the American Prospect calling for the adoption of a new vision and a new approach, especially to the Middle East.

Now this might come as a surprise for some, but I actually have no problem with the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks provided certain conditions are met, namely that they take place within the framework of a wider regional initiative that includes Iran, and that the issues of internal reforms is put on the table.

In other words, I want a combination of the Barcelona and Madrid processes, and I want some monitoring mechanism to be included as well and some manner of holding states accountable to their failure in living up to their commitments, especially with regard to internal reforms. This development will still not deliver democracy, I know, but it will give us a real chance to work it out peacefully from within, or so I hope.

Indeed, I started my career as an activist exactly by advocating the necessity for launching such an initiative, with both European and American involvement and sponsorship, and I have attended more conferences that I can remember where my colleagues from across the region and I sat down with European and American policy advisors and wrote papers upon papers and proposals upon proposal and commissioned studies upon studies, then sent them up the ladder using all appropriate channels, only to get saddled with vague declarations and initiatives such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and the Foundation for the Future, which, as significant as they are, remain woefully insufficient and fall far short of what is really needed. Follow through has always been lacking as well. The will to wage peace is not as present as that to wage war. Key people got easily distracted, and the powers that be continue to have conflicting agendas and interests.

So, we, the liberal activists, slowly drifted away to focusing on smaller initiative based on the political situation in our respective countries in the hope of bringing about a small change there that would help us advocate our agenda on a more national level. To no avail. Our leaders were all too idiotic and corrupt, and too mired in their own intenral calculations and particularistic interests to be able to deliver on promises of reform.

Leadership and vision. The world seems all too lacking in both, at a time when these two qualities are needed most. This is the essence of our contemporary dilemma I guess. Rather than managing the New World Order and building it ourselves, the New World Order is managing us and introducing itself upon us and at our expense, especially with regards to the peoples of the developing world.

But in reality, politicians do not seem capable anymore, if they have ever been, of formulating the grand visions needed today. In our hope to democratize the world and to bring greater harmony to it, and for the sake of introducing and supporting liberal and liberating ideals, the relevant visions and leadership need to be provided by independent civil actors and organizations working across boundary lines, just as in the case with transitional fundamentalist movements and terrorist cells. Non-state actors and movements working for the sake of radical causes can only be effectively combated through a parallel development on the liberal end. States, big and small, are often part of the problem, and all need to be challenged and pushed in the right direction.

No, I am not speaking here as an anti-globalization activist, but as a pro-globalization activist, a reality that illustrates just how complex a mission we have ahead of us. There are simply too many ideologies and movements and personalities involved, and too many internecine clashes to allow for a smooth and speedy transition. Harmonizing them all into a solid pragmatic movement, rather than an ideological one, will take time, a lot of time.

Meanwhile, we have no choice but to work in tandem on our little projects in the hope of achieving one little breakthrough here or there to help build a momentum for change.

For me, a peace accord between the Assads and Israel outside the regional context outlined above will constitute an unmitigated disaster for the cause of human rights and political reform in Syria and will have major repercussions on our ability as activists to push for any kind of meaningful participation in the decision-making process in the country. Still, I am not overly worried about that, for the current talk in the Israeli side reflects nothing but an Israeli dilemma centered on the inability of the current Israeli leaders to provide the needed leadership and vision for the future of their country.

Still, even should talks end up taking place one day, I wouldn’t be worried, because I know the other side of the equation all too well, and I know that I can always count on their stupidity not to do the right thing, even for themselves.

Moreover, the Assads are no longer in a position to do any deals by themselves these days seeing that their decisions are now made on their behalf in Tehran. The Assads have irrevocably tied their fortunes to Iran, without it they have no leg to stand on. And the Iranians are not so stupid as to supply weapons and arms to a regime that is not securely in their pocket. On a related note, if people really want to drive a wedge between the Syria and Iranian regimes, they should be more quiet about it. Such goals cannot be pursued in full light of day. But in the absence of back channels to either regimes speculations might be the only alternative that the Bush Administration has.

Peace has no chance in these circumstances.

Taking the Real Initiative!

2006-08-21T02:08:00.000-04:00

Because we have long stopped taking the initiative, because we always wait for the perfect deal to be put in our lap, because we continue to refuse to challenge the system and the status quo and prefer to resign ourselves to what we have or allowed to have, our leaders have become nothing more than incompetent, corrupt and sadistic nincompoops adept only at oppressing us and stealing our land’s resources and whatever foreign crumbs that are sent our way as “development aid.”

And because our leaders seem to have dealt with the outsides world with the same lack of imagination and initiative with which we tended to deal with them (and why not? After all, our leaders do not come from a different planet), our fate as viable and sovereign states seems to be forever tied to developments beyond our control.

For example, because Hafiz al-Assad did not “run towards peace” in the 90s, since that would not have looked too "dignified," even though it is indeed our land and our people that are under occupation, our fate was repeatedly sealed by individual developments, including the assassination of Israeli PM Yitshak Rabin by a deranged individual and getting cold feet with regard to the case of Israeli PM Ehud Barak.

Indeed, we took the initiative only twice in this conflict. Unsurprisingly, both initiatives were purely military. The first time paved the way for an unmitigated disaster, from our point of view of course. This was the Arab-led war of 1948. The second time came in 1973 when only Egypt managed to actually capitalize on the initial military coup that transpired in the early phase of the war. The Egyptians succeeded in this on account of their President Anwar al-Sadat’s diplomatic boldness in the years following the conclusion of the war, and his willingness to go the distance and “force” the Israelis to come to terms with the eventuality of having to return the occupied Sinai in full.

For his part, Hafiz al-Assad failed to be make himself relevant to the process. Some analysts seem to suggest that, for all his smarts, Assad Sr. allowed himself to be maneuvered out of the ongoing talks by Kissinger and others. Perhaps this is true, but that only serves to illustrate the point about the necessity of taking the initiative and of being proactive, and not waiting for the perfect deal to begin with, not to mention waiting for it to be handed to you by others.

As for our current “victory,” well, in pure military terms, it led to nothing but a stand-off that is still open on all possibility: the good, the bad, and the ugly. But for it to develop into a real diplomatic coup that could indeed pave the way for saving Lebanon from the impending mayhem in the region, taking it once and for all out of the conflict equation, Lebanon’s current leaders should themselves come out with a strong proposal for peace with Israel. There is ample justification for this move at this stage, including the necessity of capitalizing on the said “victory” to achieve the liberation of the Shebaa Farms and the return of the Lebanese prisoners still languishing in Israeli jails. The disarmament of Hezbollah, in full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, will have to be part of the deal, of course, and that is indeed the tricky part.

But, if concluded, a peace accord with Israel, and no matter how retroactively, will help mitigate the recent havoc that was wrought on Lebanon and some meaning might still emerge out of this seemingly senseless venture. Indeed, the risks involved in such a process are as high as the stakes. And, for all practical purposes, the Lebanese PM, Fouad Siniora, will have to emerge as the potential champion or fall-guy in this scenario. But the potential dividends of peace might be worth the risk.

Indeed, Fouad Siniora’s latest statements in Stockholm and his allusion that a wise Israeli policy could help pave the way for real peace might indicate that he is inclined to take such a step. Should he do that, it will be up to regional powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and international powers, such as the US and France, to protect and support him.

For while the necessary criteria for holding a Madrid II Conference seem to be absent, especially with regard to the quality of the currently available regional and international leaders, the criteria for such smaller step may not. But if they are, then, Armageddon is indeed upon us, and the Hour is Very Nigh.

Countdown to Armageddon!

2006-08-17T23:44:00.000-04:00

The arguments I made in this article on the BitterLemons-International news service, have been bolstered by the speech recently delivered by our national imbecile. Moreover, the bellicose tones of Bashar’s speech have themselves been bolstered and taken to their logical conclusion by an editorial in the official newspaper, al-Thawrah, that appeared on the following day. The editorial issued a very straightforward threat against Israel. Indeed, the threat/call for launching a Hezbollah-style campaign in the Golan was indeed the main theme.

So, are the Assads seriously contemplating such an option? Or have they inadvertently helped foster an environment that is amiable, interested, ready and desperately dying to push the envelope in this matter for reasons of national pride?

Time will tell, and we may not have to wait for long.

__________________________

Countdown to Armageddon
Ammar Abdulhamid

The rise of President Bashar Assad to power in Syria in 2000, which coincided with the collapse of the peace process and the rise of Ariel Sharon in Israel, signaled a gradual return to policies of confrontation with the international community and with Israel.

The reasons for this are numerous and are not all related to the internal makeup of the Syrian regime. Nevertheless, that issue does figure highly in this regard and should not be dismissed, lest this impede judgment regarding the current Syrian role in the region. Indeed, the minoritarian character of the Syrian regime and its consolidation around the private interests of one particular family, the Assad-Makhlouf clan, have served from the very beginning to undercut the potential for serious reform in the country.

The insistence on keeping things in the family and transferring power from father to son, all consideration of republican norms notwithstanding, has served to establish severe limits on the ability of the new president. But then, ever since his (s)election, Bashar has not missed an opportunity to show that he is a true believer in the system and in the mandate and mission assigned to him.

This is why he turned against all dissidents and reformers in early 2001, wholeheartedly embraced the Aqsa Intifada, allowed people like Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to roam freely in Syria and transformed the relationship with Hizballah from that of master-client to a strategic alliance. Moreover, Bashar never turned his back on the possibility of getting himself embroiled in regional mayhem and controversy. As was the case with his father, the legitimacy that could not be received from internal successes and reforms now needed to be derived from external sources, namely from a continuing focus of energies and attention on the Arab-Israel conflict.

This explains why the president went overboard in his criticism of the US-led invasion of Iraq and lent so much support to the Iraqi "resistance", inviting other Arab states to follow his lead. This also explains his continuing willingness to support radical Palestinian groups and, of course, Hizballah. Indeed, the more pressures the new president and the ruling family have perceived, the more radical their stands and policies have become. The point of no return, if there ever was one, came with the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri, a development that put the entire ruling family in the line of suspects.

After that, there was no end to how radical the Assad regime was willing to become. It was now facing an existential threat par excellence. The rise of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad and his subsequent visit to Syria on January 19 gave both regimes the opportunity to consolidate their alliance and to extend it to formally include Hizballah and the radical wing of Hamas. A decision seems to have been made to escalate matters further in Gaza and the Shebaa Farms in the hope of diverting international attention from these regimes and bringing about an acceptance of the status quo they represented, even as they consolidated their grip on power.

While current developments seem more than what these regimes and parties bargained for, they are also heaven-sent, hence their increased vociferousness, belligerence and confidence.

Indeed, as the recent declaration made by the Syrian foreign minister during his brief visit to Lebanon indicates, the prospect of a wider regional war is something these regimes actually welcome. For the strong showing that Hizballah has made, the destruction of the Lebanese infrastructure notwithstanding, is encouragement enough for these regimes, with their minds and hearts still stuck in the 1980s, to revive the old dream of defeating Israel militarily through involvement in a war of attrition and thus achieving military glory that will boost their credentials both at home and abroad. With the US caught in the Iraqi quagmire and its power seemingly neutralized as a result, this prospect might appear more and more tempting with each passing day.

In fact, the Assads seem to be actively preparing for this eventuality. They have already called up large reserve cohorts that are busy digging trenches all around the country, and they are currently preparing public opinion for this possibility and cultivating their support thereof. Thus, calls to reopen the Golan front are routinely reiterated during the Friday sermons, and communist and nationalist groups have recently joined the chorus.

So, even if the US and Israel seem uninterested in bringing about such a conflagration, their desires, wishes and interests are not the only factors that matter here. There is indeed another side involved, a full fledged alliance in fact, whose leaders seem to think that war, regardless of its potentially high cost in human and material terms, will serve their interests. The more troubles Israel has in Lebanon and the US in Iraq, the more convinced these leaders will be of the "wisdom" and necessity of war.- Published 17/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ammar Abdulhamid is a Syrian blogger and dissident. He runs the Tharwa Foundation, an independent initiative that focuses on diversity issues in the region, and is a non-resident fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.

Reactions to “The Imbecile!”

2006-08-16T19:41:00.000-04:00

My latest post seems to have hit a rather raw nerve among some of my readers so much so that I think a new post needs to be dedicated to the subject.

Yet indeed, and as Yaman has pointed out, calling Bashar the village idiot is actually not a purely emotional reaction on my part. Rather, it comes as a rational conclusion that I reached on the basis of own observations of Bashar’s behavior and my own contact with him, albeit somewhat limited, when we were at school – I called him an idiot then too and to his face. So, I am merely carrying out a tradition of sorts.

My description of Bashar is also based on my impression of the people around him, I have met many of them through years, especially during that the short period of interrogations that I had to go through in the first part of 2005, and many of them were no less the imbeciles than he is, which makes a lot of things really, considering the dictators’ knack for surrounding themselves with like-minded people - pale images of themselves.

Moreover, this impression of mine is not really so unique, just read what this little summary of official and popular regional reactions to Bashar’s latest gem and you’ll find out (sorry it is in available only in Arabic).

But to satisfy the request made by Engineering Change, let me just summarize here why I think Bashar is indeed an idiot and an imbecile on the basis of the current developments:

* His speech angered so many people in the international community that, instead of benefiting from the dissatisfaction of some Europeans with current US policies in the region and driving a wedge between the two, he turned them against him, including the Germans who were just trying to engage the Assads regime.
** His speech served to further alienate Syria from Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, while a more rational and calm speech, coupling a more benign criticism of these countries recent attitudes vis-à-vis the Assads (mostly for popular consumption in Syria) with a call for unity and solidarity with a Lebanese and Palestinian people, and for putting past differences aside, would have made it easier for the rulers of these countries to reengage the Assads and to defend them in international circles. Indeed, neither the Saudis, nor the Egyptians nor the Jordanians want to see regime change or instability in Syria, but Bashar keeps on pushing on this direction, hedging his bets completely on his Iranian allies, not to mention Hezbollah and Hamas. Now, pardon me if I think this is dumb. But it is. Now even the official press in Egypt and Saudi Arabia are criticizing Bashar and not always politely.
*** By attacking the March 14 crowd, he is making their argument for them, that the Assads won’t stop interfering in Lebanon. Also, he managed to baffle and upset some of his very supporters in Lebanon, such as Salim al-Hoss and the editor of al-Safir newspaper who contrasted Bashar’s speech with that of Nasrallah, which was more conciliatory in tone from a Lebanese perspective. This constant comparison between Bashar and Nasrallah is really going to hurt him on the long run. Nasrallah is a man of action and he has accomplished some of the things he promised in his speeches. Bashar will be hard pressed to do the same. Failing that, he will look more and more like the charlatan that he truly is. Now, when you put yourself in this position and you invite such a comparison, you simply must be dumb.

Now what did Bashar gain out of all this? The support of the Syrian people? Well, true, the Syrian people in their support of Bashar may not be as fickle as the Iraqis in their support of Saddam, but fickle they are, just as they were in their support of his father all through the 80s. When push comes to shove, and despite the higher proportions of 20-somethigns in the country, Bashar will have little popular support. And guess what? If and when the dreaded push comes to the yearning shove, this will not materialize as a result of any lobbying by the opposition groups, but as a result of the Assads’ own actions. And this is the quintessence of dumb. The Assads are bringing upon themselves and the rest of us, a calamity that even their enemies want them to avoid. Dumb. Dumb. Dumb.

Now, for all those people who were angry with my post, I say “damn it, it’s about time!” Where the hell were you guys? I have been lambasting this idiot for quite a while now, and it’s about time that someone got unnerved by that. After all, he must have some supporters somewhere who would be interested in defending his illusory and elusive honor.

Teasing aside though, let me be clear here: I want you, whoever you are and regardless of the nature of your loyalties, your ethnic affiliations, your professional backgrounds, your age and your gender, I want you to be angry. It does not matter in the least to me if your anger is aimed at me at this stage. After all, I am not running for president. So, think me the Anti-Christ, if you will, what possible difference will it make to me?

My relevance, as a heretic, is not premised on popular support, but on popular resentment, and my message has never been intended to be popular, but to unite a certain like-minded few who, like me, are willing to push the envelope, people who are willing to allow me to do things my way, while they do things their way, but where the basic message remains the same: the need for challenging the status quo, for breaking the stalemate, for focusing on our real problems and on developmental issues.

Already one of you accused me of “racism,” because he could detect in my discourse, a rather dismissive urban attitude vis-à-vis the Assads, who, as we all know, come from a rural background. Wonderful! There is indeed much truth here, if not about me, then about how many people in Syria, in the major urban centers in particular, feel indeed about the Assads and their supporters.

We have a major problem in Syria related to our diversity, whether defined along ethnic lines, provincial lines, religious lines, class lines, educational lines and/or professional lines. These are serious issues. We all suffer from major prejudices emanating from our particular backgrounds, and he who will claim to be completely innocent and free of that is a liar. Many of us do try to be above these matters, and we, sometimes, think that we have succeeded, but then, something happens, a little personal incident, or some major national one, and we find out that we have much to learn yet.

Prejudices like ours are so deeply rooted in our daily life and culture that they cannot be neutralized so easily. Just ask White, Black, Hispanic and Asian America, among the many other Americas out here, about this. The Americans have developed quite the extensive literature on this matter. But the only thing we seem to have developed in this regard is a culture of silence, denial and inaction, where all problems continue to fester until they blow up one sure and dismal day in our faces.

So, my question to my accuser is: do you really think you are innocent of the crime of which you accuse me?

The Imbecile!

2006-08-15T23:43:00.000-04:00

Our six year long scientific experiment in Syria aimed at turning a certain village idiot into a full fledged national leader has hit another snag yesterday when the idiot managed to break his month-long, and not too voluntary, silence and speak out. For, as usual, the National Imbecile with which we are currently blessed ended up putting his anus in it, and the world was there to see and hear.

As a result, the German Foreign Minister cancelled his scheduled trip to Damascus, proclaiming that “[t]he speech today by Syrian President Assad is a negative contribution that is not in any way justified in view of the current challenges and opportunities in the Middle East… That's why I decided not to travel to Damascus now.”

Coupled with his virulent attack against the Bush Administration and the French President, or as Bashar referred to him, the “French official,” all this talk about engagement and cutting a deal with the Assads have just been effectively nullified. Dare I say: “I told you so?”

Of course, the diehard assortment of optimists, Bush-baiters and US-haters will continue to strive to find excuses to defend engaging our national imbecile, but I think that a consensus is slowly emerging in the policy-making circles in the US and the EU to the effect that the Assads are simply unengageable and that they need to continue to be kept under lock and key in our growing regional zoo.

I also think that the main players involved here, the US, France, Britain (but, strangely enough, still not Israel) will not mind too much should they see some activity taking place on the ground in certain parts in Syria meant to undermine the hold of the Assads on power, all fears of instability aside. For the Assads have made all too clear now that if these actors do not take the fight to the Assads, the Assads will bring the fight to them, albeit by proxy, for we all know by now how cowardly this leonine lot is.

Indeed this cowardliness, manifested in the willingness to ride on the back of Hezbollah and to reiterate rhetoric of resistance over and over again while refusing to live up to it through action on the Golan Front, is exactly where the Assads are becoming all too vulnerable.

Indeed, in his most recent statements, the Syrian Foreign Minister accused all people calling for opening the Golan of seeking to implement a plan to “strike Syria,” notwithstanding the fact these calls have been reiterated by the countries most respected religious leaders and a whole assortment of the country’s nationalist and communist movements and intellectuals.

The Assads, it seems, want to bask in the glow of resistance without paying its price, as per the old tactic perfected by the late family patriarch. Unfortunately though, the times and the people have changed, and if our national imbecile appears popular now, just wait until more and more people from regional states whose policies he assaulted, like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, begin to speak out against his arrogance and cowardice, as some have indeed done (on TV). For as more and more people continue to point out the emptiness of our imbecile’s rhetoric, and no matter how defensive people might get at first, this fake aura of heroism that Bashar & Co. are currently basking under will begin to fade, and people are not necessarily as imbeciles as their leaders, the hierarchy of their basic needs notwithstanding.

Meanwhile, and just as a reminder of what’s really at stake here for the ruling family, recent reports show that the imbecile’s cousin has finally achieved his dream of controlling the car-import business in the country.

On a related note, the claims of victory by Hezbollah and supporters, have emboldened another two-but dictator out there, namely: the Sudanese president. Indeed, Omar al-Bashir has just threatened to launch a Hezbollah-style war against any international troops that would be positioned in Western Darfur. Indeed, the price of defeat, or even the mere perception thereof in our region is all too costly.

Lost in Jubilation!

2006-08-15T02:08:00.000-04:00

As always in our turbulent region, victory is in the eye of the beholder, and we so desperately need to feel victorious we are willing to see victory even in ruins. No wonder our victors have recently been nothing more than charlatans, thieves and murderers. Indeed, neither victory nor victors are what they used to be. As the old saying goes: “The times are no longer the times, and men no longer the men (la al-dinyeh dinyeh, wa la al-naas naas).” Civilization in these parts has gotten so bloody old, it seems, the gift of victory has much depreciated in value over time.

But above all, we need to beware clerics when they come bearing such gifts. For holy victories, especially when so surreal, tend to pave the way to holy hell. And we have just had about enough holiness and hell in our lives, a little heresy could indeed go a long way in improving our lot.

But who is listening these days? Who is listening? Oh where are the attentive ears of yesteryear?

Deafened by the tumult of jingoistic celebrations I presume.

But lost amidst all this jubilation over our all too Orwellian realities, where defeat is victory, democracy slavery and ignorance a holy bliss, is the fact that the hopes and aspirations of few more generations of young Arab and Middle Eastern youths have just been dashed. It won’t take long before the reality of this hit home for those concerned and, once it does, their anger will simply transform them into the fine fodder which better suit their nurture and the purpose for which they have always been prepared - the war/peace our leaders crave to ensure their survival.

Then the region-wide fireworks will truly commence.

Wagging the Lions!

2006-08-13T00:58:00.000-04:00

Assuming that things go as planned, UNSC Resolution 1701 will deliver to Israel in political terms what its troops could not achieve in military ones, namely: the neutralization of the Hezbollah Effect. For the costs of rebuilding what has been destroyed and of resettling and compensating the displaced population is bound to be very high and will occupy Hezbollah, among other Lebanese actors, for many years to come.

For those who bet on a Hezbollah victory, especially Iran and Syria, this clearly spells defeat. For the focus on international attention will turn once again to the outstanding issues at hand, the Hariri investigation, which is simply too much of a public affair to kill, as many had been predicting and hoping, and the Iranian nuclear program. In order to avoid this, the Assads and the Mullahs have to find a new game to keep world attention focused elsewhere, and to the Mullahs, this means wagging the Assads again.

This wagging will more likely assume the guise of a renewed attempt at instigating a civil conflict in Lebanon, so that the Assads can make themselves relevant there again. Failing this, however, one cannot completely discount the possibility of a move in the Golan, no matter how disastrous this would seem. Admittedly, the Assads will have to be pretty desperate to opt for this option, but, then, people could stumble unto disaster as well, disasters do not always come as a reflection of a conscious decision-making process.

Be that as it may, the main point I would like to stress here is the fact that even a “successful” implementation of 1701 will not spell the endgame for this round of conflict, as the root causes has not been addressed yet. And no, I am not referring here to the Arab-Isrseli conflict. We simply cannot continue to reduce the root causes of our current plight to the sole issue of Israeli-occupied Arab lands. We have been doing this for decades now and, as a result, all our proposed solutions have fallen woefully short of achieving peace.

Indeed, we should always bear in mind the little truths that the Arab Human Development Reports have amply demonstrated, namely that the nature of the ruling regimes involved, especially their corruption and authoritarianism, as well as the lack of serious developmental activities in the region, especially with regard to education, play the more prominent role here. Indeed, we cannot in the name of real politick turn our back on the primary causes of terrorism and instability in the region.

Yes, instability. Many real politick advocates seem to be under the illusion that autocratic regimes are good guarantors against instability because they help control the illiterate and increasingly radical masses, but, as I have argued before, such analysis, in addition to standing the problem on its head, is pretty whimsical and rather selfish, as it is only meant to export the real problems in the region to future generations. For the autocratic regimes can only hold the country together for so long before their corrupt practices end up producing nice little implosions a là Darfur and Somalia.

So, even should 1701 lead to some reprieve in the ongoing conflict, we’d do better to remember that this reprieve will be quite temporary, and that conflict will remain a fact of our lives for a few more generations to come, sorry to say. The promise of peace that flourished in the 90s is now clearly dead and buried.

The Sahhaf Mentality!

2006-08-09T15:17:00.000-04:00

The former Iraqi Minister of Information, Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf, who was the last such minister to serve under Saddam Hussein, has long gone down in history as the man who kept on denying the reality of what was actually taking place in the country with regard to the unfolding battle and kept on issuing defiant statements as he had clearly been instructed to do right until the moment US troops stormed into Saddam's palace in Baghdad.

Albeit far less comical, Nasrallah's own televised pronouncements and assurances appear to reflect the same Sahhaf mentality, an inability to accept reality driven in part by ideology, in part by self-interest, and in part by the natural necessities of propaganda.

Indeed, no one can deny the fact that Israel has incurred more losses than it had anticipated due to the resilience and preparedeness of Hezbollah's fighters. These are clearly not some beaten down Iraqi soldiers who had been defeated long before the battle had begun. These are ideologically-motivated fighters who have been engaged in active combat of sorts for many years, and some of them have even conducted a number of operations over the years behind "enemy lines."

Still, resilience is not victory, and the destruction that Lebanon had suffered is not easily reversible, and, for all its losses, Israel seems bent on continuing with its current campaign for at least another month, so where is this redefined victory that Nasrallah is promising? Nasrallah said that the victory that his fighters can deliver will be defined in their continued ability to inflect heavy casualties on the Israelis. Indeed, his fighters and his rockets are doing just that to the surprise and enchantment of many. But, if this is not going to be enough to stop the Israelis from pushing forward with their campaign, what is the point behind such "victory?"

The nationalists have given us the moral victory of '73 and the political victory of '82, and now the Islamists seem on the verge of achieving another moral victory, albeit coupled with a good propaganda coup this time, after all, the world is jeering Israel, so will that suffice?

Well, if the endgame is to preserve the status quo in certain countries and shore up the ruling regimes there, then, indeed such victories could suffice (if they were achieved that is, after all, we are still in mid-combat). But they will come at the expense of our freedom and our living standards. Indeed, we, the people, are the ultimate losers of our imagined victories and all too real defeats. Yet, most of us are cheering this on!? Thank Heaven I am a heretic.

Welcome to Regional War!

2006-08-07T02:50:00.000-04:00

The defiant declaration of the Syrian Foreign Minster, Walid al-Moallem, which he made during his brief visit to Beirut, especially the “welcome with regional war” part should begin to raise certain eyebrows in Tel Aviv, in Washington, in Paris, and all across the world. People really need to ask themselves now whether we are not indeed heading towards such a war. For even if Israel and the US are not exactly interested in having things go that far, the possibility remains that the more trouble Israel has in Lebanon and the US in Iraq, and the more beatable the two powers appear, the more tempting the push for war will be by the other side of the equation, namely the alliance that was formed not too long ago, by Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and the radical wing in Hamas, among other Palestinian groups.

Indeed, when one observes the current war preparation in Syria, the calling of the reserves, the spreading of army units across the borders with Lebanon and the digging of trenches around the country, and when one observes how the Syrian public opinion is being prepared for the possibility, nay, the inevitability of war, through constant reminders of the Friday sermons, and the various statements and declarations issued by nationalist and communist groups, one is tempted to think that an actual decision to get involved in war might actually be formulating in the minds of the Assads and the Mullahs, especially if they convinced themselves that this could prove to be a war of attrition and that the more patient side, the side that will not care much for the human and a material costs involved is bound to emerge as the victor.

For in the final analysis, what better way for troubled regimes to consolidate their hold on power than to have the relevant societies destroyed by proxy, but still manage to produce victory at the end of the day – victory in the form of an actual recapture of the occupied land or of reaching an agreement that is signed under fire? And let's not forget here that we are dealing with military regimes. We are dealing with the people whose heads and hearts are still stuck in the eighties. We are dealing with people always susceptible to wishful thinking, always thirsty for glory, always hungry to prove themselves worthy and good, albeit they are not and they will never be.

Psychologically speaking then, we do have all the necessary ingredients for disaster, and slowly but surely we seem to be developing the necessary political ingredients as well.

Are we passed the point of no return?

The Reason I Don’t Criticize Israel!

2006-08-05T00:40:00.000-04:00

“While Israeli actions in Lebanon are outrageous…” I think this is pretty much the only condemnation of Israeli actions in Lebanon that I have made ever since the beginning of the current tragedy. I frankly thought that this little adjective, “outrageous,” would prove quite sufficient to convey my feelings about this new round of Israeli aggression and intransigence in our midst. But many seem to have had a different impression. Indeed, quite a few people have so far conveyed their “annoyance” with me for failing to be more critical of Israel, and some have even begun to draw their own conclusions about my motivations in this regard, ones laced with a rather “healthy” doze of the sort of conspiratorial thinking for which we are all too famous.

So, and in order to set certain minds at ease and certain rumors to rest, let me come out and say categorically that I am definitely against the current Israeli aggression in Lebanon. If I choose not to dwell upon it, this is because there are so many people, bloggers, journalists, commentators, experts and officials, who do. Meanwhile, dissenting and heretical voices like mine, who insist on reminding our people of the other and quite forgotten side of the equation, the one that is equally guilty in the making of this mayhem, if not even more so, are very few. So, it is only natural that I choose to focus my energies on this matter.

The wisdom of this focus may not be visible now, and may never be understood by all, but, then, heresies seldom acquire popularity in the lifetimes of their authors. Moreover, few active “converts” to the “cause” may indeed suffice to make the necessary and required impact at this stage, namely: to preserve a core of independent voices that refuse to be mobilized like chattel for the “national” cause advocated by the regimes and their lackeys, and that would, once the dust of war settles, prove to these types that their internal problems are far from over and that their perceived victory, if victory is to figure anywhere in the equation for any side, is not only pyrrhic but completely illusory. Because we will still here, and the internal accounting which they were trying to elude by instigating all these external crises will be upon us all and will prove much harder and much more urgent.

There is a battle going on for our souls in the region, and I know where I stand. I shall not compromise my freedom for the sake of national sovereignty nor national sovereignty for the sake of my freedom. In fact, this should not be made into an either or situation. Indeed, it is for this reason that I refuse to join the ongoing mobilization campaign, because the people who are benefiting from this campaign are the very corrupt elite who continue to deny us our freedoms, and yes, Nasrallah is one of them. Whether he was always one of them or has just joined their ranks is academic now. He is clearly in. And while the resilience of his fighters and his on-camera serenity and calm might win him much popular adulation at this stage, especially outside Lebanon, the price for the conflict he helped generate will be born by generations to come.

The establishment of the State of Israel has always been quite problematic for us, but our reaction to its establishment has been far more problematic and costly, and has only helped Israel become more powerful and us more weak. Meanwhile, Israel’s international backers made quite sure that its military adventures did not impinge on its ability to develop itself, its infrastructure and its economy. We, on the other hand, have only our internal resources to rely on, and they will have to suffice. For this reason, the greed and ineptness of our ruling elites need to be combated. Much has been squandered already with little to show for it, in most cases. It is about time we held our ruling elites accountable for their disastrous performance over the last few decades. It is about time we set our priorities right. Freedom from internal oppression and development should come first. Our campaign to retrieve our occupied land could and should run concurrently with that, but it should not come at the expense of that. For this reason, the strategy and tactics employed and the way policy is conducted in this regard should be subject to a popular review and should take under consideration the material and human costs involved for all sides.

Even the Palestinians, the people who are more concerned with the Arab-Isrseli conflict than any other, seem to have opted for such an alternative in the recent elections. For, and as all polls conducted at the time, especially those conducted by Palestinians, demonstrate the people voted for Hamas because they were seeking a cleaner more efficient government, one that is more capable of improving their living conditions. They did not elect Hamas to fight Israel, nor they did they do it to create an Islamic state per se. Our people tend to be quite pragmatic when given the chance to express themselves freely. But they also have a very soft spot when it comes to the issue of national identify and sovereignty. This is the main weakness in our psychological constitution at this stage, one that the ruling regimes and their lackeys have learned all too well how to manipulate in order to stay in power and remain unaccountable.

I say, accountability should come first.

The Opening of the Golan!

2006-08-03T22:49:00.000-04:00

Slowly but surely, the conflict in Lebanon is beginning to spread as all sides fall victims to their rhetoric, their pride, their ambitions and their schemes. The latest chapter in this is not the meaningless operation that took place in the occupied Golan Heights a few days ago itself, but the fact that the party that took credit for it, the previously unknown Free Homeland Party, claims to be an independent Syrian organization acting against the government will.

Regardless of the veracity of this claim, the statement that the group released employs an old-style Baathist lingo, especially in its reference to Blessed Raiders (maghawiruna al-mayameen), the nationalist equivalent to Holy Warriors. As such, the group might be linked, directly or indirectly, to the recently formed Popular Front for the Liberation of the Golan, made up of former MPs and Baath Party members. As such, there is ample reason to believe that the FHP is indeed an Assadist creation, and that is a tool to apply more pressures on Israel and to demonstrate the Assads’ ability to create more problems for the “Zionist Entity.” If this is the case, then the situation is still under control, for the time being.

If this is a truly independent organization, however, then the possibility of escalation and of losing control over the situation is even more eminent and serious. Be that as it may, many Syrians seem on the verge of getting what they have been recently clamoring for – a confrontation with Israel, with all the trimmings.

But please, let’s not forget here, this is all definitely Israel’s and America’s fault. We had nothing to do with it. We are, after all, the perennial victims of a history gone mad.

On a related note, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos spoke on Thursday to Moron and came out with the impression that some kind of an agreement on Hezbollah. He even shared this impression with the rest of the unbelieving world in the press conference following his visit. But, and in a typical Syrian fashion, and mere hours after the FM’s departure, Syrian officials made a statement categorical denying this matter. So, is there anyone else who cares to talk to the Moron?

The Personal Side of History!

2006-08-02T05:22:00.000-04:00

On Tuesday morning, Future TV did a short interview with my Mom regarding her take on the current developments in Lebanon. In her usual empathetic manner my Mom managed to capture in her comments the essence of how many Arab people around the world feel today. She said that she does not know how future generations will choose to judge our current helplessness and lack of action, and that the best that she can do was to simply apologize for all those children who died because there was nothing that she could do to prevent it. She, then, concluded by saying “Long live the resistance!,” because it is the only sign of dignity that we have left.

Indeed, in times like these, people need to grasp at whatever symbols of steadfastness they are given, no matter how fake and chimerical they know them to be. My Mom is no exception.

Meanwhile, my wife, Khawla, who is half Palestinian, has enough relatives, friends and acquaintances in Lebanon to worry about. Almost everyone she knows there, Sunnis, Shiites and Maronites, had had to leave their homes. Most preferred to relocate internally, but over twenty of her relatives ended up staying in a small house owned by Khawla’s family in the poor Damascene suburb of Dariyyah. One way or another, then, the tragedy is hitting home for her and, of course, for me, as I have come to know and love these people like my own family.

My daughter’s plan to go see her friends in Beirut as soon as our application for political asylum is approved and the necessary travel documents have finally been issued, which is simply dragging on forever, seems to require adjustments now. But going to Amman is simply not the same. Indeed, Beirut is so special to us that, at one point, we were planning to relocate there rather than come to DC. We should probably be happy that we did not make that decision, but happiness, somehow, does not have much of a place in our lives these days, and contentment for being alive and relatively safe will have to suffice for now.

The headquarters of our little NGO, the Tharwa Project, that I have been slaving for the past 5 years to build, and which had only been relocated to Beirut last year following my expulsion from Syria, have had to be shut down again, as our team leader has been forced to leave the country. Thankfully, none of the people affiliated with our activities have been hurt, and, despite all these difficulties, our team leader is planning to resume her activities with us as soon as she settles down in her current refuge elsewhere in the region. Indeed, despite all the difficulties that we have faced over the last years, few have ever left the team.

And here we are working our way through yet another transitional period into the everlasting unknown.

As for me, I am too numb to feel anything really. Sometimes I think that I don’t even have the luxury of feeling, and that my energies are better invested in my work, no matter how pointless it might often seem. After all, planting a tree in the wilderness, if someone can indeed manage to pull it off, might just be more useful than a mere cry.

The Pawns of War!

2006-07-31T22:33:00.000-04:00

If even the generations that have witnessed firsthand and lived through the dark days of the 70s and 80s in Syria, and that have vivid memories of how oppressive things were at the time and how hypocritical and tiring all that patriotic song-and-dance about Israel and America and our intervention in Lebanon was, if even these generations who should be eyeing the current developments in the region through the disquieting prism of déjà vu, déjà entendu, déjà everything, can still disagree on everything that has taken place in their lifetime, can still offer a variety of interpretations and explanations thereof, and can still carry on with their ideological and personal differences to this very moment in time, how would the 75% of Syria’s inhabitants, who are below the age of 25, who have no memories to guide them in this regard and who have been brainwashed at home, at school and in the streets, and rendered absolutely apathetic, fearful and compliant with regard to the existing authority, be it political, social, economic and/or religious, how would they feel and think about the current going-ons in Lebanon, in Syria, in Palestine? Who should they blame? Who would they support? How would they show it? And what would they make of the heretical dissenting writings of someone like me?

The answers are all too obvious, of course, and all too unfortunate. Unless we can make some real breakthroughs that can help us deliver a different message to this particular segment of the populace, demography in our part of the world will continue to be on the side of tyranny, and our children will continue to be the fodder thereof and the pawns of its wars. We have to carve a space for dissent and heresy, no matter how unpopular they may seem at first, no matter how sanguine. We have to plant seeds of doubt now, so they may flourish later. For, the real battle ahead of us has always been generational, and our point of view is not likely to become popular anytime soon. But persistence does occasionally pay off, even in the Middle East.

The Islamic Reformation!

2006-07-30T03:16:00.000-04:00

While Graham Fuller, former top Middle East analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency, is quoted in this article as saying that "Resistance rises above sectarianism" in the region at the moment, al-Arabiya.net is reporting on rising sectarian tensions among Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon at this stage, in particular on rising Sunni resentment and suspicions with regard to the increasing role of the Shiites in Lebanon, and the role of Hezbollah in instigating the current round of conflict. So, what’s really going on here?

I think that people really have to differentiate here between how the Arab Street is reacting to the conflict, and how the conflict is perceived in Lebanon itself. People who bear the brunt of conflict and pay the ultimate price have a slightly more nuanced view of it. And when there is history of sectarianism involved, the difference in perception is bound to straddle sectarian fault-lines as well.

But there is something even deeper at work here. The region is being rocked to its foundation through a variety of forces and agents, including US intervention. This is definitely bound to produce some sectarian manifestations. But, then, the region has been exposed and bombarded by modern values, culture, ideologies and trappings for a period ranging 1-2 centuries depending on where you are in the region and what part of the country involved you happen to belong to. This has served to complicate things immensely, leading to the emergence of moderates and radicals of all shapes and sizes and across the political spectrum. All the while, the interests of the different players and entities involved are in constant flux. Indeed, an organization might simultaneously be conservative and radical in its stances depending on the issue involved, whether it is political, social or economic, and whether it is purely domestic or involves certain regional and international actors.

For instance, the Assads of Syria are conservatives with regard to political and economic reform, as this might upset their power base and erode their control over the country, but they are, for a variety of reason, including the desire to divert their people’s attention from the internal situation, quite radical in their stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and US regional interventionism. Indeed, they don’t seem capable of compromising here for fear of internal repercussions. For this reason, the Assads are willing to support a host of actors on the basis of their degree of adventurism and opposition to Israel and US policies, regardless of their actual ideologies and sectarian backgrounds. Alliances of conveniences are the name of the game these days and will be for a long time to come. For the entire region is in flux.

Indeed, the most hoped for Islamic Reformation could not have assumed any other guise than the current confusion taking place at this stage. New loyalties, identities, patterns of belonging will continue to emerge and interact with older ones in the variety of ways, ranging from the most accommodative and pragmatic to the most puritan and rejectionist, in a desperate attempt to root themselves in this rough terrain. (Was the situation really that different in Europe during the heydays of its reformation?)

In this, issues such as the Arab-Israeli Conflict, US intervention, globalization, energy politics, developmental issues, etc., and concepts such as resistance, integration, modernization, democratization, human rights, civil society, transparency, accountability, good governance and of course, Islam, will play both the role of catalysts and of measuring sticks for how much advance or retreat is made. Uncertainty with regard to the final outcome will color our lives for the next few decades, albeit we are already moving as though on a hyper-drive.

The Historic Opportunity!

2006-07-29T16:36:00.000-04:00

What is this historic opportunity that Nasrallah is speaking of? Is it the ability to “free our people and every inch of our land?” Or is it that lingering dream/desire to see Israel destroyed and brought to its knees? For once “the Israeli people lose their confidence in their weak and decrepit army, the foundation of the Israeli state will collapse.”

Whatever the case may be, a better and united Lebanon will not be the thing that will emerge at the end of it all. Sectarian schisms and communal identities ion the New Lebanon will be stronger than they have ever been, and some form of accounting for what has taken place will be sought and mandated by all actors. Meanwhile the Assads of Syria with their misplaced preoccupation with Lebanon rather than the Golan will be on the look-out for a new inroad back into the lost dominion. Indeed, for now and forever, to the vultures belong the spoils.

But while everybody is preoccupied with spoils, the fabric of our countries is deteriorating. The New Middle East will most surely be a more violent and fractious one than the Old Middle East, and much more profane.

Hezbollah’s “Resilience” Fuels Israeli Determination!

2006-07-28T23:32:00.000-04:00

The tougher things get for the Israelis at this stage, the more determined they will be to destroy Hezbollah. This is indeed developing into an existential war for Israel.

After all, what is Hezbollah from an Israeli perspective? Well, it is clearly an Islamist organization that, by the very nature of its ideology, still refuses to acknowledge Israeli’s right to exist, and still subscribes to the most vile of anti-Semitic myths around, including the blood libel and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. In fact, Manar TV aired a TV series it itself had produced dealing with these issues very (unfortunately most of the actors were Syrians).

Moreover, even after the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, Hezbollah raised the issues of the Shebaa Farm, despite the fact that they are not covered by UN Resolutions dealing with Lebanon, and the fact that they actually represent a disputed territory between Syria and Lebanon. This gave an excuse for Hezbollah to keep its weapons and go on living up to its ideology by attacking Israel. The fact that Hezbollah’s leadership might have ulterior motivations in this regard, related to their desire to strengthen the organization’s position vis-à-vis other communities in Lebanon, by adding a military dimension to the existing demographic one, and the fact that by adhering to claims of Shebaa’s Lebanese character, Hezbollah is serving the interests of one of its chief supporters and arms suppliers in the region, Syria, make the situation even worse, as it brings in considerations not related to the Arab-Israeli conflict per se to weigh in heavily on Israel and its security. Factor in Hezbollah's link to Iran, its supreme backer and financier, and the current domestic and foreign entanglements of the Mullas regime, and the situation becomes even more urgent.

As such, it is not just Hezbollah’s ideological predilections that makes it dangerous from an Israeli perspective, its geopolitical alliances and its internal calculations and ambitions within the region and within Lebanon itself makes it a source of danger and concern as well.

And now it has shown that it has plenty of missiles, the know-how and the will to use them, and the ability to resist a ground attack like no other Arab army has done before. So, what could Hezbollah do, many Israeli strategists must be wondering by now, if it were given even more time to develop its potential? Can Israel really feel secure with such an organization along its borders?

Indeed, now that Hezbollah has amply demonstrated its strength, Israelis have more reasons to want to fight and destroy it now, before it is too late. Indeed, this was the goal from the very beginning, judging by the kind of rhetoric employed at the time by Israeli officials. Still, for some unfathomable reason, Israeli leaders seemed to have anticipated an easier time of it. Just as Hezbollah seems to have miscalculated the size and nature of Israeli reaction to its operation, so did Israeli military leaders misjudge the amount of initial and long-term investments they need to make to achieve their stated goals in Lebanon.

But the events of the last few days seem to have jolted many of these leaders and they now seem to be more aware of the complicated and arduous nature of the challenges ahead, and more determined.

No. This battle is not winding down. It is, in fact, just beginning, human costs for all sides notwithstanding. And should it drag out for long, its regionalization will become all but inevitable, the original intentions of the instigators notwithstanding as well.

Please Do Talk to the Moron!

2006-07-28T22:42:00.000-04:00

David Lesch, Thomas Friedman, Warren Christopher and Edward Luttwak (who had enough dignity to actually beg), all want the US to talk to the Assads of Syria in order to help contain Hezbollah and the threat a conflagration in Lebanon poses to regional stability.

On the other hand, French President, Jacques Chirac, and head of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Martin Indyk, are advising against this course of action, arguing that this will come as a reward to the very people responsible for the current mayhem.

So, what should the current US administration do? And how should we in the Syrian opposition feel about it?

Well, I say that the US should indeed talk to the Assads, just to get this thing out of their system, and I think that we, members of the opposition, should feel quite safe in this regard, because the possibility of the two sides actually reaching any agreement, and the possibility that these talks could actually last more than a few hours to begin with are as realistic as Ralph Nader’s chances of becoming the next President of the United States.

So, Condy, please do talk to the Morons in Damascus. You only risk developing a greater sympathy for our plight as a people.

Blogging and the Future of Democracy in the Arab World!

2006-07-27T17:33:00.000-04:00

The following is a summary of a talk I recently gave at a State Department conference on Blogging and Democracy. I thought it would e of some interest here.

Many people across the world are still dubious of the possible avenues and channels for communications and expression that blogging can pave. But that is not surprising really. People have given a similar lukewarm response to the Internet itself at one point, not too long ago. But who can dispute the power and impact of the internet now?

In reality, and as the various talks and presentations made at the Conference on Blogging and Democracy have amply demonstrated, people just need time to get used to the possibilities that can be are afforded them by blogging. No one is the wiser in this regard than the current generation of teens and 20-somethings, with many of whom already getting hooked on such blogging varieties as MySpace, YouTube, Flickr and many such similar sites that have already been integrated into teen and youth cultures. Now, these may not be “hardcore” blogs, that is, they may not necessarily tackle significant political and social issues in a journalistic or analytical manner. Still, it is only natural to expect that those who will get used to these media as means for self-expression, communicating and networking are more likely, in due course of time, to develop a greater affinity and respect for the more socially and politically pertinent blogs.

As such, and for all the aura that seems to surround the medium today, we are, in fact, only witnessing the birth of blogging. Its real impact on our lives is something that we will not really see or appreciate for a few more years to come.

And if blogging is still in its infancy on the international arena, it is indeed still in the embryonic phase in the Arab World, where bloggers number in the thousands only in comparison to the few hundred thousands of bloggers in Iran, for instance. Still, Arab bloggers have already generated some noise and news.

In Egypt, they took active part in organizing the Kefaya movement and its various anti-regime activities and protests. In Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf, they already managed to break certain religious taboos and have managed to empower a number of female voices, enough of them, in fact, to show that many women have indeed established their own socially dissident subculture in that conservative part of the Middle East. Some bloggers, especially in Bahrain and Egypt, have already been imprisoned for the views they expressed on their blogs, with some still waiting to be released.

All this shows that the internet and blogging in particular is destined to play an important role in the social and political transformations currently taking place in the region. The democratic forces are bound to continue on using it for intercommunicating and for organization, but so will the radical forces a well including the Islamists and the ultranationalists.

By itself, then, blogging is merely a tool, and unless a consistent effort is applied to transform it into a too of democratization, other actors on the scene are liable to use it for exactly the opposite purpose, namely to advance a more militant and reactionary agenda. Regime ideologues might also be able to use it as another medium for propaganda, but unless the regimes set on reinventing their worn-out political discourse and stratagems, the medium is unlikely to be of any help. By its nature, blogging is a dynamic medium, creatures of a stultified culture are not exactly the kind that can make adequate use of it. The real competition, therefore, is likely to take place, and is indeed taking place, between independent individuals and groups of various political and social stripes.

Betting on the Assads

2006-07-26T17:09:00.000-04:00

Can the Assads still deliver any goods in Lebanon? Can they help reign in Hezbollah? Can they really afford to turn against it, to betray it, and Iran, at this stage seeing that they played a very active role in all but canonizing Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasarllah, and Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? Will there be no consequences to suffer on their behalf should they switch off the nationalist rhetoric and begin sounding a more US-friendly tone having taken such an active part in whipping up anti-US sentiments in their country and across the region in the first place? Can they afford to join the ranks of those Arab regimes, deemed cowardly and traitorous by the Arab Street, especially the Syrian Street, at a time when their sole claim to legitimacy in the country seems to rest on the adhering to certain “national constants” that will make settling for anything less than the Perfect Deal akin to suicide?

For indeed, the search for the Perfect Deal, one that includes the return of the Golan in its entirety and lays no conditions on Syria’s involvement in Lebanon or its internal developments and conditions, was the object of obsession for the Assads for all their years in power. Indeed, they almost got that deal with Rabin, and again Barak, but almost is the watch word here. For almost is not enough, and almost was also something that could only be given to the likes of Hafiz al-Assad. His pale avatar, Bashar, does not qualify. But then, don’t ask me, ask President Chirac who, up until recently, was on speaking terms with Bashar until the latter turned his back on him. This is how Chirac puts it:

"Referring to the Syrian president, Chirac said: "There was a time when I spoke to Bashar al-Assad. I spoke to his father. To hide nothing from you, this dialogue came to an end. It was he who wanted it.”

President Chirac also added that the kind of regime embodied by Assad cannot be interested in peace and security in the region.

And yet, there are indeed those who are still willing to bet on Bashar, including some Israeli figures, most recently Edward Luttwak, who want him to get them out of a potential mess in Lebanon. But, those who bet on morons are even greater morons. And those who think Syrian troops will be able to set the Lebanese house in order again or that they will be welcomed back by anyone, are beyond any hope.

For having an extensive experience in destroying and pillaging a country does not necessarily give you any insight on how to put it back together again. Moreover, there will be enough opposition across the sectarian and social spectrum in Lebanon to any direct dabbling by Syria in Lebanese affairs to render the whole new venture short and disastrous for the Syrians.

Hell, even Hezbollah would not want to go back under anyone’s mantle again. Freedom is too sweet, and being your own man, for Nasrallah, is much more prestigious and profitable.

As for the Assads, even the Perfect Deal at this stage will not be able to protect them from the consequences of betrayal.

Let's face it. The die has been cast. All actors have already made their choices. All other bets are off for now. The Israelis will have to muddle through whatever quagmire they are creating for themelves in Lebanon for a few more weeks, if not months. The Assads will have to stick to their choice of allies, or find themselves hopelessly alone and perhaps, six feet under. The time for negotiations have long passed. The Assads have long become hostage to their own allies, their own policies, their own tactics and their own avarice. They are hardly in a position to help themselves now not to mention anyone else.

Meanwhile, the Americans and the French will have to muster enough will to put together a little package that can save Israel from itself, and Lebanon from everybody else keeping it as a viable entity. They will also have to keep the Assads, for all their dabbling and penchant for trouble-making, under lock and key, or risk having another country in the Middle East blow up in their face, which might just happen no matter what anyone does anyway, as the die might have been cast in this regard as well, the smuggness of Syrian officials and analysts notwithstanding.

Taunting Lions!

2006-07-26T15:13:00.000-04:00

The repeated calls on the Assads of Syria to allow for cross-border operations to take place in the Golan may not be as “innocent” and naïve as they might seem at first. Indeed, when they are issued by an opposition figure like Mamoun al-Homsi, such calls are actually meant to taunt and gaud the Assads into taking a course of action that better fits their very nationalistic rhetoric, but one, nonetheless, that will bring about a confrontation that the Assads know very well that they cannot handle and that will only serve to expose them for the national frauds that they are. As such, calling for the liberation of the Golan is “smart” politics at this stage.

The only problem with it, of course, is that they, the Assads, are so addict on brinkmanship that they may find it necessary, if such calls were reiterated widely and frequently enough in the country, and are adopted by no lesser figures than the likes of Salahuddin Kiftaro, the son of the country’s late Grand Mufti, who had been first to issue such a call anyway, to take the gamble and allow for some operations to indeed take place across the border regardless of the consequences, which are bound to be quite dire, as we can all imagine. Or, the entire issue might simply be taken out of their hand all together and be forced upon the scene by some hapless nationalist or Islamist group acting on its own initiative. For the Assads have been playing with this fire for quite a while now that the contagion could easily spread and blow up in all our faces. In both cases, the country will end up paying a terrible price.

As such, taunting the lions could have as serious repercussions for the future of the country as leaving them be. All politics in the region today is dirty and costly politics and all possibilities ahead of us seem to be bad. The search for the lesser evil should begin at earnest, before we are forced to indeed “settle” for Armageddon.

The Lord of Desolation!

2006-07-26T00:05:00.000-04:00

What will you do for your fifteen minutes of fame?

Well, Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah fame is busy celebrating the destruction of his country on various Arab TV channels, a development that is currently affording him the opportunity to prove his worth in the Arab Street as a hero of the national resistance.

Indeed, and as the Israelis continue to bombard Lebanon back to the Stone Age, killing more than 400 civilians so far (not counting the bodies still buried under the rubble) and causing more than 10 billion USD in damages, and counting, the turbaned symbol of our forever impending national salvation continues to promise us victory, a feat that will likely assume the form of personal survival, namely: his.

For the main difference between Islam and Christianity seems to lie in the nature of our messianic figures. The Christian Messiah goes to the cross to redeem the sins of the flock. Islamic Messiahs (plural is both necessary and factual), on the other hand, have always sent the flock to the cross for their sins. But, having had a long history of behaving in a manner similar to Islamic messiahs, Jewish leaders, seems to have come up with an ingenious compromise here, namely: sending other people, messiahs and all, to the cross for their sins, for these people’s particular sins, and for the sins of whoever happened to be in the neighborhood at the time. You can even bid to have your sins redeemed in the process.

So, as Nasrallah’s rockets poke occasional holes in Israeli buildings, and Israeli bombs often bringing down whole buildings on top of occasional Hezbollah fighters, the promised victory is threatening to assume the guise of a series of little defeats, adding up to a catastrophe of major proportions, that only the survival of our Lord of Desolation can help mask. But if our recent history has taught us anything is that much can indeed be swept under the turbans of our leaders, be they real or purely figurative, the turbans that is.

War Math!

2006-07-24T22:36:00.000-04:00

Amidst the current chaos in Lebanon, an interesting episode occurs and brings back to mind some of the things that are at stake in this entire tragedy – a foiled prison break involving the four security officers imprisoned on suspicion of involvement in orchestrating the Hariri assassination. While we have no reason to believe the speculations in the report that the entire episode was orchestrated by Syrian intelligence, but, it does indeed stand to reason to believe that Syria would have been at least the preliminary destination of these figures. Their failure must have saved the Syrian regime some undesired attention at this stage. Still, we cannot but wonder as to the sort of other clandestine activities that are currently taken place in Lebanon, benefiting from the current state of affairs. War crimes come in different guises.

On a related note, and as reminder of the kind of mayhem that the continuing erosion of central authority in the country can produce, we have a report here that highlights the relevance of complicated social and sectarian cleavages in this matter. It speaks of growing poor Shia encroachments onto plush Sunni suburbs and of the growing fears of the chadorization of the local mores, or, of a clash of mores. In other words, this is a story of the Shia and the poor coming home to roost.

Indeed, should the current offensive last longer and conditions continue to deteriorate, there are enough contradictions lingering and growing within the Lebanese society to plunge it into another round of civil mayhem. Perhaps, there are those in the region who are betting on this, for the more bright the Lebanese implosion is the more relevant and central their role would be.

Indeed, War has its own rather hard and disquieting calculations. In this, dissidents like me are easily outgunned, out-sleazed, and all but completely out-done. As we sink deeper and deeper into the quagmire of war and mayhem, liberal dissidents simultaneously take an even deeper plunge into irrelevance. Hell, we are bound to become objects of disdain and hatred. We have always been preaching against the national and the social mores, so how could we not be fifth columnists and agents of the Zionists and the West?

But this developments does not come as a compelte surprise for me. I have always suspected that the best that we can achieve at this stage is to simply survive, though I had dared wish and work for more just in case my cynicism was not as amply justified as I thought. Anyway, the odds are just too high for inaction. So, and while surviving, we also have to keep an eye on the future. Indeed, some vision and some planning will go along way in this regard, for very few actors on the scene tend to have any vision at all, or any real long-term plans. We, the dissidents, the democrats, the heretics of our modern day and age, should strive to fill that void.

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Tharwa Topic of the Week: Should the United States negotiate with Islamist groups?